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Zusammenfassung 
In unserem Alltag werden wir kognitiv sehr gefordert und sind auf kognitive Kontrolle 
angewiesen, die es uns erlaubt, flexibel und adaptiv zu handeln. Kognitive Kontrolle wird als 
zentral und generisch angesehen, wodurch sie erlaubt, Verhalten im Allgemeinen, unabhängig 
von der spezifischen zugrunde liegenden Situation, zu kontrollieren. Entsprechend ist kognitive 
Kontrolle per Definition amodal und sollte daher weder durch die sensorische Modalität der 
Reize noch durch die Modalität motorischer Reaktionen beeinflusst werden. 
Die Kernfrage der vorliegen Dissertation ist, ob die Idee amodaler kognitiver Kontrolle, 
die gegen modalitäts-spezifische Einflüsse abgeschirmt ist, überzeugt, gerade weil wir uns in 
einer multisensorischen Umgebung multimodal verhalten. Um diese Frage zu beantworten 
werden zunächst zentrale Modelle der kognitiven Kontrolle betrachtet. Jedoch beziehen diese 
Theorien entweder modalitäts-spezifische Einflüsse nicht mit ein oder schließen sie sogar 
explizit aus.  
Zur Untersuchung kognitiver Kontrollprozesse wurden verschiedene Paradigmen wie das 
Doppelaufgabenparadigma und das Aufgabenwechselparadigma entwickelt. In Doppelaufgaben 
bearbeiten die Probanden zwei zeitlich überlappende Aufgaben, was überlicherweise zu 
Leistungseinbußen (d.h. Doppelaufgaben-Kosten) im Vergleich zur Bearbeitung von 
Einzelaufgaben führt. In Studien konnte gezeigt werden, dass Doppelaufgabenkosten 
modalitätsspezifischen Einflüssen unterliegen. Genauer gesagt, dass Aufgaben mit visuellen 
Stimuli und manuellen Reaktionen (VM Aufgaben) in Kombination mit Aufgaben mit auditiven 
Stimuli und vokalen Reaktionen (AV Aufgaben) zu geringeren Kosten führen als auditiv-
manuelle (AM) Aufgaben kombiniert mit visuell-vokalen (VV) Aufgaben. Als Ursache dieses 
Effektes vermuten Stephan und Koch (2010) spezielle Modalitätskompatibilitätsbeziehungen 
beruhend auf der Ähnlichkeit zwischen der Modalität des Stimulus und der Modalität der 
reaktionsbezogenen sensorischen Konsequenzen. Zur näheren Untersuchung dieser 
Modalitätskompatibilität sowie der zugrundeliegenden Mechanismen wurde das 
Aufgabenwechselparadigma eingesetzt. Charakteristisch ist eine verminderte Leistung der 
Probanden bei Aufgabenwechseln im Vergleich zu Aufgabenwiederholungen (d.h. 
Wechselkosten). Die Mehrheit der Modelle zur Erklärung und Vorhersage von Wechselkosten 
berücksichtigen, wie Modelle zu Doppelaufgabenkosten, modalitätsspezifischen Aspekte nicht. 
In einer Reihe von Studien, die der vorliegen kumulativen Dissertation eingefügt sind, 
untersuchten Stephan und Koch (2010, 2011, 2014a, 2014b) sowie Stephan, Koch, Hendler und 
Huestegge (2013), inwiefern Wechselkosten modalitätsspezifischen Einflüssen unterliegen. Zu 
diesem Zweck wechselten Probanden entweder zwischen AV und VM Aufgaben 
 X 
 
(modalitätskompatiblen Aufgaben) oder zwischen AM und VV Aufgaben 
(modalitätsinkompatiblen Aufgaben). Die resultierenden Wechselkosten waren in der 
modalitätsinkompatiblen Bedingung signifikant höher als in der modalitätskompatiblen 
Bedingung.  
Als Ursache dieses Modalitätskompatibilitätseffekts werden ideomotorische 
Verbindungen zwischen der mentalen Repräsentation des Stimulus und den antizipierten 
Effekten der Reaktionen auf Modalitätsebene vermutet. Im Aufgabenwechsel verursachen diese 
ideomotorischen Verbindungen Crosstalk zwischen den parallel aktiv gehaltenen 
Aufgabenrepräsentationen (Aufgaben-Sets) und erhöhen dadurch die Wechselkosten. Dieser 
Crosstalk ist jedoch eher kurzlebig (Studie 1, Stephan & Koch, 2010). 
In Studie 4 (Stephan & Koch, 2014b) konnte gezeigt werden, dass die 
Modalitätskompatibilität auch Kongruenzeffekte beeinflusst. Da Kongruenzeffekte ebenfalls als 
Maß der Aufgabeninterferenz betrachtet werden, kann der Anstieg der Kosten in 
modalitätsinkompatiblen Aufgaben als konvergierende Evidenz für den Crosstalk-Mechanismus 
interpretiert werden. 
Ebenso wurde gezeigt, dass der Modalitätskompatibilitätseffekt in Aufgaben mit taktiler 
statt visueller Stimulation (d.h. kompatible taktil-manuelle Aufgaben und inkompatible taktil-
vokale Aufgaben) auftritt und dies den Kompatibilitätseffekt verstärkt (siehe Studie 3, Stephan & 
Koch, 2014a). In Studie 5 (Stephan et al., 2013) wurden zusätzlich Blickbewegungen als 
Reaktionsmodalität implementiert und es wurde gezeigt, dass die Reaktionsleistung durch 
Blickbewegungen auf visuelle und auditive Stimuli vergleichbar ist. Es scheint demnach, dass 
die Verwendung supramodaler Blickbewegungen gegen Crosstalk abschirmt.  
Des Weiteren wurde in Studie 2 (Stephan & Koch, 2011) untersucht, inwiefern das 
Auftreten von Crosstalk von der Verwendung räumlich kompatibler Aufgaben abhängt. Der 
Modalitätskompatibilitätseffekt zeigte sich jedoch auch in arbiträren, räumlich non-kompatiblen 
Aufgaben und scheint daher unabhängig von dieser Form der Kompatibilität zu sein. 
Insgesamt konnte mit Hilfe dieser Studien gezeigt werden, dass modalitätsspezifische 
Einflüsse, gemessen als Modalitätskompatibilitätseffekt, einen robusten Einfluss auf 
Wechselkosten haben. Die zu Grunde liegenden kognitiven Kontrollprozesse werden demnach 
ebenfalls durch diese modalitätsspezifischen Einflüsse mit determiniert und können nicht länger 
als gänzlich amodal angesehen werden. Viel mehr unterstreichen diese Studien die Wichtigkeit 
der Berücksichtigung möglicher modalitätsspezifischer Einflüsse. 
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1  Introduction 
In a land far far away…or in daily life we are confronted with a multitude of tasks which 
we execute in close succession or even at once. When driving home for example, we steer the 
car, observe traffic, think about what to cook for dinner and which groceries to get while 
answering questions asked by a passenger. Also external factors, such as sirens might force us to 
alternate to other tasks, like getting out of the way of an ambulance. As this example reveals, it is 
hardly possible to only focus on one task. We have to be flexible and switch between tasks or 
end up doing two things at once. Such situations also require us to perceive and process our 
multisensory world (e.g., streetlights requiring us to break, listening to the passenger) while 
trying to select the most accurate response out of a vast variety of possibilities in a wide range of 
modalities (i.e., breaking, accelerating, changing gear, responding to a question)
1
. Accordingly, 
daily life is cognitively highly demanding and we depend on cognitive control to enables us to 
stay flexible and adaptive while still being able to perform the currently required activity. 
 
2  Cognitive control 
Cognitive control is commonly understood to envelope cognitive processes like planning, 
decision making, monitoring, attention, inhibition of inappropriate behavior, mental flexibility, 
initiation of actions. In general, it allows the flexible and adaptive coordination, organization and 
control of our behavior and thoughts, depending on the demands of the current, possibly 
complex or new, situation in accordance with internal goals (see, e.g., Collette, Hogge, Salmon, 
& Van der Linden, 2006; Damasio, 1995; Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, Howerter, & 
Wager, 2000; Shallice, 1988; Stuss et al., 2005; Stuss & Benson, 1986). Put differently, 
cognitive control is an umbrella term, describing the processes enabling the mind to control itself 
(see also Logan, 2003) or more directly our will (James, 1890) and therefore allowing us to do 
what we want or have to.  
Cognitive control has also been referred to as the Supervisory Attentional System (SAS; 
Norman & Shallice, 1986), the Central Executive (Baddeley, 1986), Executive Functions (e.g., 
Miyake et al., 2000) or Control Processes (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968). Regardless of the specific 
term(s) used, this theoretical construct is commonly understood as central and generic, thus 
enabling the control of behavior in general, independent of the mostly very specific underlying 
situation. Accordingly, cognitive control is per definition amodal and thus characterized by “the 
                                                 
1 Vernacularly these situations are also referred to as multitasking (Lee & Taatgen, 2002; Pew & Mavor, 1998; Salvucci, 2005). 
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lack of concern with domain-specific details”, (Monsell, 1996, p.100), such as the sensory 
modalities or the modalities of motor action. 
The central question of this dissertation is whether the core idea of cognitive control 
being amodal and shielded against modality-specific influences is convincing, regarding that 
behavior is multimodal within a multisensory environment. In order to answer this question, an 
overview of exemplary central accounts of cognitive control is given with specific regard 
towards their amodal characteristics, followed by a description of classical tasks and paradigms 
used to study cognitive control. Based on studies providing empirical evidence for modality-
specific influences (assessed as effect of modality compatibility, see sections 2.4, 3.3), possible 
explanations for these effects are discussed. 
 
2.1  Models of cognitive control 
Almost 40 years ago Norman and Shallice (1986) introduced their influential attentional 
control model, integrating automatic and intentional action control. They postulated that actions 
can be initiated automatically (contention scheduling) as well as intentionally and goal-oriented 
(supervisory attentional system, SAS). In routine situations and for habitual behavior, the 
contention scheduling mechanism automatically selects the action (i.e., stored as schema) 
activated to the highest degree by a certain trigger condition. During goal-oriented, controlled 
behavior a second control mechanism, the SAS, is necessary. The SAS modulates the selection 
of schemas through contention scheduling by additionally activating or inhibiting a schema 
depending on its conformity with a superior goal. Contention scheduling or the SAS were not 
discussed regarding modality-specific influences and specifically the SAS, reflecting cognitive 
control, is rather understood as being driven by a superior central goal than by the specific 
peripheral conditions or circumstances, such as modalities.  
Miyake et al. (2000) focused on providing an empirical basis for the development of 
theories concerning the underlying organizational structure of cognitive control and its function 
in complex cognition. Specifically, they focused on the interrelation of three specific cognitive 
functions: inhibition of automatic or dominant response patterns and distractor interference 
(Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Miyake et al., 2000); updating and monitoring (i.e., also 
manipulation) of working memory representations (Miyake et al., 2000); and finally shifting 
between different tasks, operations, or mental sets (see Monsell, 1996). Based on their empirical 
results, Miyake et al. (2000) proposed that inhibition, monitoring, and shifting are distinct and 
separable functions. In line with previous theories, all three cognitive control functions are 
defined on an abstract, amodal level.  
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Another approach to study cognitive control is to focus on the neural correlates. Since the 
last century it has been suspected that the prefrontal cortex (PFC) is fundamental for controlling 
and coordinating our actions to achieve an internal goal (Miller & Cohen, 2001; Tombu et al., 
2011; Wager, Jonides, Smith, & Nichols, 2005). Miller and Cohen (2001), for example, assumed 
that internal goals and opportunities to achieve them are represented in the PFC, making it 
essential for cognitive control (see also e.g., Passingham, 1993; Wise, Murray, & Gerfen, 1996). 
Inspired by Desimone and Duncan´s (1995) model of visual attention, they proposed that control 
is achieved by selectively biasing the gain of sensory or motor neurons, as well as of internal 
states (e.g., memories, emotions etc.) engaged in goal-directed behavior. Through this “biased 
competition” neural activity is guided along the appropriate pathways in order to establish the 
pertinent mappings between input, thoughts or internal stages, and output (Miller & Cohen, 
2001). Even though the sensory and response modalities, regarded as input and output, are part 
of this model, their influence is rather marginalized and inferior regarding that cognitive control 
is subserved by the superior PFC, modulating behavior top-down in accordance with internal 
goals and intentions.  
In respective neuro-imaging research modality-specific influences have rather been 
neglected until a recent fMRI study raised the issue of (a)modality of the PFC (Tamber-Rosenau, 
Dux, Tombu, Asplund, & Marois, 2013). It was demonstrated that during response selection, 
commonly agreed to be the crucial generic, modality-unspecific processing stage, the 
dorsolateral PFC and regions of the anterior insula were insensitive to modality-specific task 
information. However, most frontal and parietal areas of the PFC were sufficiently sensitive 
towards modality-specific information (i.e., coding modalities).  
Related models also emphasizing generic and amodel cognitive control processes are, for 
example, Baddeleys working memory model (Baddeley, 2003) and models of information 
processing (e.g., Shannon, 1948; Sanders, 1998). Whereas the working memory model 
(Baddeley, 2003) includes modality-specific components (visuo-spatial sketchpad, phonological 
loop), its core, the central executive, is characterized as a modality-free component, which is 
limited in capacity. Moreover, also models of information processing (e.g., Shannon, 1948; 
Sanders, 1998) differentiate three stages of processing: perception, central decision/response 
selection, and response execution. The central stage (i.e., control decision/response selection) 
serves to translate (S-R translation; Sanders, 1998) the modality-specific perceptual (sensory) 
codes into modality-specific motor codes and is assumed to be generic and amodal (i.e., content-
blind). 
 
 -4- 
2.2  Models of cognitive control in dual tasks 
The general assumption of an amodal generic central processing stage strongly influenced 
and inspired later models such as the most influential dual-task model, the Response-Selection-
Bottleneck (RSB) model (Telford, 1931; Welford, 1952). Developed to account for costs arising 
when two or more tasks have to be performed simultaneously (i.e., dual task costs), and thus to 
study the underlying cognitive control processes, this model assumes three cognitive processing 
stages namely: perceptual processing/stimulus encoding, response selection, and response 
execution. While perceptual processing and response execution can be performed in parallel with 
a second task, processing of the second task has to be withheld until response selection of the 
first task is completed (Pashler, 1990, 1994a, 1994b). Pashler (1994a) argued that the 
Psychological Refractory Period (PRP) effect2 provides evidence for the existence of this 
invariant, structurally anchored central bottleneck during response selection. Although this view 
was supported by numerous studies (e.g., Lien & Proctor, 2002; Pashler & Johnston, 1989), there 
have also been critical results the RSB model cannot account for (see, e.g., De Jong 1993; 
Schumacher et al., 2001, for further discussion).  
Alternative explanations for dual-task costs, also relying on restrictions due to the 
cognitive architecture, are provided by theories proposing a limitation of central capacity 
(Kahneman, 1973; Tombu & Jolicoeur, 2003). Kahneman (1973), for example, assumes a 
general limited mental resource, which can be divided flexibly between different tasks (or used 
for only one task). Tombu and Jolicoeur (2003) shared this idea but specified that only central 
processing stages, as opposed to other pre- and post-central processing stages, are limited in 
capacity.  
The central bottleneck model (e.g., Pashler, 1994a, 1994b) and the theories of limited 
(central) capacity (Kahneman, 1973, 1992; Tombu & Jolicoeur, 2003) both postulate that central 
processes use generic, task content-independent (i.e., modality-independent)  resources. Provided 
there is no peripheral interference (e.g., due to physical or contextual overlap, see, e.g., 
Kornblum, Hasbroucq, & Osman, 1990) between stimuli or responses, dual-task costs should 
reflect the duration of central processes, resembling the underlying cognitive control processes. 
In contrast to the previous structural accounts, the Executive Process Interactive Control 
(EPIC) model developed by Meyer and Kieras (1997a, 1997b) suggests that dual-task costs are 
due to voluntary strategic adaptation to the task specific affordances. Hence, under adaptive 
executive control (i.e., cognitive control), two or more tasks could be performed simultaneously 
                                                 
2 The PRP-effect denotes the strict dependency of performance in a second task on the degree of temporal overlap with a first 
task (Carrier & Pashler, 1995; Logan & Gordon, 2001; Pashler & Johnston, 1989; Telford, 1931). 
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and response selection of these competing tasks can overlap temporally (Schumacher et al., 
1999). The strategic theories assume that the duration of central processes influences the 
duration of the strategic (voluntary) bottleneck. Meanwhile, direct modality-specific (i.e., task 
content-specific) influences on central operations are excluded by assuming no direct interaction 
between the specific stimulus-response translations (for further discussion see also Hazeltine, 
Ruthruff, & Remington, 2006).  
 
2.3  Models considering modality-specific influences 
While the majority of dual-task accounts focused on central, amodal mechanisms of 
cognitive control, some accounts did consider modalities. Opposing the idea of one central 
amodal resource, multiple resource theories assume that dual-task costs arise because tasks 
compete for multiple domain-specific resources (Navon & Gopher, 1979; Wickens, 1980, 2002). 
Wickens (1984) proposed a three-dimensional taxonomy of these resources differentiating 
between: processing stage (encoding, central processing, response-execution), central codes 
(verbal vs. spatial), and modalities (visual, auditory, manual, vocal). Dual-task costs are defined 
by the degree to which two tasks draw on the same resources along these three dimensions. 
Hence, no conflict would arise when the tasks involve different modalities (i.e., different 
stimulus and response modalities) and central codes. In addition, Wickens, Sandry, and Vidulich 
(1983) proposed specific compatibility relations between the modalities and central codes along 
the three dimensions (i.e., between visual input - spatial task - manual response and between 
auditory input - verbal task - vocal output). Even though this idea considers modality-specific 
influences on dual-task performance, the compatibility relation is restricted to an overlap across 
all three dimensions. Moreover, the concept of resources was defined circularly, by assuming 
that resources were shared because there were dual-task costs and dual task costs arise because 
of shared resources (Navon, 1984). Furthermore, the rather sparse empirical evidence tested on 
primarily complex tasks, even though it has been pointed out that simple stimulus-response tasks 
are better suited to investigate the underlying mechanisms in dual-task performance (e.g., Koch, 
2008; Meyer & Kieras, 1997a; Pashler, 1994a).  
Another approach considering influences of task-specific content in terms of an 
interrelation between tasks is based on the notion of crosstalk introduced by Navon (1984, 1985) 
and Navon and Miller (1987). The core idea was that a task causes output which is accidently 
transferred to the competing task and thus interferes with processing of this task, in turn causing 
a degradation of dual-task performance (Navon & Miller, 1987). The crosstalk potential is 
directly determined by the degree of overlap across tasks. This overlap can refer to overlapping 
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peripheral motor commands (e.g., in bimanual coordination, see, e.g., Spijkers, Heuer, Steglich, 
& Kleinsorge, 2000) and has also been discussed regarding overlapping central processes (e.g., 
central operations or information codes, see Hirst & Kalmar, 1987; Koch, 2009; Koch & Prinz, 
2002; Logan & Schulkind, 2000). Similar to the multiple resources account, (crosstalk) 
interference would not be predicted if two tasks involve different modalities (i.e., peripheral 
crosstalk) and if central operations differ essentially (central crosstalk).  
A more general approach that can be related to modality-specific issues in a dual-task 
context is the ideomotor view. The ideomotor perspective emphasizes our intentions and regards 
actions as internally driven, goal-directed behaviour, which is controlled by the anticipation of its 
intended effects (e.g., James, 1890; Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001). Various 
versions of the theory share the core idea that actions are represented as the anticipated mental 
image of the sensory feedback they produce and that this perceptual image or idea of an action is 
sufficient to instigate this action (e.g., Carpenter, 1852; James, 1890; for reviews see Shin, 
Proctor, & Capaldi, 2010; Stock & Stock, 2004). Based on this theory, Greenwald (1970a, 
1970b, 1972) reasoned that the extent to which a stimulus resembles the sensory feedback of a 
response (e.g., saying a word in response to hearing it) should affect performance. In line with 
this idea, Greenwald (1972) introduced the notion of ideomotor compatibility, stating that stimuli 
are most compatible to responses when they resemble the respective anticipated sensory effects 
(e.g., saying “ONE” in response to hearing “one”). Empirical evidence for this claim stems from 
dual-task studies reporting reduced interference with ideomotor tasks (see, e.g., Greenwald, 
1970a, 1970b, 1972; Greenwald & Shulman, 1973). The original ideomotor idea (James, 1890, 
1950) has also inspired the development of other theoretical frameworks such as the theory of 
event coding (TEC, Hommel et al., 2001) and research regarding anticipated action effects (e.g., 
Kunde, Koch, & Hoffmann, 2004). 
Nevertheless, the notion of ideomotor compatibility is highly specific, as it is restricted to 
the exact match between a specific response and a specific stimulus (e.g., saying “ONE” in 
response to hearing “A” would not be ideomotor compatible). Stephan and Koch (2010, see 
enclosed Study I) extended this idea of ideomotor compatibility by assuming an additional, more 
general compatibility relation referring to similarity of the stimulus modality and the modality of 
the response-related sensory consequences, namely modality compatibility. According to this 
definition, saying “ONE” in response to hearing the letter “A” would be modality compatible 
because the stimulus modality (auditory) would match the modality of the sensory effect of the 
response (i.e., hearing “ONE”). 
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2.4  Empirical evidence for modality-specific influences in dual-tasks 
Along the lines of most models discussed above, traditionally research focused on 
central, amodal mechanisms of cognitive control. Yet, more recent research raised the issue of 
modality-specificity of cognitive control. If central mechanisms, reflecting cognitive control 
processes necessary to coordinate two or more tasks are generic and amodal, then the modalities 
involved in the individual tasks should not determine dual-task interference. A possibility to test 
this hypothesis is by investigating whether dual-task costs are determined by the mapping 
between the different stimulus and response modalities of the tasks involved. Following this 
logic, a series of studies was conducted demonstrating that tasks combining visual stimulation 
with manual responses (VM task) and auditory stimulation with vocal responses (AV task) (i.e., 
modality compatible tasks) could be performed in parallel after sufficient practice, whereas 
visual-vocal (VV) tasks combined with auditory-manual (AM) tasks (i.e., modality incompatible 
tasks) resulted in significant dual task costs even after extensive practice (e.g., Hazeltine & 
Ruthruff, 2006; Hazeltine, Ruthruff, & Remington, 2006; Ruthruff, Hazeltine, & Remington, 
2006; Stelzel, Schumacher, Schubert, & D´Esposito, 2006; see Figure 1).  
 
 
  Figure 1. Mapping of stimulus modality to response modality in modality compatible (green) and 
  modality incompatible (red) tasks.  
 
Hazeltine et al. (2006) and Ruthruff et al. (2006) proposed that this advantage for certain 
modality mappings relies on preferred modality-specific processing pathways stemming from 
natural binding preferences between certain stimulus and response modalities (Hazeltine et al., 
2006). However, while in the initial study tasks with extreme temporal overlap were used (see 
also Stelzel et al., 2006), the influence of modality compatibility on dual-task performance was 
replicated in a subsequent study using conditions with non-simultaneous stimulus presentation 
(Ruthruff et al., 2006).  
Nevertheless, the empirical evidence for modality-specific influences on cognitive 
control processes was restricted to variants of the dual-task paradigm, and thus specifically to 
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temporally overlapping tasks. Moreover, explaining this phenomenon by natural binding 
preferences seems rather descriptive and underspecified.  
 
3  Task switching 
Inspired by the findings of previous dual-task studies, Stephan and Koch (2010, 2011, 
2014a, 2014b, see enclosed Studies I-IV; see also Stephan, Koch, Hendler, & Huestegge, 2013, 
see enclosed Study V) conducted a series of task switching studies. These studies aimed at 
exploring modality-specific influences assessed as effects of modality compatibility in task 
switching. Besides demonstrating possible phenomenon-specific constraints including different 
stimulus or response modalities, the major motivation was to uncover and specify the 
mechanism(s) underlying the modality specific influences in mixed task situations. 
 
3.1  Models on task switching 
As emphasized earlier, cognitive control allows mental flexibility and adaptivity to direct 
our behavior towards higher goals. In cognitive psychology task switching, next to dual-tasks, 
has become a major paradigm to study the mechanisms of cognitive control (see, e.g., Allport, 
Styles, & Hsieh, 1994; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; see, e.g., Kiesel et al., 2010; Vandierendonck, 
Liefooghe, & Verbruggen, 2010, for reviews). In task switching, participants have to switch 
between two or more sequentially presented tasks. Typically, performance is impaired when a 
task switches from the preceding trial to the current trial compared to when a task is repeated in 
two successive trials. These performance costs in RT and error rate have been termed “switch 
costs” (see, e.g., Allport et al., 1994; Meiran, 1996; Rogers & Monsell, 1995).  
The task-switching paradigm can be employed to investigate the mechanisms and 
dynamics underlying our ability to adopt and flexibly change or maintain task sets. A task set is 
the abstract cognitive representation of a task (Rogers & Monsell, 1995). It comprises different 
components necessary to proceed from stimulus encoding to response execution, including the 
task-relevant set of stimuli and responses, as well as the corresponding set of stimulus-response 
mapping rules essential to specify a certain task goal (e.g., Allport et al., 1994; Meiran, 2000a; 
Monsell, 2003; Kiesel et al., 2010)
3
.  
A first variant of this paradigm was introduced almost 90 years ago (Jersild, 1927). But 
this paradigm has only sporadically been applied (Spector & Biederman, 1976) until, more than 
                                                 
3 Please note that a task set has also been described as a set of control parameters (e.g., prioritizing certain stimulus features to 
biasing response selection; Logan & Gordon, 2001) or as being composed of multiple stimulus and response sets (Meiran, 
2000a). 
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70 year later, Allport et al. (1994) and Rogers and Monsell (1995) revived this methodology and 
stimulated researchers` interest. Since then task switching has evolved into an exceptionally 
active field of research inspiring the design of different experimental methods, uncovering 
corresponding phenomena, as well as the development of different theories on the origin of these 
phenomena in order to gain a better understanding of cognitive control (for further details see the 
respective reviews, e.g., Kiesel et al., 2010; Vandierendonck et al., 2010).  
It would be beyond the scope of the present work to discuss the multitude of theoretical 
accounts. Instead a focus is put on the two main perspectives, namely the reconfiguration view 
(Rogers & Monsell, 1995) and the interference view (Allport et al., 1994), because the majority 
of task switching accounts shares, at least in part, either one or both of these perspectives
4
. The 
following sections will outline an overview of these two main streams of theoretical 
development, also regarding the aspect of possible modality-specific influences.  
 
3.1.1  Reconfiguration view 
The reconfiguration account originally suggested by Rogers and Monsell (1995), and 
other two-stage models of task reconfiguration developed, for example, by Rubinstein, Meyer, 
and Evans (2001) and Meiran (1996; see also Meiran, 2000a, 2000b) share the core idea that 
switch costs reflect the duration of cognitive control processes needed to reconfigure the 
cognitive system in accordance to the task set of the upcoming task in switch trials. This task set 
reconfiguration can be understood as updating of goals or task rules included in the task sets 
through reinstatement of the currently relevant task set or its retrieval from long-term memory 
(Monsell, Yeung, & Azuma, 2000; see also Mayr & Kliegl, 2000; Rubinstein et al., 2001; Sohn 
& Anderson, 2001). In case of a task repetition, the relevant task set is still active and therefore 
reconfiguration is unnecessary. It is assumed that task set reconfiguration consists of two-stages. 
The first, endogenous stage is initiated prior to stimulus onset directly after execution of the 
previous response. The second, exogenous stage is initiated by the imperative stimulus itself and 
can therefore only proceed after stimulus presentation (see also, Monsell, 2003). Interestingly, 
the control mechanisms of cognitive reconfiguration are essentially amodal as they refer to the 
reconfiguration of abstract goals or task rules independent of the specific modalities involved in 
the individual tasks (Logan & Gordon, 2001; Monsell, 2003).  
 
                                                 
4 More recent theoretical development does not seem to regard the two main accounts as mutually exclusive and focuses more on 
the integration of these views (see, e.g., Gilbert & Shallice, 2002; Meiran, 2000a, 2000b; Meiran, Chorev, & Sapir, 2000; 
Vandierendonck et al., 2010; Yeung & Monsell, 2003). 
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3.1.2  Interference view 
Switch costs can also be explained by interference accounts as for example suggested by 
Allport et al. (1994). They proposed that switch costs are a result of automatic carry-over effects 
of the preceding task. In detail, to perform a task, a task set is activated and this activation 
persists even after task execution. In case of a task switch, the persisting activation (proactively) 
interferes with the following task (and the corresponding task set) and thus it takes longer to 
select the response (Allport et al., 1994). Additionally, interference does not only result from 
previous activation (positive priming/competitor priming) of the currently irrelevant task set but 
also reflects prior inhibition (negative priming) of the currently relevant task set (e.g., Allport & 
Wylie, 1999; Koch, Gade, Schuch, & Philipp, 2010, for reviews). Like the reconfiguration 
accounts, interference accounts have neither been discussed with respect to modality-specific 
influences nor do they provide a basis to account for such influences. 
 
3.2  Do task sets contain modality-specific information? 
Despite the fundamental differences between the theoretical accounts for the origin of 
switch costs, it seems to be commonly agreed that in order to perform a certain task, the so called 
task set, needs to be adopted (e.g., Allport et al., 1994; Monsell, 2003; Pashler, 2000; for reviews 
see Kiesel et al., 2010; Vandierendonck et al., 2010).  
To allow for task switching, the task sets (of the two tasks) need to differ in at least one 
component (for a discussion on possible task set components, see, e.g., Philipp, & Koch, 2010). 
Traditional task switching studies employed for example judgment or categorization tasks, 
differing with regard to the applied task (or S-R) rule (e.g., magnitude vs. consonant/vowel 
judgment, see, e.g., Rogers & Monsell, 1995; parity vs. magnitude, see, e.g., Allport et al., 
1994), while using the same set of stimuli and/or responses. Moreover, it seems that 
traditionally, task switching studies were mainly restricted to visually presented stimuli followed 
by manual responses. Studies using other response modalities such as vocal responses (e.g., 
Allport et al., 1994; Waszak, Hommel, & Allport, 2003), or other stimulus modalities such as 
auditory stimuli (e.g., Hunt & Kingstone, 2004; Murray, de Santis, Thut, &Wylie, 2009) have 
been something of a rarity. 
However, more recently, the stimulus and response modalities have also been considered 
as relevant task set components and thus as essential for the mental representation of a task. 
Several studies demonstrated switch costs when switching between tasks either differing in 
stimulus modalities (e.g., Hunt & Kingstone, 2004; Lukas, Philipp, & Koch, 2010; Murray et al., 
2009; Quinlan & Hill, 1999; Sandhu & Dyson, 2013) or when switching between different 
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response modalities (e.g., Arrington, Altmann, & Carr, 2003; Philipp & Koch, 2005, 2010; 
Philipp, Weidner, Koch, & Fink, 2013; Sohn & Anderson, 2001).  
These studies solely considered the influence of modalities, by either manipulating the 
stimulus modality or the response modality, whereas the core of the task sets, the mapping 
between stimuli and responses at the level of modalities, has been neglected. In light of previous 
dual-task studies (e.g., Stelzel et al., 2006), demonstrating an influence of the specific mapping 
between stimulus modalities and response modalities on dual-task performance, it seems even 
more crucial to investigate whether switch costs are affected by the specific modality mappings 
used in the tasks. Yet, traditional accounts on the origin of switch costs, similar to accounts on 
the origin of dual-task costs, focused on central, amodal mechanisms of cognitive control. 
Demonstrating such modality-specific influences in task switching would challenge this core 
characteristic of cognitive control processes. Moreover, examining such influences in a task 
switching context would indicate they are a general phenomenon arising in situations where 
cognitive control is necessary in order to coordinate the performance of two or more tasks rather 
than that this phenomenon is restricted to very specific dual-task situations with temporally 
overlapping tasks (Hazeltine et al., 2006). 
 
3.3  Modality-specific influences in task switching 
In order to provide empirical evidence for modality-specific influences on cognitive 
control processes underlying task switching, Stephan & Koch (Studies I-IV; see also Study V) 
conducted a series of studies. In their initial task switching study (Study I), the same modalities 
and specifically the same modality mappings as in previous dual-task studies (see, e.g., Hazeltine 
et al., 2006; Stelzel et al., 2006; see also Huestegge & Hazeltine, 2011, for an overview) were 
employed. Accordingly, participants switched between two modality compatible tasks (i.e., a 
VM task and an AV task) and between two modality incompatible tasks (i.e., a VV task and an 
AM task) as depicted in Figure 1 (see also Table 1). Critically, both compatibility conditions 
employed tasks requiring the same cognitive operation. In both compatible tasks and in both 
incompatible tasks participants had to indicate whether the (visual or auditory) stimulus was 
presented on the left or right side by either saying the german word for “left” (“links”) or “right” 
(“rechts”) or by pressing a left or right key, respectively (for further details regarding the specific 
stimuli and responses see Tables 2 and 3). The modality compatible and the modality 
incompatible condition included the exact same stimuli and responses to increase overall 
comparability across conditions. Moreover, each task switch included switching the stimulus 
modality as well as the response modality, which has already been shown to produce 
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performance costs (see, e.g., Hunt & Kingstone, 2004; Lukas et al., 2010; Philipp & Koch, 2005, 
2010). Note that comparing the data of the individual tasks regarding modality compatibility is 
not feasible because the respective modality compatible and incompatible tasks would either 
involve different stimulus modalities (e.g., AV vs. VV) or different response modalities (e.g., 
AV vs. AM). To avoid this confound, data were collapsed across the two compatible and the two 
incompatible tasks as illustrated in Figure 1. Hence, possible performance costs due to switching 
the stimulus modality (Hunt & Kingstone, 2004; Lukas et al., 2010) or the response modality 
(Philipp & Koch, 2005, 2010) should affect both conditions equally. Cues indicating the relevant 
task were not necessary since modality compatibility was fixed within blocks and univalent 
stimuli were used (only in Stephan & Koch, 2014b; see enclosed Study IV, bivalent stimuli were 
used requiring a fixed sequence of double alternations to avoid cues). 
 
Table 1.  
Mappings of stimulus modalities to response modalities in modality compatible (depicted as green lines) 
 an modality incompatible (depicted as red lines) tasks in Stephan and Koch (2010, 2011, 2014a, 2014b) 
 and Stephan, Koch, Hendler and Huestegge (2013).  
 
 
In summary, this novel experimental approach allowed us to design tasks and respective 
task sets defined by the mapping between the stimulus modality and the response modality and 
thus tasks differing only regarding this modality-specific task-set component. Using this design, 
substantial switch costs were observed in both the modality compatible and the modality 
incompatible condition. The major new finding was that these switch costs were significantly 
increased in the modality incompatible condition relative to the modality compatible condition. 
In contrast, modality compatibility was not beneficial in single tasks, revealing that modality 
incompatible tasks and modality compatible tasks do not simply differ in difficulty per se (see 
also section 5.1 and Table 4). 
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As described above, the mapping between stimuli and responses is considered part of the 
task set (e.g., Rogers & Monsell, 1995; for a review see Kiesel et al., 2010; see section 3.1). 
Finding this performance difference in switch costs between tasks differing only in their 
modality mappings strongly implies that task sets cannot be exclusively amodal but must include 
such modality specific components. Hence task sets seem to entail the modality of the stimuli 
and responses, as well as the mapping between both modalities (for further discussion on task set 
components see, e.g., Philipp & Koch, 2010).  
Moreover, demonstrating that two independent measures of cognitive control, namely 
switch costs (e.g., Study I) and dual-task costs (e.g., Hazeltine, et al., 2006) are influenced by the 
specific mapping between the modalities involved in the individual tasks, provides substantial 
evidence against the general assumption that cognitive control processes are entirely amodal and 
generic. As discussed above, in line with the major models of cognitive control, the dominant 
models regarding the origin of dual-task costs and of switch costs were not developed to account 
for modality-specific influences. This emphasizes the importance to develop an account to 
explain the effect of modality compatibility, and thus the modality-specific influences in mixed 
task situations. 
 
4  Developing an account for modality-specific influences in task switching 
In line with previous dual task studies, it is assumed that performance differences 
between modality compatible and incompatible tasks are due to natural binding preferences 
resulting in specific linkages (i.e., preferred processing pathways) between stimuli and responses 
at the level of modalities (see also, Hazeltine et al., 2006; Proctor & Vu, 2006; Ruthruff et al., 
2006; Stelzel et al., 2006). However, these “natural tendencies” seem like a rather descriptive 
approach to explain the modality-specific influences, whereas the underlying mechanisms 
remain underspecified.  
Regarding the definition of modality compatibility (e.g., Stephan & Koch, 2011, see 
enclosed Study II), it was stated that the effect refers to the similarity of the stimulus modality 
and the response-related sensory consequences. The ideomotor view and this more general 
notion of modality compatibility share the core idea that response selection is guided by the 
anticipation of sensory response effects (e.g., James, 1890; Greenwald, 1970; Herwig & Waszak, 
2009; Prinz, 1997; see also Shin et al., 2010, for a review; see section 2.3). Thus, it is assumed 
that the anticipatory activation of the sensory effect representations and the activation of the 
stimulus representation (induced by the stimulus) could prime each other at the level of 
modalities. In the context of a modality incompatible task this facilitatory influence would be 
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hindering, because of the mismatch between the modality of the anticipated sensory response 
effect and the stimulus-induced activation in a certain modality. 
Note that, according to this idea of modality-specific ideomotor backward linkages, 
responding in a certain modality would prime processing of a stimulus in the modality 
corresponding to the modality of the anticipated response-effect. Conversely, perceiving a 
stimulus in a certain modality may induce activation of a response producing an effect in the 
same modality (see, e.g., Studies I and V). Converging neurophysiological evidence was 
provided by a series of studies demonstrating that auditory stimulation triggered activity in pre-
motor areas involved in vocalization and visual stimulation activated premotor areas underlying 
prehension (Schubotz, 2007; Schubotz, von Cramon, & Lohmann, 2003).  
Modality-specific ideomotor links influence performance specifically in mixed-task 
situations (i.e., dual-task or task-switching) involving modality incompatible tasks, because the 
modality of the anticipated response effects would prime processing of the competing task (or 
stimulus modality), thus increasing between-task crosstalk of central processing codes (see also 
Hazeltine, et al. 2006). The ideomotor theory assumes that effect anticipation necessarily 
precedes response selection (see, e.g., Shin et al., 2010). Accordingly, in modality incompatible 
tasks effect anticipation (in terms of ideomotor backward linkages) should increase between-task 
crosstalk during the response process (see, e.g., Studies I and II). In contrast, this rather late 
response-effect based interference is weaker when switching between modality compatible tasks 
(see also Study IV and section 6.1). 
Whereas crosstalk was originally described in the context of temporally overlapping tasks 
in terms of unwanted transfer of processing output of one task to a processing component of the 
other task (e.g., Koch, 2009; Mayer & Kieras, 1997; Navon & Miller, 1987), the present work 
demonstrated that it occurs in strictly serial task switching due to temporally overlapping 
activation of the task sets (see also Study I).  
In Study I, it was demonstrated that the between-task crosstalk is transient, since it is 
associated with temporal variability across trials as it diminishes over time. Thus, the 
dependence of the modality compatibility effect on temporal proximity between the tasks reflects 
theorizing on temporal dynamics of between task interference (e.g., Altmann & Gray, 2008; for 
further discussion see Study I).  
However, performance in single tasks should not be affected by this mechanism, since 
only one task (set) is active and therefore no between-task crosstalk can occur. Converging 
evidence for this was indeed found, since the modality compatibility effect was observed across 
tasks rather than within tasks as it is very robust and reliable in mixed task situations but does 
 -15- 
usually not affect performance in single tasks (see, e.g., Studies I and IV). 
Additionally, it can be argued that due to the absence of ambiguity in single tasks, the 
stimulus modality becomes irrelevant. This would allow participants to selectively attend to the 
stimulus location (or the specific stimulus code, see Study II), while ignoring the stimulus since 
processing the stimulus modality is neither necessary nor sufficient for successful task execution. 
In contrast, in the mixed tasks the stimulus modality indicates the required response modality 
and therefore has to be processed. Accordingly, the impact of anticipated (sensory) response 
effects might be greater in mixed tasks compared to single tasks.  
In summary, the modality compatibility effect is presumably caused by ideomotor 
backward linkages between the imperative stimuli and the anticipated response effects (Study 
IV). In terms of this generalized ideomotor idea, response selection of the compatible modality 
would be primed, thus facilitating performance in modality compatible tasks (due to the match 
between anticipated effects and stimuli on the modality level). On the other hand, in modality 
incompatible tasks processing of the competing task would be primed and cause increased 
between-task crosstalk in modality incompatible tasks.  
 
4.1  Converging evidence for modality-specific effects on crosstalk in task switching 
Converging evidence for the more specific account of modality-specific effects in terms 
of increased between-task crosstalk based on modality-specific ideomotor backward linkages 
was provided by Study IV. They implemented bimodal (i.e., bivalent) stimulation to examine 
whether congruence effects are modulated by modality compatibility (regarding the specific 
experimental design see Study IV and Tables 2 and 3). Bivalent stimuli can either be congruent 
(i.e., indicate the same response) or incongruent (i.e., indicate different responses). The 
experiment revealed a congruency effect, which was increased in modality incompatible 
compared to modality compatible tasks. To explain this increased congruency effect it was 
argued that performance suffers with incongruent stimuli compared to congruent stimuli (i.e., 
congruency effect) because incongruent stimuli activate both the response in accordance with the 
currently relevant task rules and the response indicated by the task rules of the currently 
irrelevant task. Thus, finding an increased congruency effect in a modality incompatible task 
implies that ignoring the competing stimulus was more difficult in the incompatible tasks
5
. 
Hence, supporting the idea that processing of the competing stimulus was primed because the 
modality it was presented in matched the modality of the anticipated sensory effects of the 
                                                 
5 Note that the bivalent stimuli used in the modality compatible and in the modality incompatible tasks were identical (for further 
details see Study IV). 
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response required by the relevant stimulus (i.e., in a visual-vocal task, the required vocal 
response would prime processing of the competing auditory stimulus) (for further examples see 
Study IV).  
 
4.2  Extending and specifying the account  
In the initial task switching study (Study I), as in previous dual-task studies (see, e.g., 
Hazeltine et al., 2006; Hazeltine & Ruthruff, 2006; Levy & Pashler, 2001; Ruthruff et al., 2006; 
Stelzel et al., 2006), solely visual and auditory stimuli were mapped to vocal and manual 
responses (see Table 1). Thus, empirical data and theory of the modality compatibility effect was 
restricted to these two stimulus and two response modalities (see also Huestegge & Hazeltine, 
2011).  
In Studies I, IV and V, it was argued that the modality-specific ideomotor linkages might 
reflect life-long response-effect (i.e., action effect, see, e.g., Kunde, Koch, & Hoffmann, 2004) 
learning and correspond to the modality of the most representative or intended response effect 
(see also Study V). Since birth, we constantly experience that any vocalization is immediately 
followed by audible effects and movement is usually accompanied by visible changes in our 
environment (i.e., we can see our hands moving). Moreover, modality-specific ideomotor 
linkages between vocal responses and auditory stimulation would be favorable for oral 
communication (Scott & Johnsrude, 2003) and we have also learned to rely on visual 
information to guide manual behaviour (Milner & Goodale, 2006). Of course, manual responses 
might also produce audible effects (e.g., playing an instrument) as well as vocal responses induce 
tactile effects in the laryngeal tract or guide other peoples´ visible actions but these effects are 
overall probably less salient and representative (for further examples see, e.g., Stephan & Koch, 
2014a, see Study III; see also Study V).  
 
4.2.1  Tactile stimulation increases crosstalk  
In line with the examples for life-long response-effect learning discussed above, it can 
also be argued that manual movement relies on proprioception and is not only guided visually. 
Manual movement is accompanied by the tactile input it produces (e.g., feeling a key being 
drawn back when it was pressed) but not necessarily by visual feedback (e.g., moving our hands 
out of sight). Furthermore, the sense of touch cannot be ignored as easily as visual input (e.g., 
looking the other way or shutting our eyes). It has also been shown that tactile feedback is 
essential to perform complex manual movements, whereas visual feedback is not crucial (Cole, 
1995). Accordingly, manual responses should be at least as compatible to tactile stimulation as 
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they have been shown to be to visual stimulation. 
To demonstrate that the effect of modality compatibility on task switching is a general 
phenomenon that extends to other stimulus modalities, such as the tactile modality, Study III was 
conducted to compare performance of a group using tactile and auditory stimulation
6
 to 
performance of a group using visual and auditory stimuli, identical to those used in the other 
studies (e.g., Studies I, II and IV) as depicted in Table 1. The specific stimuli and responses used 
in Study III are depicted in Tables 2 and 3. The substantial switch costs observed in both groups 
(tactile-auditory stimulus group and visual-auditory stimulus group) were larger in modality 
compatible compared to modality incompatible tasks, nicely replicating previous findings 
(Studies I, II and V) and demonstrating that the effect of modality compatibility extends to tasks 
with vibrotactile stimulation. 
Importantly, this study also revealed an even more pronounced effect of modality 
compatibility with the tactile-auditory stimulus group compared to the visual-auditory stimulus 
group. In Study III, it was argued that the stronger modality compatibility effect with tactile 
stimulation compared to visual stimulation indicates that the strength of the ideomotor linkages 
determines the degree of between-task crosstalk.  
 
Table 2.  
Overview of the stimulus modalities and types of stimuli used in Stephan and Koch (2010, 2011, 2014a, 2014b) and Stephan, 
Koch, Hendler and Huestegge (2013). 
 
 
Study 
 
Stimulus modality 
 
Type of stimuli 
 
Stephan and Koch (2010, 
2011, 2014a, 2014b) 
Stephan et al. (2013) 
 
 
 
Auditory 
 
Tone left vs. right 
Stephan and Koch (2011) Spoken letters X vs. M 
 
Stephan and Koch (2011) 
 
 
Visual 
 
Spoken letters X vs. M 
Stephan et al. (2013) Arrow pointing left vs. right 
Stephan and Koch (2011) Square vs. circle 
 
Stephan and Koch (2014a) 
 
Tactile 
 
Vibrating key left vs. right 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 By replacing the visual stimuli with tactile stimuli, a condition combining an AV task with a tactile-manual task (i.e., further 
referred to as modality compatible condition) and a condition combining an AM task combined with a tactile-vocal task (i.e., 
referred to as modality incompatible condition) were created. 
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4.2.2  Oculomotor responses shield against crosstalk  
Extending this line of research, Study V explored whether the effect of modality 
compatibility can also be generalized to oculomotor responses. Assuming that oculomotor 
responses should be more modality compatible to visual stimulation than to auditory stimulation 
(see Study V), a vocal-oculomotor response group was implemented by replacing manual 
responses with oculomotor responses
7
 (see Tables 1 and 3).  
Unexpectedly, the modality compatibility effect on switch costs was largely abolished for 
the vocal-oculomotor response group, whereas it was replicated for the vocal-manual control 
group, using the same modality mappings as prior studies (e.g., Study II). Additional analyses 
revealed a stronger performance advantage for manual responses if stimuli were presented 
visually than when they were presented auditorily, whereas performance was equally effective 
for visual and auditory stimulation with oculomotor responses. This finding led to the conclusion 
that the oculomotor system is supra-modal (i.e., equally accessible by different stimulus 
modalities, see also Zambarbieri, 2002) and that therefore auditory-oculomotor (AO) tasks are as 
modality compatible as visual-oculomotor tasks. Consequently, in the condition comprising AO 
tasks and VV tasks, a modality compatible task was combined with an incompatible task. 
Presumably, crosstalk only arises when two modality incompatible tasks are combined, therefore 
involving supra-modal oculomotor responses (in the AO task) shielded again crosstalk (see 
Study V for further details). 
 
Table 3.  
Overview of the response modalities and types of responses used in Stephan and Koch (2010, 2011, 2014a, 2014b) and Stephan, 
Koch, Hendler and Huestegge (2013). 
 
 
Study 
 
Response modality 
 
Type of response 
 
Stephan and Koch (2010, 
2011, 2014a, 2014b) 
Stephan et al. (2013) 
 
 
 
Vocal 
 
 
Spoken words left vs. right 
Stephan and Koch (2011) Spoken letter A vs. number 1 
 
Stephan and Koch (2010, 
2011, 2014a, 2014b) 
Stephan et al. (2013) 
 
 
 
Manual 
 
Key left vs. right 
 
Stephan et al. (2013) 
 
Oculomotor 
 
Saccade left vs. right 
 
 
                                                 
7 This vocal oculomotor group included a condition combining AV tasks with visual-oculomotor tasks and a condition combining 
VV tasks with auditory-oculomotor tasks. 
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4.2.3  Dimensional overlap and modality compatibility  
Previously discussed studies (Studies I, III, V) clearly demonstrated modality-specific 
influences in task switching, but all studies employed spatially S-R (stimulus-response) 
compatible tasks. Therefore it could be argued that modalities influence performance only 
because the stimulus sets and the response sets share a high degree of dimensional overlap (DO; 
Kornblum et al., 1990) within as well as across tasks. The degree of DO is defined by the 
(conceptual, perceptual, physical, or structural) similarity between a set of stimuli and a set of 
responses (Kornblum, 1992). To account for effects of DO, Kornblum et al., (1990) proposed a 
dual-process model comprising of an intentional and an automatic response selection process. In 
tasks without DO, intentional S-R translation is necessary, whereas in tasks with DO, the 
stimulus additionally activates the corresponding compatible response automatically. Since the 
tasks used in previous studies are characterized by a high degree of DO within and across tasks, 
stimuli might have activated the corresponding spatially compatible response even in the 
incorrect response modality. However, the effect of modality compatibility was also 
demonstrated using tasks without DO across and within tasks (Study II; regarding the specific 
stimuli and responses used see Tables 2 and 3)
8
. Based on these findings, it can be concluded 
that automatic activation based on DO does neither cause the increased between-task crosstalk in 
modality incompatible tasks nor is it a necessary precondition. 
 
4.3  Summary of empirical findings 
Overall five studies (see enclosure I-V) were conducted and provided converging 
evidence for modality-specific influences in task switching. Specifically, it was revealed that the 
modality compatibility effect found in Study I does not depend on DO (Study II). Moreover, 
Study III revealed an increased influence of modality compatibility on switch costs in tasks with 
tactile stimulation instead of visual stimulation. In contrast, replacing manual responses with 
oculomotor responses seems to shield against crosstalk (Study V). In Study IV tasks with 
bivalent stimuli were employed, which allowed to additionally assess congruency effects. 
Importantly, these congruency effects were increased in modality incompatible compared to 
modality compatible tasks, providing converging evidence for the suggested between-task 
crosstalk mechanism. An overview of the major results is given in Table 4. 
 
 
                                                 
8 Performance was compared between modality compatible and modality incompatible tasks without DO, and additionally, tasks 
with and without DO were used to compare performance between a modality compatible and a modality incompatible group 
(Study II). 
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Table 4.  
Summary of the main findings of Stephan and Koch (2010, 2011, 2014a, 2014b) and Stephan, Koch, Hendler and Huestegge 
(2013). 
 
Study 
 
 
Main findings 
 
 
 
 
Stephan and Koch (2010) 
  
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
Increased switch costs in modality compatible condition 
compared to modality incompatible condition  
 
Modality compatibility effect diminished with long 
response-stimulus interval 
 
No benefit of modality compatibility in single tasks 
 
 
 
 
Stephan and Koch (2011) 
  
- 
 
 
- 
 
Modality compatibility influences switch costs in tasks 
without dimensional overlap 
 
No benefit of modality compatibility in single tasks 
 
 
 
Stephan , Koch, Hendler, and 
Huestegge (2013) 
  
- 
 
 
 
- 
 
No effect of modality compatibility in tasks involving 
oculomotor responses 
 
No benefit of modality compatibility in single tasks 
 
 
 
 
 
Stephan and Koch (2014a) 
  
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
- 
 
Modality compatibility influences switch costs in tasks 
with tactile instead of visual stimulation 
 
Effect of modality compatibility is increased with tactile-
auditory stimulation compared to visual-auditory 
stimulation 
 
No benefit of modality compatibility in single tasks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stephan and Koch (2014b) 
 
  
- 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
Modality compatibility influences switch costs in tasks 
with bimodal (bivalent) stimulation and a fixed sequence 
(double-alternations) 
 
Congruency effect is increased in modality compatible 
compared to incompatible tasks 
 
No benefit of modality compatibility in single tasks 
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5  Relating and integrating modality-specific influences 
5.1  Models for spatial S-R compatibility 
In the following, established ideas accounting for spatial S-R compatibility effects are 
discussed as possible alternative explanations of the modality compatibility effect. In general, the 
performance benefit for spatial S-R compatible mappings compared to incompatible mappings is 
attributed to an advantage for response selection if the spatially corresponding response has to be 
carried out (see, e.g., Fitts & Deininger, 1954; Reeve & Proctor, 1990). 
Most accounts on S-R compatibility assume a representation of stimuli and responses in 
the form of spatial feature codes (e.g., Kornblum et al., 1990; Reeve & Proctor, 1990; Umiltà & 
Nicoletti, 1990), which are necessary to code a stimulus and translate it into a response. But 
while some accounts attribute S-R compatibility effects to differences in translational processes 
(e.g., automatic processing, Kornblum et al., 1990), others propose shared common codes for 
stimuli and responses (e.g., common coding, Hommel et al., 2001). 
Furthermore, Kornblum et al. (1990) distinguished between S-R compatibility on 
element-level and on set-level (see also, Fitts & Deininger, 1954). While set-level compatibility 
refers to the pairing of different stimulus and response sets, element-level compatibility refers to 
the individual mapping of stimuli to responses within the same S-R set (see, e.g., Proctor & Vu, 
2006). S-R compatibility effects emerge when there is DO (see section 4.2.2) on set-level and 
therefore corresponding compatible and incompatible mappings can be defined on the element-
level. On set-level, however, compatibility relations can also be defined independently of DO 
and compatibility on element-level. Attempting to relate and integrate modality compatibility to 
the levels of S-R compatibility, modality compatibility could be categorized as a specific form of 
set-level compatibility. This set-level compatibility cannot depend on DO since the effect of 
modality-compatibility has been demonstrated in tasks without DO (i.e., when compatibility 
relations on element-level cannot be defined) (Study II). However, the DO-model only predicts 
effects of compatibility in tasks with DO (Kornblum et al., 1990; Kornblum, 1994, Kornblum & 
Lee, 1995) and could therefore not account for effects of modality compatibility, whereas the 
proposed account in terms of ideomotor backward linkages explains the effect. 
Even extending the DO-model by implementing the concept of modality compatibility 
and assuming, for example, anticipatory modality priming effects during automatic response 
selection, would only allow to account for modality compatibility effects in single tasks. 
However, modality compatibility is a phenomenon emerging specifically in mixed task 
situations, whereas effects of set-level compatibility (and DO) typically affect performance in 
single tasks. For this reason, it seems more suitable to distinguish between set-level compatibility 
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as compatibility within tasks and modality compatibility across tasks affecting performance only 
in mixed tasks. 
In line with the DO-model, the salient feature coding account (e.g., Proctor & Reeve, 
1985) also assumes that S-R translation is influenced by the systematic correspondence between 
stimuli and responses. The central idea is that salient stimulus and response features can be 
utilized for S-R translation. If salient stimulus features overlap with salient response features, 
retrieval of the response would be fast, causing a benefit for (intentional) S-R translation (Reeve 
& Proctor, 1990). Note that automatic processing was not discussed for this idea. However, as 
for DO, assuming such systematic correspondences between stimuli and responses for the 
modality level should lead to performance differences in single tasks.  
Another prominent account, TEC, was proposed by Hommel et al. (2001). This 
metatheory incorporates the ideomotor principle (see, e.g., James, 1890) and suggests a common 
representational system, the common coding system, of feature codes for perception and action. 
These feature codes refer to distal external events, assuming that actions are mentally 
represented in terms of their external effects (see also Shin et al., 2010). To be accessible by 
perception through different sensory systems (i.e., visual, tactile, auditory) and to modulate 
action in different motor systems (i.e., vocal, manual, pedal) the essential idea is that the shared 
common codes themselves (i.e., feature codes) are generic and amodal (Hommel et al., 2001). 
Accordingly, also the event files, in which all feature codes related to an event are integrated, can 
be characterized as amodal (see also Shin et al., 2010). In order to account for the modality-
specific influence (e.g., Study I), this core contention of the TEC would have to be modified, for 
example, by assuming that actions are mentally represented not only regarding their abstract 
amodal effects, but additionally in terms of the modality in which this effect is anticipated. The 
modality of anticipated action effects could be implemented as an additional feature code 
(modality code; see Huestegge & Koch, 2009)
9
. This modality code is activated by an external 
event (i.e., stimulus) perceived in the same sensory modality. Such a common modality code 
would imply an advantage for modality compatible tasks. However, despite the fact that 
implementing these modality specific codes would change the fundamental assumption of 
modality-free common codes, this modified theory of event coding would predict an effect not 
only in mixed tasks but also in single tasks and would thus not be sufficient to account for the 
pattern of results found in task switching studies (e.g., Study III).  
                                                 
9 An approach, suggesting modality codes in addition to spatial codes, was put forward by Huestegge and Koch (2009). They 
assumed that task specific (spatial and modality) codes are mapped to each other during response selection. Note that this model 
was developed to explain the binding of responses in crossmodal action, and therefore did not regard possible influences of the 
stimulus modality. 
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Overall, these exemplarily discussed ideas accounting for spatial S-R compatibility 
effects are not applicable, since even after major changes, compatibility effects would be 
predicted specifically in single tasks, whereas it has been shown that modality compatibility 
primarily effects performance in mixed task situations (for further discussion see, e.g., Study 
IV). Since the models of S-R compatibility are not sufficient to account for modality-specific 
influences, the major task switching models are revisited. 
 
5.2  Models for task switching 
As discussed earlier (see section 3.1), the current theoretical views on task switching 
assume that switch costs result from the reconfiguration of abstract task sets and/or (proactive) 
interference from the previously relevant task (see, e.g., Kiesel at al., 2010; Vandierendonck et 
al., 2010, for reviews). Even though these models neither predict nor account for modality-
specific influences in task switching, considering the substantial empirical evidence of such 
influences strongly suggests modulation of reconfiguration and/or interference by modality-
specific factors. 
However, the process of configuration or reconfiguration of a task set referring to the 
retrieval of a task set from long-term memory (e.g., Mayr & Kliegl, 2000; Monsell et al., 2000; 
Rubinstein et al., 2001) or the activation or chaining of task set components (e.g., Logan & 
Gordon, 2001; Monsell, 1996; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; ) is per definition amodal. Perhaps by 
implementing the modality-specific components as part of a task set (i.e., modality-specific task 
sets, see section 3.3), an influence of the modality-specific relations on binding processes or 
during retrieval of the task set from long-term memory (Mayr & Kliegl, 2000) during task set 
reconfiguration might be assumed. Yet, such binding processes are essential for the process of 
cognitive reconfiguration, which could accordingly no longer be characterized as amodal (see 
also Study I). Nevertheless, even by incorporating modality-specific task sets and assuming this 
rather indirect influence on the reconfiguration of abstract goals or task rules, it would remain 
rather unclear why and how modality compatibility would affect switch costs. 
In contrast, the interference view regards switch costs as a result of persisting activation 
of the previously relevant task set and/or persisting inhibition of the previously irrelevant task set 
(e.g., see Allport & Wylie, 1999; Koch et al., 2010, for reviews). Even though interference has 
not been discussed with respect to modality-specific influences, it can be argued that they 
contribute to interference in task switching. If task sets are modality-specific, the persisting 
activation of a previously active task set would include persisting activation at the modality 
level. In the current task, this persisting modality-specific activation might impair performance 
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specifically in modality incompatible tasks by increasing between-task crosstalk. If the interval 
between two tasks is lengthened, the persisting activation is expected to decay passively (Allport, 
et al., 1994; Meiran, 1996). Consequently, the modality specific activation should decay, 
resulting in diminished crosstalk in modality incompatible tasks. Converging evidence for this 
idea was provided by Study I.  
 
6  Remaining issues 
6.1  Possible sources of conflict 
Even though previous research allowed to develop an account for modality-specific 
influences in mixed task situations, it remains to be specified where specifically crosstalk 
interference arises. Regarding interference in task switching in general, it has been distinguished 
between stimulus-based (or related) and response-based (or related) interference (see, e.g., Kiesel 
et al., 2010; Vandierendonck et al., 2010 for reviews). Response–based interference arises when 
the same responses are used in both tasks (i.e., bivalent responses, see, e.g., Meiran, 2000b, 
Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Schuch & Koch, 2003, 2004), whereas stimulus-based interference has 
been described in the context of bivalent stimuli, which are associated with both tasks and can 
afford congruent or incongruent responses (see, e.g., Allport et al., 1994; Rogers & Monsell, 
1995; Wylie & Allport, 2000). 
Studies on modality compatibility employed univalent stimuli combined with univalent 
responses. It could be argued that stimuli as well as responses overlapped in terms of DO, which 
allowed them to be applied across tasks (e.g., one could respond to a left sided stimulus by 
saying left or by pressing a left key). Despite the fact that this specific bivalency (in terms of 
sameness of abstract meaning) has been shown to affect switch costs (e.g., Gade & Koch, 2007; 
Hübner & Druey, 2006; Schuch & Koch, 2004), it does not need to be considered further in the 
context of modality compatibility since the effect of modality compatibility has also been 
demonstrated using tasks non-overlapping stimulus sets and non-overlapping response sets (see, 
e.g., Hazeltine et al., 2006; Study II).  
However, it has not yet been discussed whether the crosstalk interference triggered by 
ideomotor backward linkages is rather stimulus-modality-based or response-modality-based. 
Interference between tasks might arise in modality incompatible tasks because the modality of 
the anticipated response-effect and the modality of the stimulus would not match. On the one 
hand, this could be attributed to response-modality-based interference because the response is 
associated with effects in a certain modality and the anticipation of these effects would prime 
processing of a stimulus in the modality assigned to the competing task. On the other hand, 
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interference might also be driven by the stimulus-modality. Perceiving a stimulus in a certain 
sensory modality primes processing of a response associated with response effects in the sensory 
modality matching the stimulus. In modality incompatible tasks this primed response (modality) 
would be mapped to the competing task.  
Both types of interference are not mutually exclusive. In order to avoid confusion, the 
interference could preliminarily be referred to as modality-specific response-effect-based 
interference. Further research is necessary to distinguish whether interference is driven by the 
stimulus modality, the response modality, or both.  
 
6.2  Task conflict or response conflict 
In addition to the type of interference (stimulus-based or response-based), the level at 
which modality incompatible tasks cause conflict should be defined. Besides the task-switching 
paradigm and the dual-task paradigm, so-called conflict tasks have been used to study cognitive 
control processes. These conflict tasks demonstrate that task-irrelevant information, such as 
distracters (flanker task; Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974), word meaning (Stroop task; Stroop, 1935), or 
location (Simon task; Simon, 1969), is processed (automatically) and influences task 
performance. Regarding the Stroop task, for example, various versions, using visual, auditory, or 
even crossmodal stimuli have been applied (see, e.g., Elliott et al., 2014). In the original Stroop 
tasks, for example, participants had to name the color of a written word, while ignoring its 
meaning. When the irrelevant stimulus feature (i.e., word meaning) and the relevant stimulus 
feature (i.e., ink color) indicated different responses, conflict at the response level arises (e.g., 
Cohen, Dunbar, & McClelland, 1990; Roelofs, 2003). However, it has also been argued that the 
stimuli in Stroop tasks might activate two competing tasks (i.e., word naming vs. color naming) 
and thus induce task conflict. Relating the modality compatible and incompatible tasks used in 
task switching research (e.g., Study I) to these conflict tasks, it can be assumed that in these tasks 
the modality of the stimulus influences performance, even though participants had to respond to 
the location of the stimulus. The stimulus modality was irrelevant insofar it only served as a cue 
indicating the required response modality. It could be argued that in modality incompatible tasks 
the irrelevant stimulus modality (i.e., visual) automatically activates a compatible manual 
response even though a vocal response would have been required, thus inducing response 
conflict. In contrast, task conflict could be assumed because the irrelevant stimulus modality 
(i.e., visual) could activate the competing task (i.e., AM) because it requires a manual response 
(i.e., in terms of stimulus-based priming of the task; see, e.g., Koch & Allport, 2006). Based on 
the present state of research it is not clear whether modality-specific influences can be ascribed 
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to response conflict or to task conflict, thus providing a possible research question for future 
studies.  
 
6.3  Further open issues  
The size of switch costs has been shown to be determined by several factors, including 
preparation (Goschke, 2000; Meiran, 1996; Rogers & Monsell, 1995), processing content (e.g., 
Navon & Miller, 1987), and training (e.g., Schumacher et al., 2001). It would be interesting to 
investigate whether these factors also modulate the effect of modality compatibility on switch 
costs. Furthermore, finding modality-specific influences on switch costs, dual task costs and 
congruency effects could implicate that these influences arise in cognitively demanding 
situations. To this end, other situations affording cognitive control such as conflict tasks could be 
employed to further investigate the underlying mechanisms of these modality-specific 
influences. 
 
7  Conclusion 
The central question underlying the present research program (i.e., doctoral dissertation 
project) was whether the core idea of cognitive control being generic and modality-unspecific is 
convincing (or rather a tale), given that behavior is multimodal within a multisensory 
environment. Traditionally, models of cognitive control focused rather on central, amodal 
processes to explain interference while more or less neglecting modality-specific processes. 
However, substantial empirical evidence for modality-specific influences has been provided 
using the major paradigms, namely the dual-task paradigm and the task switching paradigm, 
assessing cognitive control processes. Consequently, the dominant idea of amodal, central 
processes in cognitive control needs to be revised by taking modality-specific influences into 
consideration, for example by implementing the idea of modality-specific ideomotor backward 
linkages. Developing the idea of between-task crosstalk based on ideomotor backward linkages 
provides an important contribution to current research of task switching and moreover of 
cognitive control processes in general.  
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Abstract 
Two experiments examined the role of compatibility of input and output (I-O) modality 
mappings in task switching. We define I-O modality compatibility in terms of similarity of 
stimulus modality and modality of response-related sensory consequences. Experiment 1 
included switching between 2 compatible tasks (auditory–vocal vs. visual–manual) and between 
2 incompatible tasks (auditory–manual vs. visual–vocal). The resulting switch costs were smaller 
in compatible tasks compared to incompatible tasks. Experiment 2 manipulated the response–
stimulus interval (RSI) to examine the time course of the compatibility effect. The effect on 
switch costs was confirmed with short RSI, but the effect was diminished with long RSI. 
Together, the data suggest that task sets are modality specific. Reduced switch costs in 
compatible tasks may be due to special linkages between input and output modalities, whereas 
incompatible tasks increase cross-talk, presumably due to dissipating interference of correct and 
incorrect response modalities. (143 words) 
 
Keywords: task switching, cross-talk, cognitive control, selective attention, modality 
compatibility 
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Task switching represents a major paradigm to study cognitive control processes (see 
Koch, Gade, Schuch, & Philipp, in press; Meiran, in press; Monsell, 2003, for a review). In task 
switching, performance on task switch trials is compared to that on repetition trials. Usually, task 
switches lead to increased reaction time (RT) and error rate, so-called switch costs (see, e.g., 
Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994; Altmann, 2007; Meiran, 1996; Rogers & Monsell, 1995). 
However, until now, no study systematically examined whether task switching is modulated by 
the influence of input and output (I-O) modality combinations, and current models (e.g., 
Altmann & Gray, 2008; Meiran, Kessler, & Adi-Japha, 2008) were not designed to predict such 
an influence. The present study demonstrates the novel finding that I-O modality compatibility 
substantially affects switch costs in task switching. 
Previous studies that addressed the influence of I-O modality combinations examined 
temporally overlapping dual-task performance (e.g., Greenwald, 1972, 2003; Hazeltine, 
Ruthruff, & Remington, 2006; Wickens, 1984). For example, Greenwald (1972, 2003) reported 
reduced dual-task costs when two tasks are “ideomotor compatible”. The notion of ideomotor 
compatibility (Greenwald, 1972, 2003) suggests that actions are coded by the mental image of 
the sensory feedback they produce. Importantly though, for instance saying “one” in response to 
hearing the letter “A” would be I-O modality compatible because of the match of input modality 
and modality of the output effect (i.e., the auditory sensory consequences), but it would not be 
ideomotor compatible because the specific response (“one”) does not match the specific stimulus 
(“A”). As this example underlines, the concept of ideomotor compatibility is quite narrow. In 
contrast, we define I-O modality compatibility generally in terms of similarity of stimulus 
modality and modality of response-related sensory consequences. 
Such a more general account has been suggested by Wickens (1984), who proposed that 
dual-task interference is determined by the mapping between input modality (visual vs. 
auditory), central codes (spatial vs. verbal), and output modality (manual vs. vocal). However, 
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the existing empirical evidence is rather sparse and rests primarily on studies using complex 
tasks, whereas it has been argued that using simple stimulus-response (S-R) tasks offers a better 
methodological tool to uncover underlying processing limitations in dual-task performance (e.g., 
Meyer & Kieras, 1997; Pashler, 1994). 
Recently, however, Hazeltine et al. (2006) investigated the effect of I-O modality pairings 
by using a dual-task paradigm combining two simple RT tasks. In an I-O modality compatible 
condition, participants responded to visually presented words from the categories BUG, FOOD, 
and TREE by pressing the j, k, or l key on a keyboard, and they responded to tones of 220 Hz, 
880 Hz, and 3520 Hz by saying “one”, “two”, or “three”. In an incompatible condition, 
participants responded to the same words by saying “bug”, “food”, or “tree”, and to the tones by 
pressing the j, k, or l key. The major finding was that visual-manual tasks combined with 
auditory-vocal tasks lead to less dual-task interference than auditory-manual tasks combined 
with visual-vocal tasks. Note though that Hazeltine et al. (2006) used conditions of extreme 
temporal task overlap (see also Stelzel, Schumacher, Schubert, & D’Esposito, 2006), but 
Ruthruff, Hazeltine, and Remington (2006) were able to replicate the effect of I-O modality 
compatibility on dual-task performance with nonsimultaneous stimulus presentation as well (see 
Pashler, 1994). 
This influence of I-O modality compatibility suggests that for correct task execution, it 
might be necessary to bind response codes to stimulus codes and task goals (see, e.g., Hommel, 
Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001). Consistent with this idea, Ruthruff et al. (2006) 
proposed a natural tendency to bind auditory stimuli to vocal responses and visual stimuli to 
manual responses. For I-O incompatible tasks, these natural binding tendencies may cause 
problems in dual-task situations because the stimuli tend to bind with responses in the wrong 
modality. 
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However, in Hazeltine et al.´s (2006) and in Ruthruff et al.´s (2006) studies, pressing 
arbitrarily assigned response keys to words was presumably less S-R compatible than just 
naming the category. Therefore, the manipulation of I-O modality compatibility in these studies 
was not fully independent of S-R compatibility. 
Moreover, the existing evidence on the role of I-O modality compatibility is currently 
restricted to variants of the dual-task paradigm, in which two tasks are performed in a single 
trial. The aim of the present study is to demonstrate that I-O modality compatibility affects 
switch costs in strictly serial task switching. Because switch costs and dual-task interference are 
different phenomena in different multitasking settings, and also the theoretical accounts for the 
observed phenomena differ (e.g., Pashler, 2000, for a discussion), it is important to examine 
whether the influence of I-O modality compatibility extends to task switching. 
To examine the role of I-O modality compatibility in task switching, we devised a novel 
experimental approach, in which tasks were never processed concurrently. Critically, both 
compatibility conditions required the same cognitive operation, which referred to indicating 
whether a stimulus was visually or auditorily presented on the left or right side by either pressing 
a left or right key or by saying the word “left” or “right”, so that S-R compatibility should be 
comparable across I-O modality compatibility conditions. Moreover, note also that across the 
two compatible conditions (i.e., visual-manual and auditory-vocal) and across the two 
incompatible conditions (visual-vocal and auditory-manual), exactly the same visual and 
auditory input was given, followed by the same vocal and manual responses, so that collapsing 
the data across the two compatible tasks and across the two incompatible tasks controlled for 
possible differences due to the input modality or to the output modality in the individual task 
combinations. Therefore, performance costs exclusively due to switching input modality (Hunt 
& Kingstone, 2004; Lukas, Philipp, & Koch, in press) or to switching response modality (Philipp 
& Koch, 2005) should affect both I-O modality compatibility conditions equally. 
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In the context of task switching, the mapping of stimuli to responses is defined as a part 
of the task set (Monsell, 2003), which is the cognitive representations of the task requirements. 
Accordingly, finding effects of I-O modality compatibility on switch costs would suggest that 
task sets have modality-specific components. 
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 was designed to demonstrate that I-O modality compatibility affects task 
switch costs. Each compatibility condition started with two single-task blocks, followed by two 
task-switching blocks. The assessment of single-task performance was necessary to control 
whether compatibility affects individual task difficulty independent from its possible effects in 
task switching (see also Hazeltine et al., 2006). 
Method 
Participants. Sixteen participants (9 women and 7 men, mean age = 26.4 years) were 
tested. Hearing and visual acuity were normal or corrected to normal. 
Stimuli and Apparatus. Auditory stimuli were 400 Hz tones presented via headphones 
(Speed Link, SL 8755) on either the left or right ear. Visual stimuli were white diamonds on 
black background with a width and height of 1.5 cm, presented either 1.25 cm to the left or right 
of the center of a 15 '' display (Sony, Multiscan 200 SX). Viewing distance was about 60 cm. 
Manual responses were made by pressing the Ctrl or Alt key of a QWERTZ keyboard with the 
index fingers of the left and right hand, respectively. Vocal responses were the words “links” 
(left) or “rechts” (right). The S-R mapping was spatially compatible, ensuring maximally 
comparable S-R compatibility in both I-O modality compatibility conditions. RT (i.e., speech 
onset) in vocal responses was measured using a voice key. Accuracy of vocal responses was 
online coded by the experimenter in the intertrial interval. 
 -48- 
Procedure. Instructions appeared on the screen before the experiment started, and the 
experimenter also explained the task orally. Participants were requested to respond as quickly 
and accurately as possible. 
Each participant took part in the I-O modality compatible and in the incompatible 
condition. The order of I-O modality compatible and incompatible conditions was 
counterbalanced across participants. At the beginning of each condition, two single-task blocks 
were presented (order counterbalanced across participants). In the modality compatible 
condition, one single-task block contained the visual-manual task and the other single-task block 
contained the auditory-vocal task, whereas in the incompatible condition, one single-task block 
contained the visual-vocal task and the other single-task block contained the auditory-manual 
task. Single-task blocks included four practice trials and 40 experimental trials each. In each 
modality compatibility condition, single-task blocks were followed by two task-switching 
blocks, containing both tasks in random order. Only the first task-switching block started with 
four practice trials, while both blocks included 80 experimental trials. Stimuli were presented 
individually (i.e., visual or auditory), so that no additional task cues were needed because the I-O 
modality mapping was fixed within blocks. After each block, participants received feedback 
about mean RT in the preceding block and were offered a little rest. The next block was initiated 
by pressing any key. In all blocks, the stimulus and response sequence was random, with the 
constraint that each stimulus appeared equally frequently. 
Each trial started with the onset of the imperative stimulus and lasted until a response was 
made or until 1500 ms had elapsed. The response-stimulus interval (RSI) in correct trials was 
600 ms. If an error was made, the German word “Fehler” (error) was displayed for 500 ms 
(lengthening the RSI to 1100 ms). The experiment took about 45 minutes. 
Design. The independent within-subjects variables were I-O modality compatibility 
(incompatible vs. compatible) and task transition (switch vs. repetition). The dependent variables 
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were RT and percentage error (PE). For the analyses, mean RTs and PEs were collapsed across 
the two modality compatible tasks and across the two incompatible tasks. 
Results and Discussion 
The first two experimental trials in each block were discarded. All responses given in the 
first 50 ms after stimulus onset were excluded because these were most likely voice-key artefacts 
(1.3%). For RT analysis, RTs were z-transformed for each subject separately and then all values 
exceeding +/- 3 were discarded as outliers (1.6%). Also, error trials and immediately subsequent 
trials were excluded. 
To analyse the effect of modality compatibility in single tasks, we ran an analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) with the variable of I-O modality compatibility. It revealed no significant 
difference between compatible and incompatible tasks for both RT (334 ms vs. 324 ms), F(1, 15) 
= 1.334, p > .2, and PE (2.2% vs. 3.7%), F(1, 15) = 2.997, p > .1. (Note that there was a non-
significant trend in PE, but this was not confirmed by the data of Experiment 2.) Accordingly, 
differences in single-task performance cannot explain a possible effect of modality compatibility 
in task switching. 
RT in task-switching blocks was submitted to an ANOVA with the independent variables 
of I-O modality compatibility and task transition (Figure 1; Table 1 presents these data as a 
function of tasks). 
--Figure 1 & Table 1-- 
The effect of task transition was significant, F(1, 15) = 86.966, MSE = 2,012, p < .001, indicating 
higher RT on switches (533 ms) than on repetitions (429 ms). There was also an effect of I-O modality 
compatibility, F(1, 15) = 23.936, MSE = 1,066, p < .001, indicating shorter RTs in compatible tasks than 
in incompatible tasks (461 ms vs. 501 ms). Importantly, the interaction was significant, too, F(1, 15) = 
10.674, MSE = 283, p < .01, showing that incompatible tasks led to larger switch costs (118 ms) than 
compatible tasks (91 ms). The same ANOVA on PE revealed an effect of task transition, F(1, 15) = 
36.468, MSE = 20, p < . 001, indicating that mean PE was greater on switches (11.1%) than on repetitions 
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(4.3%), but no other effect was significant, F(1, 15) = 4.458, p > .05, for the effect of I-O modality 
compatibility, and F(1, 15) = 1.462, p > .2, for the interaction. 
Given the significant main effect of I-O modality compatibility, it is important to exclude 
that the effect of I-O modality compatibility on switch costs is just due to higher costs in tasks 
associated with higher RT. To do so, we calculated the proportional switch costs for each 
compatibility condition by dividing switch costs by RT on repetitions. Importantly, the re-
analysis with this proportional measure confirmed the effect of I-O modality compatibility on 
switch costs, F(1, 15) = 5.996, MSE = .004, p < .05. 
Note that not only switch costs differed as a function of I-O modality compatibility but 
also performance on task repetition. RT on repetitions of compatible tasks was 26 ms shorter 
than on repetitions of incompatible tasks, t(15) = 2.797, p < .05. The same analysis on PE 
revealed no significant effect (3.5% vs. 5.2%, t < 1.6). To examine this I-O modality 
compatibility effect on task repetitions further, we analyzed the influence of repetition lag by 
dividing into first repetition (following a switch), second repetition (following a first repetition), 
and third or subsequent repetition (i.e., following a second repetition) and conducted an ANOVA 
with the independent variables I-O modality compatibility and repetition lag (first vs. second vs. 
third or subsequent). For RT, the effect of repetition lag was significant (F(1, 15) = 24.403, MSE 
= 1,210, p < .001) , indicating higher RTs for first (456 ms) than for second (408 ms), and third 
or subsequent (400 ms) repetitions. There was also an effect of I-O modality compatibility, F(1, 
15) = 9.213, MSE = 1,761, p < .01), indicating shorter RTs in compatible tasks than in 
incompatible tasks (408 ms vs. 434 ms). The compatibility effect was comparable for first (30 
ms), second (24 ms), and third or subsequent (24 ms) repetitions, and accordingly the interaction 
was nonsignificant (F < 1). 
In sum, Experiment 1 showed that switch costs and performance on task repetitions are 
affected by I-O modality compatibility. The analysis of repetition lag suggests that the 
compatibility effect on repetitions is rather long-lived and does not dissipate as a function of lag, 
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which covers a time range of several seconds. However, the specific influence of modality 
compatibility on task switches, and thus on switch costs, might critically depend on high 
temporal proximity of task processing. To test this hypothesis in Experiment 2, we manipulated 
the RSI because it has been found that switch costs in unpredictable task sequences decrease 
with increasing temporal separation of the tasks (see, e.g., Koch 2001; Meiran, Chorev, & Sapir, 
2000; Philipp & Koch, 2005). 
Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants. Sixteen new participants (9 women; mean age = 23.8 years) took part. 
Stimuli, Apparatus, Procedure, and Design. There were two differences to Experiment 1. 
First, the RSI varied randomly (1600 ms vs. 600 ms). Second, the number of trials per block was 
increased (60 trials in single-task blocks and 120 trials in task-switching blocks). 
Results and Discussion 
Data analyses proceeded as in Experiment 1. We excluded voice-key artefacts (RT < 50 
ms; 0.5%). For RT analysis, we discarded outliers (1.2%); also error trials and immediately 
subsequent trials were excluded. 
For single-task data, a two-way ANOVA with the independent variables of RSI (long vs. 
short) and I-O modality compatibility revealed no significant effects both for RT (F(1, 15) = 
1.187, p > .2, for the effect of I-O modality compatibility; F(1, 15) = 3.062, p > .1, for the effect 
of RSI; and F < 1 for the interaction) and PE (all Fs < 1.946, all ps > .1), suggesting that any 
effect of modality compatibility on task switching cannot be due to differences in single-task 
performance. Averaged across RSI, RT was 355 ms (PE was 1.8%) in compatible tasks and 364 
ms (2.5%) in incompatible tasks. 
The ANOVA on the task switching data additionally included task transition as variable 
(Figure 2). The effect of task transition was significant, F(1, 15) = 95.403, MSE = 2,366, p < 
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.001, indicating higher RT on switches (531 ms) than on repetitions (447 ms). There was also an 
effect of I-O modality compatibility, F(1, 15) = 9.014, MSE = 1,904, p < .01, indicating shorter 
RTs in compatible tasks than in incompatible tasks (477 ms vs. 500 ms). Furthermore, the effect 
of RSI was significant, F(1, 15) = 4.707, MSE = 941, p < .05. RT was shorter with long RSI (483 
ms) than with short RSI (494 ms). The two-way interactions between task transition and I-O 
modality compatibility, F(1, 15) = 7.213, MSE = 372, p < .05, and between RSI and task 
transition F(1, 15) = 14.422, MSE = 671, p < .005, were significant. However, these effects were 
qualified by a significant three-way interaction, F(1, 15) = 7.484, MSE = 200, p < .05. 
--Figure 2-- 
To follow up this three-way interaction, we conducted ANOVAs separately for the RSI 
conditions. For the short RSI, the two-way interaction between task transition and I-O modality 
compatibility was significant, F(1, 15) = 15.332, MSE = 267, p < .005, indicating that the RT 
switch costs in compatible tasks were smaller (85 ms) than in incompatible tasks (117 ms), 
confirming the data of Experiment 1. Also, the effects of task transition, F(1, 15) = 85.780, MSE 
= 1,917, p < .001, and I-O modality compatibility, F(1, 15) = 8.210, MSE = 854, p < .05, were 
significant. In contrast, for the long RSI, the effects of task transition, F(1, 15) = 63.353, MSE = 
1,120, p < .001, and of I-O modality compatibility, F(1, 15) = 8.115, MSE = 1,270, p < .05, were 
significant, but, critically, the interaction was non-significant (F < 1).
1
 
As for Experiment 1, we conducted a re-analysis with proportional switch costs. 
Importantly, this reanalysis confirmed a significant interaction between RSI and I-O modality 
compatibility, F(1, 15) = 8.134, MSE = .002, p < .05, and separate ANOVAs confirmed the 
effect of I-O modality compatibility for trials with short RSI, F(1, 15) = 12.541, MSE = .003, p < 
.005, but not for trials with long RSI (F < 1).
2
 
The three-way ANOVA on PE disclosed an effect of task transition, F(1, 15) = 43.693, 
MSE = 20, p < .001, indicating greater PE on switches (9.4%) than on repetitions (4.2%), and of 
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RSI, F(1, 15) = 25.210, MSE = 20, p < .001. PE was lower with short RSI (5.1%) than with long 
RSI (8.6%). In addition, the interaction between RSI and task transition, F(1, 15) = 12.195, MSE 
= 10, p < .005, was significant. PE switch costs were higher with long RSI (7.0%) than with 
short RSI (3.5%). No other effect or interaction was significant, Fs < 1.189. (Note that the effect 
of RSI in PE suggests a speed-accuracy trade-off, but this cannot explain the theoretically 
relevant three-way interaction in RT.)
 
 
Taken together, the data of Experiment 2 confirmed the effect of modality compatibility 
on switch costs. However, while Experiment 1 showed that the influence of I-O modality 
compatibility in task repetitions does not depend on repetition lag, Experiment 2 showed that the 
effect in task switches depends on RSI. RT switch costs no longer differed in compatible and 
incompatible tasks when the RSI was long, suggesting that the influence of I-O modality 
compatibility on switch costs quickly dissipated over time. 
General Discussion 
The present study demonstrates that input and output (I-O) modality compatibility affects 
performance in task switching. We used a novel experimental approach to compare performance 
on modality compatible and incompatible tasks while maintaining maximally comparable levels 
of S-R compatibility. To this end, we used identical stimuli and responses for the modality 
compatible and incompatible condition. Accordingly, differences in perception of visual and 
auditory stimuli as well as differences in response execution of manual and vocal responses 
should have a similar effect on performance in the modality compatible and incompatible 
conditions. 
Using this paradigm, we observed substantial switch costs. The major new finding was 
that switch costs increased with incompatible modality mappings relative to compatible 
mappings. Furthermore, in Experiment 2 we confirmed the compatibility effect on switch costs 
but showed that this effect diminishes with long RSI. Note that differences in individual task 
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difficulty can be ruled out as an explanation of the effect of I-O modality compatibility on task 
switching because there was no significant performance difference between incompatible and 
compatible tasks in single-task conditions. 
To account for the observed influence of I-O modality compatibility in task switching, we 
assume that this influence is due to special linkages between stimuli and responses that are based 
on natural tendencies to bind certain stimuli to certain responses (see also Hazeltine et al., 2006; 
Proctor & Vu, 2006; Ruthruff et al., 2006; Stelzel et al., 2006). Obviously, a strong tendency to 
bind vocal output to auditory input implies an advantage for oral communication (Scott & 
Johnsrude, 2003). Moreover, manual behaviour is often guided by visual information (Milner & 
Goodale, 2006). This idea of special I-O modality mappings is also supported by fMRI research, 
showing that auditory stimulation primarily activated the inferior ventrolateral premotor cortex, 
an area underlying vocalization, whereas visual stimulation primarily activated the superior 
ventrolateral premotor cortex, an area underlying prehension (e.g., Schubotz, von Cramon, & 
Lohmann, 2003). 
On the basis of these considerations, we suggest that increased switch costs when 
switching between modality incompatible tasks are due to increased crosstalk of central 
processing codes (see also Hazeltine et al., 2006). Usually, crosstalk describes the unwanted 
transmission of input of one task to a component of the other task if two task sets overlap (e.g., 
Koch, 2009; Meyer & Kieras, 1997; Navon & Miller, 1987). The novel finding of the present 
study is that this increased crosstalk between task sets occurs not only when the tasks have close 
temporal overlap, as in dual-tasks, but also in strictly serial task switching. 
In task switching, two task sets have to be kept constantly active, so that crosstalk of 
central processing codes can occur even if performance of the tasks does not overlap temporally. 
That is, modality incompatible tasks evoke significantly more crosstalk potential in task 
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switching because the modality of the stimuli does not correspond to the modality of the 
anticipated sensory response consequences. 
In models of task switching, the specific S-R mappings, which entail also the modality of 
stimulus and response, are defined as a part of the task set (e.g., Rogers & Monsell, 1995). Our 
data thus suggest that task sets include I-O modality-specific components. If the natural tendency 
to link stimulation in a particular modality to a particular response modality is weak, as in 
modality incompatible tasks, the cognitive reconfiguration of the task set should be more 
difficult than if the linkage is strong, which should result in increased between-task crosstalk 
(i.e., activation of the incorrect response modality) in a task switch and thus in increased switch 
costs. Note though that we did not find an I-O modality compatibility effect in single task 
performance. In single tasks, there is absolute task certainty and thus no between-task crosstalk, 
so that the input modality serves as a highly effective retrieval cue for the required response 
modality. Hence, the influence of I-O modality compatibility occurs primarily when switching 
tasks. 
The data of Experiment 2 show that the influence of I-O modality compatibility on switch 
costs decreases as a function of time, which is consistent with current theorizing on the temporal 
dynamics of task sets (e.g., Altmann & Gray, 2008). Interestingly, when we analyzed whether 
the I-O modality compatibility effect is influenced by the repetition lag (which covers temporal 
intervals of seconds), we found a stable effect of modality compatibility on repetition trials. Note 
that there is no contradiction here because lag refers to task repetitions, whereas RSI primarily 
affected task switches. The RSI effect thus suggests that the I-O modality compatibility effect on 
switch costs is due to a rather short-lived priming (or crosstalk) component specifically on task 
switches that appears to decay quickly within the first second. 
It is important to point out that our finding of an I-O modality compatibility effect on 
switch costs cannot be explained by assuming across-trial sequential priming from the output 
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modality to the input modality. This would be the case when compatible tasks are repeated (e.g., 
if vocal output primes processing of auditory input in the subsequent trial). For repetitions of 
incompatible tasks (e.g., visual-vocal), no such effect would occur (e.g., vocal output would not 
prime processing of visual input). However, such a priming effect should be reversed in switch 
trials, so that no priming (or even interference) should occur in modality compatible tasks (e.g., 
output in the auditory-vocal task would not prime processing input in the visual-manual task), 
whereas a priming effect should occur in modality incompatible tasks. Hence, this kind of 
across-trial priming can be excluded as explanation of the influence of I-O modality 
compatibility on switch costs. 
Also, note that the present influence of I-O modality compatibility on task switching 
cannot be accounted for by the concept of ideomotor compatibility (Greenwald, 1972). This 
concept refers to the specific match of stimuli and response-specific sensory effects, but our 
tasks were clearly not ideomotor compatible in that narrow sense (e.g., hearing a tone at the left 
has no sensory resemblance to saying “left”). Hence, our data show that there are benefits of 
modality compatible I-O mappings independent from the specific stimuli and responses used in 
the modalities. In that sense, the present data represent an important generalization of the 
ideomotor idea that responses are coded in terms of their anticipated consequences (e.g., 
Greenwald, 1972). 
In conclusion, the present study demonstrates that I-O modality compatibility is an 
important factor in task switching. The data suggests that modality incompatible tasks increase 
between-task crosstalk primarily in task switches. An important theoretical implication of this 
suggestion is that task sets include modality-specific components. 
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Footnote 
1
Note that in Experiment 2 in tasks with short RSI (600 ms), different than in Experiment 1, 
RT on repetitions of compatible tasks (446 ms) was comparable to RT on repetitions of 
incompatible tasks (441 ms) (t < 1), but since our study is focused on the influence of I-O 
modality compatibility on switch costs (which is replicated across experiments), we do not 
discuss this particular difference between experiments in more detail.  
 
2
Note that RTs for tasks requiring vocal responses were in both experiments generally higher 
than for manual responses (see Table 1). To assure that switch costs do not differ in the 
individual tasks, we compared switch costs in Experiment 1 in the two I-O modality 
incompatible tasks (105 ms vs. 131 ms) and in the two compatible tasks (86 ms vs. 95 ms) 
using t-tests, but the differences within the modality compatibility conditions were not 
significant (ts < 1.4, p > .19). In Experiment 2, switch costs differed neither in the two 
incompatible tasks (117 ms vs. 118 ms with short RSI; 60 ms vs. 78 ms with long RSI) nor in 
the two compatible tasks (80 ms vs. 91 ms with short RSI; 60 ms vs. 67 ms with long RSI)(ts 
< 1.5, p > .16). 
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Table 1 
Mean response times (RT) and percentage error (PE) for the individual tasks in the task-switching blocks as a function of task transition and RSI 
for Experiment 1 and for Experiment 2. 
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8.8 (4.2) 
 
20.9 (9.8) 
 
17.1 (13.7) 
 
repetition 
 
7.5 (6.8) 
 
5.4 (3.5) 
  
4.6 (5.2) 
 
6.0 (6.1) 
 
8.7 (6.9) 
 
8.4 (7.6) 
 
switch costs 
 
12.2 
 
7.6 
  
6.7 
 
2.8 
 
12.2 
 
8.7 
 
    
            manual output 
             
 
switch 
 
6.0 (4.8) 
 
5.6 (4.1) 
  
3.0 (5.5) 
 
4.0 (4.4) 
 
5.7 (8.1) 
 
4.4 (4.8) 
 
repetition 
 
2.9 (3.6) 
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2.0 (3.2) 
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switch costs 
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4.1 
  
1.0 
 
3.4 
 
2.9 
 
3.8 
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Figure captions 
Figure 1. Mean RTs in Experiment 1 as a function of I-O modality compatibility. 
Figure 2. Mean RTs in Experiment 2 as a function of I-O modality compatibility and RSI (600 
ms vs. 1600 ms).  
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Abstract 
Input–output (I-O) modality compatibility refers to the similarity of stimulus modality and 
modality of response-related sensory consequences. A previous study found higher switch costs 
in task switching in I-O modality incompatible tasks (auditory-manual and visual-vocal) than in 
I-O modality compatible tasks (auditory-vocal and visual-manual). However, these tasks had 
spatially compatible S–R mappings, which implied dimensional overlap (DO). DO may have led 
to automatic activation of the corresponding compatible responses in the incorrect response 
modality, thus increasing interference effects. The present study was aimed to examine the 
influence of DO on I-O modality compatibility effects. In two experiments, we found that I-O 
modality compatibility affects task switching even in tasks without DO, which even tended to 
result in further increased modality influences. This finding suggests that I-O modality mappings 
affect response selection by affecting between-task cross-talk not on the level of specific 
response codes but on the level of modality-specific processing pathways. 
 
 
Keywords: cognitive control, task switching, modality, S-R compatibility, cross-talk,  
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The task-switching paradigm has been developed to study cognitive control processes 
(see, Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994; Rogers & Monsell, 1995). In task-switching experiments, 
participants perform one of two different tasks in each trial. Performance on task-switch trials is 
compared to repetition trials. Usually, one finds costs in both reaction time (RT) and error rate 
(PE) for switch trials compared to repetition trials (“switch costs”, see, e.g., Kiesel, Steinhauser, 
Wendt, Falkenstein, Jost, Philipp, & Koch, 2010; Koch, Gade, Schuch, & Philipp, 2010; 
Vandierendonck, Liefooghe, & Verbruggen, 2010). 
During the past, different factors influencing switch costs have been studied intensely, 
like preparation (Goschke, 2000; Meiran, 1996; Rogers & Monsell, 1995), time-based decay 
(Horoufchin, Philipp, & Koch, 2011), stimulus modality switches (Murray, de Santis, Thut, & 
Wylie, 2009; Lukas, Philipp, & Koch, 2010) or response modality switches (e.g., Philipp & 
Koch, 2005). However, the interaction of stimulus (i.e., input) modality effects and response 
(i.e., output) modality effects has rarely been studied.  
Recent studies addressing the influence of I-O modality combinations used the dual-task 
paradigm (e.g., Hazeltine, Ruthruff, & Remington, 2006; Ruthruff, Hazeltine, & Remington, 
2006; Stelzel, & Schubert, in press; Stelzel, Schumacher, Schubert, & D’Esposito, 2006). 
Ruthruff et al.  (2006) found an effect of input and output (I-O) modality mappings on dual-task 
performance also with nonsimultaneous stimulus presentation (see Pashler, 1994). Specifically, 
these authors found that dual-task costs were higher when visual-vocal and auditory-manual 
tasks were paired than when visual-manual and auditory-vocal tasks were paired. 
An influence of input and output (I-O) modality combinations in dual-task performance 
was already reported by Greenwald (1972) and Greenwald and Shulman (1973). They found 
reduced dual-task costs with ideomotor compatible tasks (Greenwald, 1972; Greenwald & 
Shulman, 1973). Greenwald proposed that actions are coded by the mental image of the sensory 
feedback they produce (see, e.g., Shin, Proctor, & Capaldi, 2010). Accordingly, saying “A” in 
response to hearing the letter “A” would be ideomotor compatible because of the exact match of 
 -71- 
the specific response (“A”) and the specific stimulus (“A”). In contrast, saying “one” in response 
to hearing the letter “A” would not be ideomotor compatible. Importantly, though, both tasks 
described above would be I-O modality compatible because of the match of input modality and 
modality of the output effect (i.e., the auditory sensory consequences). As this example 
underlines, the concept of ideomotor compatibility is highly specific, while I-O modality 
compatibility refers generally to the similarity of stimulus modality and modality of response-
related sensory consequences (Hazeltine et al., 2006; Stephan & Koch, 2010). 
In a recent study, we examined the influence of I-O modality combinations in serial task 
switching using two spatial RT tasks (Stephan & Koch, 2010). In the I-O modality compatible 
condition, participants responded to visually presented diamonds either on the left or right side of 
the display by pressing a left or right key on a keyboard (visual-manual task), and they 
responded to tones presented on the left or right ear by saying “links” or “rechts” (i.e., the 
german words for left and right; auditory-vocal task). In the incompatible condition, participants 
responded to the diamonds by saying “links” or “rechts” (visual-vocal task), and to the tones by 
pressing the left or right key (auditory-manual task). The major finding was that visual-vocal 
tasks combined with auditory-manual tasks produced substantially larger switch costs than 
visual-manual tasks combined with auditory-vocal tasks. Hence, this study demonstrated that the 
influence of I-O modality compatibility is not restricted to conditions of extreme temporal task 
overlap but extends to strictly serial task switching. 
In line with Ruthruff et al. (2006) and Hazeltine et al. (2006), we assumed that this 
influence is due to special linkages between stimuli and responses that are based on natural 
tendencies to bind certain stimuli to certain responses (see also Proctor & Vu, 2006; Stelzel et 
al., 2006). In addition, we proposed that on modality incompatible tasks these special linkages 
evoke cross-talk of central processing codes (see also Hazeltine et al., 2006) resulting in 
increased switch costs. Usually, cross-talk describes the unwanted transmission of input of one 
task to a component of the other task if two task sets overlap (e.g., Koch, 2009; Meyer & Kieras, 
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1997; Navon & Miller, 1987). Notably, in task switching, two task sets have to be kept 
constantly active, so that cross-talk between task sets occurs not only when the tasks have close 
temporal overlap, as in dual-tasks, but also in strictly serial task switching.  
Note, however, that Stephan and Koch (2010) used spatially S-R compatible I-O 
modality compatible and incompatible tasks, in which the stimulus sets and response sets were 
characterised by a high degree of dimensional overlap (DO; Kornblum, 1992; Kornblum, 
Hasbroucq, & Osman, 1990; Proctor & Vu, 2006). DO is defined as the degree to which a 
stimulus set and a response set are conceptually, perceptually, physically or structurally similar 
(Kornblum et al., 1990). In general, a high degree of DO results in superior perfomance. Effects 
of DO are very robust and have been obtained for a wide range of stimulus and response sets and 
within a variety of different tasks (see Proctor & Vu, 2006, for an overview).  
Kornblum et al. (1990) proposed a dual-process model to explain the influence of DO. 
This model distinguishes between an automatic and an intentional response selection process. In 
tasks without DO, the relevant stimulus information has to be translated into a response 
intentionally, following the task instructions. However, if DO is present, the corresponding 
response to the stimulus is in addition to the intentional translation also automatically activated 
(Kornblum et al., 1990).  
In our previous study, we used tasks with DO, which was not restricted to the stimulus set 
and response set within one task, but extends also across the two tasks (i.e., between the stimulus 
set of one task and the response set of the other task). This was the case because both tasks 
involved the physical location of the stimuli and, therefore, involved spatial codes. In the I-O 
modality compatible tasks, for example, the physical locations of the visual stimuli (left vs. right) 
have conceptual, physical and perceptual similarity with left and right keypresses (i.e., with the 
required manual responses). But additionally they have conceptual similarity with the spoken 
responses “links” and “rechts”, which were only required if the stimulus was presented 
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auditorily. As this example underlines, using spatial stimuli might have caused automatic 
activation of the corresponding responses even in the incorrect response modality. Therefore, 
DO might have contributed to the increased between-task cross-talk as a basis of I-O modality 
compatibility effects (Stephan & Koch, 2010). That is, if the I-O modality compatibility effect in 
task switching occurs only when DO is present, then this would suggest that the I-O modality 
compatibility effect is based on automatic activation of specific response codes, which then 
create cross-talk. However, if the I-O modality compatibility effect can be demonstrated even 
without DO, then this would suggest that I-O modality compatibility is mediated by more 
general cross-talk at the level of whole modality-specific processing pathways underlying non-
automatic, intentional response selection.  
In sum, the present study was aimed to examine the influence of DO on I-O modality 
compatibility effects in task switching.  To this end, we devised tasks with no DO within and 
across tasks. In Experiment 1, we used tasks without DO to determine if DO is necessary for the 
occurrence of the effect of I-O modality compatibility. Experiment 2 examined directly whether 
the effect of I-O modality compatibility is stronger in tasks with DO as compared to tasks 
without DO. 
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, we used tasks without DO. Each compatibility condition (i.e., visual-
manual and auditory-vocal tasks for the compatible condition and visual-vocal and auditory-
manual tasks for the incompatible condition) started with two single-task blocks, followed by 
two task-switching blocks. The assessment of single-task performance was necessary to control 
whether I-O modality compatibility affects individual task difficulty independent from its 
possible effects in task switching (see also Hazeltine et al., 2006). In order to avoid modality 
priming effects (see e.g., Lukas, Philipp, & Koch, 2010), we only used univalent stimuli in the 
experiments.
1
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Method 
Participants. Sixteen native German speakers (5 women and 11 men, mean age = 22.1 
years) were tested and received € 6 for taking part in the experiment. Hearing and visual acuity 
were normal or corrected-to-normal.  
Stimuli and Apparatus. Visual stimuli were white squares and circles on black 
background with a width and height of 1.5 cm, presented at the center of a 15 '' display (Sony,  
Multiscan 200/SX). The viewing distance was about 60 cm. Auditory stimuli were the spoken 
letters “X” and “M” presented binaurally via headphones (Speed Link SL 8755, Weertzen, 
Germany). For manual responses, two keys (Ctrl and Alt) were chosen from a QWERTZ 
keyboard. Participants responded with the index fingers of the left and right hand, respectively. 
Vocal responses were made by saying “A” or “eins (one)”. RT (i.e., speech onset) in vocal 
responses was measured using a voice key. Accuracy of vocal responses was online coded by the 
experimenter in the intertrial interval. To avoid DO, we used arbitray S-R mappings without DO 
(e.g., a square is not associated with the vocal response “A”, nor is it associated with pressing 
any particular key on a keyboard). These mappings were fully counterbalanced arcross 
participants.  
Procedure. At the beginning of the experiment, written instructions appeared on the 
screen, but the experimenter also explained the tasks orally. Participants were requested to 
respond as accurately and as fast as possible.  
Each participant took part in the I-O modality compatible and in the incompatible 
condition (i.e., visual-manual and auditory-vocal tasks for the compatible condition and visual-
vocal and auditory-manual tasks for the incompatible condition). Accordingly, participants had 
to learn the S-R mapping for one condition and after completing all blocks of that condition, they 
had to learn a new S-R mapping for the other condition. The order of I-O modality compatible 
and incompatible conditions was counterbalanced across participants. At the beginning of each I-
O modality compatibility condition, two single-task blocks were presented (order 
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counterbalanced across participants). Single-task blocks included eight practice trials and 40 
experimental trials each (i.e., 40 trials of the visual-manual and 40 trials of the auditory-vocal 
tasks for the I-O modality compatible condition, and 40 trials of the visual-vocal and 40 trials of 
the auditory-manual tasks for the I-O modality incompatible condition, respectively). In each 
modality-compatibility condition, single-task blocks were followed by two task-switching 
blocks, containing only the two tasks (either both I-O modality compatible or both I-O modality 
incompatible) in random order. The first task-switching block in each condition was preceded by 
48 practice trials. Both task-switching blocks consisted of 80 trials (i.e., 160 trials in the I-O 
modality compatible condition and 160 trials in the I-O modality incompatible condition).  
Stimuli were presented individually (i.e., visual or auditory), so that no additional task 
cues were needed because the I-O modality mapping was fixed within blocks. After each block, 
participants received feedback about mean RT in the preceding block and were offered a little 
rest. The next block was initiated by pressing any key. In all blocks, the stimulus and response 
sequence was random, with the constraint that each stimulus appeared equally frequently. 
Each trial started with the onset of the imperative stimulus and lasted until a response was 
made or until 1500 ms had elapsed. The response-stimulus interval (RSI) in correct trials was 
600 ms. If an error was made, the German word “Fehler” (error) was displayed for 500 ms 
(lengthening the RSI to 1100 ms). The experiment took about 45 minutes. 
Design. The independent within-subjects variables were I-O modality compatibility 
(incompatible vs. compatible) and task transition (switch vs. repetition). The dependent measures 
were RT and percentage error (PE). For the analyses, mean RTs and PEs were collapsed across 
the two modality compatible tasks and across the two modality incompatible tasks. All 
significance tests were conducted with an alpha level of 0.05. 
Results and Discussion 
The first two experimental trials in each block were discarded (additionally to the practice 
trials). All responses given in the first 50 ms after stimulus onset were excluded because these 
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were most likely voice-key artefacts (0.1%). Additionally, all trials in which no response was 
detected were excluded (0.8%). For RT analysis, RTs were z-transformed for each subject 
separately and then all values exceeding +/- 3 were discarded as outliers (1.2%). Also, error trials 
and immediately subsequent trials were excluded. 
Single-task performance 
To analyse the effect of modality compatibility in single tasks, we ran an analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) with the variable of I-O modality compatibility. It revealed a significant 
difference between compatible and incompatible tasks for both RT, F(1, 15) = 110.464, MSE = 
47,818, p < .001, and PE, F(1, 15) = 8.458, MSE = 60, p < .05, indicating higher RT and PE on 
compatible tasks (458 ms, 7.0%) than on incompatible tasks (381 ms, 4.3%). Note that  
performance was actually worse in the I-O modality compatible single-task condition compared 
to the I-O modality incompatible single-task condition. The influence of I-O modality 
compatibility on single-task performance is most likely due to differences in the ease of response 
selection with the arbitrary S-R mappings. Note that there was no significant I-O modality 
compatibility effect in single-tasks in Stephan and Koch (2010), who used tasks with DO. In any 
case, the advantage for I-O incompatible tasks in the single-task condition should rather result in 
an advantage for I-O incompatible tasks in the task-switching condition. Accordingly, the effect 
of I-O modality compatibility on switch costs should be reversed or at least decreased. 
Therefore, any advantage of I-O modality compatibility in task switching can certainly not be 
due to better performance in single-task conditions (Table 1).  
Task-switching performance 
To examine the effect of I-O modality compatibility on task switching, RT and PE in 
task-switching blocks were submitted to an ANOVA with the independent variables of I-O 
modality compatibility and task transition (Table 1). 
--Table 1-- 
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For RT, the effect of task transition was significant, F(1, 15) = 72.745, MSE = 298,116, p 
< .001, indicating higher RT on switches (636 ms) than on repetitions (500 ms) and thus switch 
costs of 136 ms (see also Figure 1, left panel). There was also an effect of I-O modality 
compatibility, F(1, 15) = 5.649, MSE = 26,569, p < .05, indicating longer RTs in incompatible 
tasks than in compatible tasks (588 ms vs. 548 ms). Importantly, the interaction was significant, 
too, F(1, 15) = 21.670, MSE = 26,732, p < .001, showing that incompatible tasks led to larger 
switch costs (177 ms) than compatible tasks (95 ms).  
--Figure 1-- 
The same ANOVA on PE revealed an effect of task transition, F(1, 15) = 24.176, MSE = 
456, p < .001, indicating that mean PE was greater on switches (10.3%) than on repetitions 
(4.9%). There was also an effect of I-O modality compatibility, F(1, 15) = 9.079, MSE = 110, p 
< .01, indicating larger PE in incompatible tasks than in compatible tasks (8.9% vs. 6.3%, but the 
interaction was non-significant [F(1, 15) = 1.332, p > .2]. 
Given the significant main effect of I-O modality compatibility, it is important to 
demonstrate that the effect of I-O modality compatibility on switch costs is not just due to 
proportionally higher costs in tasks associated with higher RT. For this reason, we calculated the 
proportional switch costs for each compatibility condition by dividing switch costs by RT on 
repetition trials. Importantly, this re-analysis with proportional scores confirmed the effect of I-O 
modality compatibility on switch costs [F(1, 15) = 21.226, MSE = .215, p < .001]. 
In summary, Experiment 1 showed that, even in tasks without DO, switch costs are 
affected by I-O modality compatibility. However, it remains unclear whether or not DO had a 
specific influence on the effect of I-O modality compatibility in task switching. It is possible that 
in the spatial S-R tasks with DO, cross-talk was increased due to automatically activated 
response codes in the incorrect response modality, causing an increased effect of I-O modality 
compatiblity on switch costs. Therefore, in Experiment 2, we manipulated I-O modality 
compatibility and directly compared switch costs in tasks with DO and without DO. 
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Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants. Sixteen new native German speakers (12 women and 4 men, mean age = 
22.6 years) were tested and received € 6 for participation. Hearing and visual acuity were normal 
or corrected-to-normal.  
Stimuli, Apparatus, Procedure, and Design. There were two differences to Experiment 1. 
First, Experiment 2 included tasks with and without DO. The stimuli and apparatus in the tasks 
without DO were exactly the same as in Experiment 1. As tasks with DO we used the same tasks 
as in Stephan and Koch (2010). In that condition, visual stimuli were white diamonds on black 
background with a width and height of 1.5 cm, presented either 1.25 cm to the left or right of the 
center of the 15 '' display. Auditory stimuli were 400 Hz tones presented on either the left or 
right ear via headphones. For manual responses, two keys (Ctrl and Alt) were chosen from a 
QWERTZ keyboard. Participants responded with the index fingers of the left and right hand, 
respectively. Vocal responses were the words “links” (left) or “rechts” (right). The S-R mapping 
was spatially compatible.  
Second, I-O modality compatibility (compatible vs. incompatible) was a between-subject 
variable, but DO (with vs. without) and task transition (switch vs. repetition) were within-subject 
variables. Participants were divided into two groups of eight. Each group was either presented 
with the I-O modality compatible tasks or the I-O modality incompatible tasks. Within the 
groups, each participant took part in the condition with DO and in the condition without DO. In 
each group, in the condition with DO, only the spatially compatible S-R mappings were used 
(i.e., a right stimulus was mapped to a right response), whereas in each group, in the condition 
without DO, four different S-R mappings can be created by using each possible S-R mapping 
[i.e., in the I-O modality compatible group, visual-manual (2) and auditory-vocal tasks (2) 
provide four different combinations, in the I-O modality incompatible condition, visual-vocal (2) 
and auditory-manual tasks (2) provide four differnt combinations, too].  Participants were 
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randomly assigned to one of these combinations. The order of conditions with DO and without 
DO was counterbalanced across participants.  
Results and Discussion 
Data analyses proceeded as in Experiment 1. We excluded voice-key artefacts (RT < 50 
ms; 0.3%) and trials without responses (0.5%). For RT analysis, we RTs were z-transformed for 
each subject separately and then all values exceeding +/- 3 were discarded as outliers (1.0%), 
also error trials and immediately subsequent trials were excluded. 
Single-task performance 
For single-task data, a mixed ANOVA with the independent within-subject variable DO 
(with vs. without) and the between-subject variable I-O modality compatibility (compatible vs. 
incompatible) was run. It revealed a significant effect of DO for both RT [F(1, 14) = 133.574, 
MSE = 61,557, p < .001] and PE, [F(1, 14) = 6.798, MSE = 74, p < .05], indicating higher RT 
and PE in the condition without DO (443 ms; 6.2%) than in the condition with DO (356 ms; 
3.1%). For RT, the interaction between I-O modality compatibility and DO was significant, too 
[F(1, 14) = 41.415, MSE = 19,086, p < .001], showing a smaller effect of I-O modality 
compatibility on tasks with DO (3 ms) than on tasks without DO (102 ms). This interaction 
replicates earlier results. That is, when there is no DO, like in Experiment 1, performance in the 
I-O modality compatible conditions is actually worse than in the I-O modality incompatible 
condition (see Discussion section of Experiment 1). However, when there is DO in single tasks, 
I-O modality compatiblity has no significant influence, just like in Stephan and Koch (2010). For 
PE, the interaction was non-significant, F < 1. The between-subjects main effect of I-O modality 
compatibility was neither significant for RT [425 ms vs. 373 ms for modality compatible vs. 
modality incompatible group, F(1, 14) = 4.077, p > .06], nor for PE [(5.8% vs. 3.5%), F(1, 14) = 
2.697, p > .1] (Table 2). 
Task-switching performance 
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The ANOVA on the task-switching data additionally included task transition (switch vs. 
repetition) as a within-subject variable (Table 2; Figure 1, right panel). For RT, the effect of task 
transition was significant, F(1, 14) = 121.175, MSE = 131,044, p < .001, indicating longer RT on 
switches (579 ms) than on repetitions (489 ms). There was also an effect of DO, F(1, 14) = 
73.072, MSE = 148.321, p < .001, indicating shorter RTs in tasks with DO than without DO (486 
ms vs. 582 ms). Importantly, the two-way interaction between task transition and I-O modality 
compatibility was significant, F(1, 14) = 17.546, MSE = 18,975, p < .005, indicating larger RT 
switch costs in incompatible tasks (125 ms) than in compatible tasks (56 ms), confirming the 
data of Experiment 1. 
--Table 2 & Figure 1-- 
The interaction of task transition and DO was non-significant, F(1, 14) = 3.991, MSE = 
4,096, p > .06, even though switch costs tended to be higher without DO than with DO. 
Importantly, the influence of I-O modality compatibility on switch costs was numerically even 
larger in the conditions without DO than with DO. However, the corresponding three-way 
interaction was not significant, F(1, 14) = 2.221, MSE = 2,280, p > .15. It is possible that this 
interaction would be significant with increased statistical power, but the present result at the very 
least suggests that I-O modality compatibility has an influence on switch costs in tasks without 
dimensional overlap as well as in tasks with dimensional overlap. In the RT data, no other effect 
or interaction was significant, Fs < 1. 
The same three-way ANOVA on PE disclosed an effect of task transition, F(1, 14) = 
30.511, MSE = 607, p < .001, indicating greater PE on switches (10%) than on repetitions 
(3.8%). In addition, the interaction between DO and task transition, F(1, 14) = 7.962, MSE = 97, 
p < .05, was significant. PE switch costs were higher on tasks without DO (8.7%) than on tasks 
with DO (3.7%). No other effect or interaction was significant, Fs < 1. 
Taken together, the data of Experiment 2 confirmed that the effect of modality 
compatibility on switch costs is not exclusively mediated by DO. However, while Experiment 1 
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showed that the influence of I-O modality compatibility on switch costs extends to tasks without 
DO, Experiment 2 used a between-subjects design for I-O modality compatibility and showed 
that I-O modality compatibility affects switch costs in tasks without and with DO at least to a 
similar degree. 
General Discussion 
The present study was aimed to examine whether previously observed effects of I-O 
modality compatibility on switch costs in task switching were based on cross-talk due to 
automatic activation of specific response codes or of modality-specific processing pathways in 
general. A previous study used spatial S-R tasks with DO (Stephan & Koch, 2010), so that cross-
talk might have been due to automatically activated response codes in the incorrect response 
modality. Therefore, in Experiment 1 we devised tasks without DO and compared performance 
in I-O modality compatible tasks and I-O modality incompatible tasks. In Experiment 2, we 
devised tasks with DO and without DO and compared performance in an I-O modality 
compatible group and an I-O modality incompatible group.  
In both experiments, substantial switch costs were observed. Experiment 1 revealed that 
also in tasks without DO, I-O modality compatibility affects switch costs. In Experiment 2, the 
effect of I-O modality compatibility on switch costs was replicated. Furthermore, we 
demonstrated that I-O modality compatibility affects tasks with DO and tasks without DO. Note 
that in the I-O modality compatible and the I-O modality incompatible tasks the exact same 
stimuli and responses were used. Accordingly, differences in perception of auditory and visual 
stimuli as well as differences in response execution of vocal and manual responses should affect 
performance in the modality compatible and incompatible conditions similarly. 
The theoretical motivation of the present study was to examine whether the previously 
observed influence of I-O modality compatibility on switch costs in task switching (Stephan & 
Koch, 2010) was due to the presence of DO and thus of automatic activation of specific response 
codes as a basis of increased between-task cross-talk. The finding of clear I-O modality 
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compatibility effects on switch costs in tasks without DO rules this account out. In Experiment 2, 
the effect was at least as strong without DO than with DO, but we refrain from drawing strong 
conclusions from the non-significance of the corresponding three-way interaction because the 
statistical power may not have been high enough to detect this effect. If anything, however, 
finding increased effects of I-O modality compatibility on switch costs in tasks without DO 
would have further supported our argument that the presence of DO is not the crucial 
precondition for the influence of I-O modality compatibility in task switching. Hence, the data of 
the present study suggests that the effect of I-O modality compatibility on switch costs is not 
based on the automatic activation of specific response codes. Instead, this effect seems to be 
mediated by general cross-talk at the level of modality-specific processing pathways.  
In our previous study, we proposed that the influence of I-O modality compatibility in 
task switching is due to natural tendencies to bind certain stimuli to certain responses (see also 
Hazeltine et al., 2006; Proctor & Vu, 2006; Ruthruff et al., 2006; Stelzel et al., 2006), causing 
special linkages between stimuli and responses. These binding tendencies might evolve from 
life-long response-effect learning. Since birth, we experience that voicing creates audible effect 
and that moving (e.g., our hands) leads to changes in our visual environment (i.e., we see the 
movement of our hands, or of the things we touch). These response-effect mappings produce 
strong associations for anticipating response-produced environmental effects. Given that effect 
anticipation is a hallmark of intentional action (e.g., James, 1890; Greenwald, 1970; Prinz, 1997; 
Shin et al., 2010), I-O modality compatibility effects should naturally evolve from life-long 
response-effect learning.  
In contrast to compatible I-O mappings, incompatible I-O mappings refer to typically less 
strongly associated response-effect mappings. For example, voicing rarely produces immediate 
visual response-effects and manual responses only sometimes are intended to produce audible 
effects (e.g., piano playing). Therefore, the response-effect association with I-O incompatible 
tasks should be weaker than with I-O compatible tasks.  
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However, our present data generalize this idea.  It seems that the influence of I-O 
modality compatibility on switch costs in task switching is mediated by more general cross-talk 
at the level of modality-specific processing pathways rather than by the automatic activation of 
specific response codes. This more general idea of modality-specific processing pathways is also 
supported by studies using fMRI (Schubotz, von Cramon, & Lohmann, 2003; Schumacher, 
Schwarb, Lightman, & Hazeltine, in press). For example, Schubotz et al. (2003) demonstrated 
that visual stimulation primarily activated the superior ventrolateral premotor cortex, an area 
underlying prehension, whereas auditory stimulation primarily activated the inferior ventrolateral 
premotor cortex, an area underlying vocalization.  
The present data provides further evidence that I-O modality compatibility plays an 
important role in task switching (Stephan & Koch, 2010). In contrast, previous studies on I-O 
modality compatibility mainly focussed on dual-task performance (Greenwald, 1972; 
Greenwald, & Shulman, 1973; Hazeltine et al., 2006; Ruthruff et al., 2006; Stelzel et al., 2006). 
Thus the present data represent an important generalization of the role of I-O modality 
compatiblity in multitasking in general. 
In conclusion, the present study shows that I-O modality incompatible tasks increase 
between-task cross-talk in task switching. The contribution of the present study is to show that 
this I-O modality compatibility influence refers to whole modality-specific processing pathways, 
whereas automatic response activation as a function of DO within the S-R mapping in the tasks 
is not a necessary precondition for the I-O modality compatibility effects to occur on task 
switching. 
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Footnote 
1
Commonly, task-switching studies use bivalent stimuli (i.e., stimuli involving 
features relevant for both tasks), but clear switch costs have been found with univalent stimuli 
(i.e., stimuli involving features relevant to only one task), too (see e.g., Allport et al., 1994; 
Meiran, 2000; Rogers & Monsell, 1995, for a discussion). 
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Table 1  
Mean response times (RT) and percentage error (PE) for the I-O modality compatible and I-O modality incompatible tasks as a function of task 
transition for Experiment 1. 
 
 Task transition 
I-O modality compatibility Single tasks Repetition Switch Switch costs 
Incompatible     
  RT 381 (41) 500 (47) 677 (105) 177 
  PE 4.3 (3.3) 5.7 (2.8) 12.1 (5.0) 6.4 
Compatible     
  RT 458 (53) 500 (75) 595 (105) 95 
  PE 7.0 (3.1) 4.1 (2.5) 8.5 (5.6) 4.4 
 
 
Table 2  
Mean response times (RT) and percentage error (PE) for the I-O modality compatible and I-O modality incompatible tasks as a function of task 
transition and dimensional overlap (DO) for Experiment 2. 
. 
 Task transition 
 No DO DO 
I-O modality compatibility Single tasks Repetition Switch Switch costs Single tasks Repetition Switch Switch costs 
Incompatible         
  RT 392 (57) 503 (70) 655 (68) 152 354 (59) 443 (55) 540 (78) 97 
  PE 4.9 (4.7) 3.2 (4.0) 12.8 (12.8) 9.6 2.1 (2.3) 5.5 (4.4) 9.3 (6.3) 3.8 
Compatible         
  RT 494 (40) 555 (75) 615 (98) 60 357 (58) 454 (57) 506 (54) 52 
  PE 7.4 (3.9) 2.7 (1.1) 10.4 (3.9) 7.7 4.2 (3.0) 3.9 (4.2) 7.5 (3.4) 3.6 
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Figure 1. Mean RT switch costs in Experiment 1 (left panel) and Experiment 2 (right panel) as a function of I-O modality compatibility and 
dimensional overlap (DO). 
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Abstract 
Modality compatibility refers to the similarity of stimulus modality and modality of response-
related sensory consequences (e.g., vocal response effects are audible). Previous dual task 
studies found increased switch costs for modality incompatible tasks (auditory-manual and 
visual-vocal) compared to modality compatible tasks (auditory-vocal and visual-manual). The 
present task switching study examined modality compatibility and investigated vibrotactile 
stimulation as a novel alternative to visual stimulation. Interestingly, a stronger effect of 
modality compatibility on switch costs was revealed for the group with tactile and auditory 
stimulation compared to the group involving visual and auditory stimulation. We suggest that the 
modality compatibility effect is based on cross-talk of central processing codes due to ideomotor 
“backward” linkages between the anticipated response effects and the stimuli indicating this 
response. Due to a higher degree of compatibility in the tactile-manual tasks, crosstalk is 
increased in the group with tactile-auditory stimulation compared to the group with visual-
auditory stimulation. 
 
Keywords: cognitive control, task switching, modality compatibility, cross-talk, tactile 
stimulation, vibrotactile stimulation,  
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Usually, performance costs arise when two or more tasks are performed at once (Pashler, 
1998). Two major paradigms have been developed to study the origin of costs observed in such 
situations, namely the dual task paradigm and the task switching paradigm. Despite substantial 
differences between these paradigms, it has been found in both paradigms that the interrelation 
of the stimulus and response modalities involved affect the performance costs (Huestegge & 
Hazeltine, 2011). 
The influence of the specific combination of stimulus and response modalities on dual-
task performance has already been explored in the 1970s and 1980s. In general, performing two 
tasks simultaneously leads to performance costs (dual task costs, i.e., higher reaction time [RT] 
and error rate) in at least one of the tasks compared to when only one task is performed (see e.g., 
Pashler, 1998). These studies typically used a dual-task paradigm combining two rather complex 
continuous tasks (e.g., driving, writing, reading, etc.), either involving the same versus different 
stimulus or response modalities across tasks. The major result was that performing two tasks 
involving the same stimulus or response modality resulted in increased dual-task costs (e.g., 
Hirst, Neisser, & Spelke, 1978; Spelke, Hirst, & Neisser, 1976) relative to tasks differing in 
stimulus and/or response modality.  
To account for these results, multiple resource accounts were proposed (e.g., Wickens, 
1980, 1984, 2008). These accounts assume that dual-task interference is determined by the extent 
to which two tasks depend on the same domain-specific processing resources. However, due to 
the use of rather complex continuous tasks, there was no full experimental control over the time 
course of underlying cognitive processing limitations (e.g., Meyer & Kieras, 1997, Pashler, 
1994). 
The influence of stimulus and response modalities on dual-task costs has also been 
considered in terms of ideomotor compatibility (Greenwald, 1972). The main idea is that actions 
are coded as the anticipated mental image of their sensory feedback. Greenwald (1972, 2003) 
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reported that dual-task costs are determined by the similarity between a stimulus and the sensory 
feedback of the assigned response (e.g., naming a letter in response to hearing it). But the 
concept of ideomotor compatibility is quite specific and narrow as it relies on the exact match 
between a stimulus (e.g,. hearing the letter “A”) and a response (i.e., saying “A”), whereas 
matching stimulus and response modalities (e.g., hearing “A” and responding by saying “one”) 
would not be considered ideomotor compatible. 
More recent dual-task studies began to broaden the focus and investigated more directly 
whether dual-task costs are determined by the combinations of stimulus and response modalities 
of the tasks involved (see e.g., Hazeltine, Ruthruff, & Remington, 2006). For example, Hazeltine 
et al., (2006) compared performance in a condition comprising tasks with visual stimulation and 
manual responses (i.e., visual–manual (VM) tasks) and tasks with auditory stimulation and vocal 
responses (i.e., auditory–vocal (AV) tasks) to a condition comprising visual-vocal (VV) tasks 
and auditory-manual (AM) tasks. Hazeltine et al. (2006) found increased dual-task costs when 
VM and AV tasks were combined relative to when VV and AM tasks were combined. They 
assumed that this advantage for certain stimulus-response modality mappings relies on preferred 
modality-specific processing pathways that are based on natural binding preferences between 
certain stimulus and response modalities (Hazeltine et al., 2006). 
In recent work, we advanced previous research by demonstrating that the modality-
specific influence is a general phenomenon that does not only occur in dual-task situations but 
extends to task switching situations (Stephan & Koch, 2010; 2011). Generally, switching 
between two or more tasks causes interference (i.e., switch costs), which can be measured as the 
performance difference between task switches and repetitions (for reviews, see Kiesel et al., 
2010; Vandierendonck, Liefooghe & Verbruggen, 2010). In these studies (Stephan & Koch, 
2010, 2011), the same modality pairings as in previous dual-task studies (e.g., Hazeltine et al., 
2006) were used (i.e., VM and AV tasks were compared to VV and AM tasks). 
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The major finding was that switch costs are increased when switching between VV and 
AM tasks (termed modality compatible) compared to switching between VM and AV tasks 
(termed modality incompatible). In order to explain this effect of modality compatibility, we 
extended the general idea of the ideomotor principle, which is that the anticipation of the sensory 
response effect guides response selection (e.g., James, 1890; Greenwald, 1970; Herwig & 
Waszak, 2009; Prinz, 1997; see also Shin, Proctor & Capaldi, 2010, for a review) to the notion of 
modality compatibility. In contrast to the notion of ideomotor compatibility, modality 
compatibility is not restricted to the perfect match of a stimulus and a response but depends on 
the modalities involved. As the underlying mechanisms behind the modality compatibility effect 
we assume that the imperative stimuli are linked backwards to the anticipated response effects. If 
the modality of the anticipated response effect matches the modality of the stimulus, as in 
modality compatible tasks, selection of a response in the correct modality is primed. In other 
words, we assume that the stimulus induced activation of the stimulus representation and the 
anticipatory activation of the effect representation prime each other on the modality level. Thus, 
response selection is determined by the degree of similarity between the stimulus modality and 
the response related sensory consequences. For example, manual movements can be perceived 
visually, whereas overall audible effects (e.g., playing the piano) might be less representative. 
Likewise, speaking is primarily perceived auditorily, whereas the associated tactile effects in the 
laryngeal tracts seem much less salient. 
In contrast, in modality incompatible task the modality of the anticipated sensory 
response effect and the stimulus-induced activation would not match. Furthermore, whenever 
two tasks involve modality incompatible mappings, the modality-specific ideomotor backward 
linkages would cause cross-talk between tasks. Specifically, the stimulus-induced activation of 
the stimulus representation and the anticipatory activation of the effect representation would not 
match within but between tasks. Thus, the modality of the anticipated response effect in one task 
would prime processing of a stimulus presented in the modality relevant for the competing task. 
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Likewise, the stimulus-induced activation of the present task would match the anticipatory 
response effect of the competing task on the level of modalities.  
In a recent study, we examined the role of the response modality for the effect of 
modality compatibility by focusing on the role of oculomotor responses (Stephan, Koch, 
Hendler, & Huestegge, 2013). Unexpectedly, while the modality compatibility effect on switch 
costs was replicated for the vocal-manual response group, it was largely abolished for the vocal-
oculomotor response group. This implies that oculomotor responses are triggered equally well by 
auditory and visual stimulation (e.g., Zambarbieri, 2002). This presumably stems from the 
general importance to perceive the location of potential threats as rapidly as possible independent 
from the sensory modality of the associated cues. That is, while we found modality compatibility 
effects with the vocal and manual response modality, this did not extend to oculomotor 
responses. 
These earlier findings showed that the specific modalities involved substantially 
determine the modality compatibility effect (Stephan et al., 2013), which underlines the necessity 
to examine whether the underlying modality-specific mechanisms extend to other modalities. 
Since prior evidence remained restricted to two stimulus modalities (i.e., visual and auditory) 
and explored the range of response modalities (Stephan et al., 2013), the present study aimed at 
exploring the role of stimulus modality. Specifically, we tested if the influence of modality 
compatibility can be demonstrated using tactile stimulation. 
Tactile stimulation, specifically vibrotactile stimulation, has already been used by 
Leonard (1959) to investigate tactile choice reactions. Since then the peripheral sensory 
mechanisms and the processing underlying tactile stimulation have been examined extensively 
(see e.g., Craig & Rollman, 1999). More recent studies focused on understanding selective 
attention and cross-modal integration of tactile perception (see e.g., Frings, Bader, & Spence, 
2008; Johansen-Berg & Lloyd, 2000; Spence, 2002, for a review) and also compared tactile 
stimulation to stimulation in other modalities regarding, for example, statistical learning 
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(Conway & Christiansen, 2006). However, whether due to technical possibilities or pragmatism, 
compared to stimulation in other modalities tactile stimulation has rarely been used. Moreover, 
tactile stimulation has never been considered in the context of modality compatibility.  
Implementing tactile stimulation as an alternative to visual stimulation in studies 
researching modality-specific influences in task switching is important. Usually, coordinating the 
movement of our hands depends on visual guidance and proprioception. Manual movements 
themselves cause tactile input (e.g., we feel a key been drawn back as our finger presses it) but 
not necessarily visual input (e.g., we can move our hand out of sight), and even this potential 
visual input can easily be ignored (by shutting our eyes), whereas this is not the case for our 
sense of touch. Accordingly, it is possible to perform even complex manual movements, like 
touch typing or playing the piano, without any visual feedback, whereas tactile feedback remains 
crucial for these abilities (Cole, 1995). 
Moreover, tactile perception benefits from movement. For example, Morley Goodwin 
and Darian-Smith (1983) found lower thresholds for roughness discrimination with dynamic 
touch (e.g. finger is moving over a surface) compared to static (e.g. finger is not moving) touch 
(see also Cybulska-Klosewicz, Meftah, Raby, Lemieux, & Chapman, 2011). For these reasons 
we assume that the modality compatibility effect should be greater or at least comparable in the 
tactile-auditory stimulus group compared to the visual-auditory stimulus group. 
In the present study we used the same tasks as in previous experiments (Stephan & Koch, 
2010) and replaced the visual stimuli with tactile stimuli, thereby creating a condition including 
an AV task combined with a tactile-manual (TM) task and a condition with a AM task combined 
with an tactile-vocal (TV) task.
 In the following, we will refer to the TM tasks as “modality 
compatible” and to the TV tasks as “modality incompatible” even though the aim of the present 
study was to test this assumption. Moreover, going beyond merely demonstrating the existence 
of modality compatibility effects in task switching using tactile stimulation (i.e., tactile-auditory 
group), we also examined whether these effects (if observed) would be different from that 
 -99- 
observed in a visual-auditory control group, for which this effect has already been reliably 
observed (e.g., Stephan & Koch, 2011). 
Method 
Participants 
Fourty-eight participants (36 women, mean age = 23.4 years) were tested. Hearing and 
visual acuity were normal (or corrected to normal). They received course credit or payment, and 
gave their informed consent. We randomly divided participants into two groups of 24 (visual-
auditory stimulus group vs. tactile-auditory stimulus group, see below). 
Stimuli and Apparatus 
Visual-auditory stimulus group. In the visual-auditory stimulus group, we used the exact 
same setup as in a previous study (Stephan & Koch, 2010). As visual stimuli, we used white 
diamonds (width and height of 1.5 cm), presented against a black background either 1.25 cm left 
or right to the center of a 15'' display. Viewing distance amounted to 60 cm. Auditory stimuli 
were 400 Hz tones presented via headphones (Speed Link, SL 8755) either on the left or right 
ear. Vocal responses were made by saying the german words “links” (left) or “rechts” (right) and 
RT (i.e., speech onset) was measured using a voice key. Accuracy of vocal responses was coded 
online by the experimenter during the intertrial interval. Manual responses were maded by 
pressing a left (Ctrl) or right (Alt) key on a QWERTZ keyboard with left vs. right index fingers. 
Tactile-auditory stimulus group. Auditory stimuli and vocal responses were the same as 
in the visual-auditory stimulus group. For vibrotactile stimulation, vibrating external keys were 
used (width and height of 5 cm). Vibrations were created via an implemented playstation 
handcontrol motor. Participants were instructed to place their left and right index fingers on the 
keys and leave them there during the entire experiment. Manual responses were made by 
pressing the left or right vibration key in concordance with the location of vibration with the 
index finger of the left and right hand, respectively. 
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Throughout all conditions and tasks, responses were allways spatially compatible to the 
imperative stimuli, thereby ensuring maximally comparable S-R compatibility in both modality 
compatibility conditions.  
Procedure  
At the beginning of the experiment, written instructions were presented on the screen and 
additionally the experimenter explained the task. Participants were instructed to respond as 
accurately and fast as possible.  
Each participant took part in the modality compatible condition (i.e., VM and AV tasks 
for the visual-auditory stimulus group and TM and AV tasks for the tactile-auditory stimulus 
group) and in the incompatible condition (i.e., VV and AM tasks for the visual-auditory stimulus 
group and TV and AM for the tactile-auditory stimulus group), with condition order 
counterbalanced across participants. In each modality compatibility condition, two single-task 
blocks (order counterbalanced across participants) were presented,  followed by two task-
switching blocks. Each single-task block contained only one task, which was presented for four 
practice trials and 40 experimental trials (e.g., for the tactile-auditory stimulus group in the 
modality compatible condition a single-task block would contain either the TM task or the AV 
task). In the two task-switching blocks, both tasks (both either modality compatible or modality 
incompatible) were presented in random order (e.g., for the tactile-auditory stimulus group in the 
modality compatible condition, the task-switching blocks would contain the TM and the AV 
task). Both task-switching blocks consisted of 80 trials, but only the first task-switching block 
was preceded by eight practice trials. 
The stimulus (and response) sequence was random in all blocks, with the constraint that 
each stimulus appeared equally frequently. The modality mapping was fixed within blocks and 
stimuli were presented individually (i.e., visual, tactile or auditory), therefore no additional task 
cues were necessary. After each block, participants received feedback about mean RT in the 
preceding block. The next block was initiated via keypress. 
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Each trial started with the onset of the imperative stimulus and lasted until a response was 
made or until 1500 ms had elapsed. The response-stimulus interval (RSI) was 600 ms in correct 
trials. In case of an error, the German word “Fehler” (error) was displayed for 500 ms 
(lengthening the RSI to 1,100 ms). The experiment was run in a single session of about 45 
minutes. 
Design 
The independent between-subjects variable was group (visual-auditory vs. tactile-
auditory). The independent within-subjects variables were modality compatibility (incompatible 
vs. compatible) and task transition (switch vs. repetition). The dependent variables were RT and 
percentage of errors (PE). Please note that we proceeded as in previous studies and collapsed the 
data across the two modality compatible tasks and across the two modality incompatible tasks to 
equate for trivial influences of stimulus and response modalities across modality compatibility 
conditions (see also Stephan & Koch, 2010, 2011, 2013). 
Results 
Practice trials as well as the first two experimental trials in each block were discarded. 
Responses given within the first 50 ms after stimulus onset were excluded (2.8%) as artifacts. 
RTs exceeding +/- 3 SD (intraindividually) from the mean were discarded as outliers (1.6%). 
Also, error trials and immediately subsequent trials were excluded from the RT analysis.  
Single-task performance 
To analyse the effect of modality compatibility in single tasks, a mixed ANOVA with the 
independent between-subject variable group and the within-subject variable modality 
compatibility was run. 
For RT, it revealed a significant between-subjects main effect of group, F(1, 46) = 14.07, 
p < .001, ηp² = .234, indicating shorter RTs in the visual-auditory (358 ms) than in the tactile-
auditory stimulus group (429 ms) due to the overall longer latencies in tasks with tactile 
stimulation (see below). There was no significant RT difference between compatible and 
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incompatible tasks, F < 1, and also the two-way interaction between group and modality 
compatibility was not significant, F(1, 46) = 4.00, p = .051, ηp² = .080. The non-significant trend 
indicates a larger (but reversed) modality compatibility effect in the visual-auditory group (-18 
ms) than in the tactile-auditory stimulus group (9 ms). 
For PE, there was also a main effect of group, F(1, 46) = 5.20, p < .05, ηp² = .101, 
indicating smaller PE in the visual-auditory (3.4%) than in the tactile-auditory stimulus group 
(5.8%). The main effect of modality compatibility was not significant, F(1, 46) = 2.70, p = .107, 
ηp² = .055, but the interaction between group and modality compatibility was significant, F(1, 
46) = 7.17, p < .05, ηp² = .135, showing that the effect of modality compatiblity was smaller in 
the visual-auditory group (1%) than in the tactile-auditory stimulus group (4.1%). To follow up 
on this interaction, we conducted separate ANOVAs for each group. For the tactile-auditory 
stimulus group, the effect of modality compatibility was significant, F(1, 23) = 7.13, p < .05, ηp² 
= .237, indicating higher PE in incompatible (7.9%) than in compatible tasks (3.8%), but this 
effect was not significant for the visual-auditory stimulus group, F < 1. 
Note that in single-task conditions, the PE data revealed a small performance benefit for 
compatible tasks in the tactile-auditory group. Accordingly, differences in single-task 
performance cannot be ruled out as an explanation of a possible effect of modality compatibility 
in task switching. Moreover, RT data and PE data show a significant difference between both 
groups. To rule out these single-task differences in task difficulty between modality compatible 
and incompatible tasks as a basis for the modality compatibility effect in task switching, we 
additionally analysed the RT data using proportional switch cost (see below). 
Task switching performance 
RT and PE in task-switching blocks were submitted to an ANOVA with the independent 
between-subject variable group and the within-subject variables modality compatibility and task 
transition. 
--Table 1-- 
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For RT, the effect of task transition was significant, F(1, 46) = 328.71, p < .001, ηp² = 
.877, indicating higher RT on switches (601 ms) than on repetitions (494 ms). The effect of 
modality compatibility was significant, too, F(1, 46) = 152.74, p < .001, ηp² = .769, indicating 
shorter RT in compatible (502 ms) than in incompatible tasks (593 ms). There was also a main 
effect of group, F(1, 46) = 32.10, p < .001, ηp² = .411, indicating longer RTs in the tactile-
auditory stimulus group (608 ms) than in the visual-auditory stimulus group (488 ms), which 
may be due to the overall longer latencies of processing tactile stimulation (see below). 
Notably, the two-way interaction between task transition and modality compatibility was 
clearly significant, F(1, 46) = 54.43, p < .001, ηp² = .542, indicating larger RT switch costs in 
incompatible (143 ms) than in compatible tasks (72 ms). This effect nicely replicates earlier 
findings (e.g., Stephan & Koch, 2011). Moreover, group entered two significant two-way 
interactions. The interaction between group and modality compatibility was significant, F(1, 46) 
= 54.22, p < .001, ηp² = .541, showing that the effect of modality compatiblity was larger in the 
tactile-auditory stimulus group (145 ms) than in the visual-auditory (37 ms). Also, the interaction 
between group and task transition was significant, F(1, 46) = 5.50, p < .05, ηp² = .107, revealing 
larger switch costs in the tactile-auditory stimulus group (121 ms) than in the visual-auditory (94 
ms). Crucially, the three-way interaction was significant, too, F(1, 46) = 32.10, p < .001, ηp² = 
.411, indicating a larger effect of modality compatibility on switch costs in the tactile-auditory 
stimulus group (109 ms) than in the visual-auditory stimulus group (35 ms). 
To further qualify the three-way interaction, we conducted separate two-way ANOVAs 
for each group. The ANOVA for the tactile-auditory stimulus group revealed a significant two-
way interaction, F(1, 23) = 45.63, p < .001, ηp² = .665, indicating larger RT switch costs in 
incompatible tasks (175 ms) than in compatible tasks (67 ms). The same ANOVA for the visual-
auditory stimulus group also revealed a significant two-way interaction, F(1, 23) = 10.31, p < 
.005, ηp² = .310, indicating larger RT switch costs in incompatible (112 ms) than in compatible 
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tasks (76 ms), nicely confirming the data of Stephan and Koch (2010; 2011), but this two-way 
interaction was simply significantly less pronounced than in the tactile-auditory group. 
Given the significant main effect of modality compatibility (in task switching blocks) and 
of group (in task switching blocks and in single task blocks), we standardized switch costs within 
each group for each task based on the appropriate mean repetition RT to ascertain that higher 
switch costs with modality compatible tasks were not just proportional to tasks with overall 
higher RT. After collapsing these proportional measures across both compatible tasks and across 
both incompatible tasks, a two-way ANOVA with the independent between-subject variable 
group and the within-subject variables modality compatibility was conducted. Importantly, this 
reanalysis with proportional measures confirmed the interaction between modality compatibility 
and group on switch costs, F(1, 46) = 6.39, p < .05, ηp² = .122. Separate ANOVAs for each 
group using proportional switch costs showed the effect of modality compatibility on switch 
costs in both groups (visual-auditory stimulus group: F(1, 23) = 6.47, p < .05, ηp² = .580; tactile-
auditory stimulus group: F(1, 23) = 31.76, p < .001, ηp² = .219). 
--Figure 1-- 
The same three-way ANOVA on PE revealed a significant effect of task transition, F(1, 
46) = 80.26, p < .001, ηp² = .636, indicating that mean PE was larger on switches (10.7%) than 
on repetitions (5.6%). The effect of modality compatibility was significant, too, F(1, 46) = 51.67, 
p < .001, ηp² = .529, indicating smaller PE in compatible (5.9%) than in incompatible tasks 
(10.5%). There was also a main effect of group, F(1, 46) = 11.29, p < .005, ηp² = .197, indicating 
larger PE in the tactile-auditory (10.0%) than in the visual-auditory stimulus group (6.4%). 
The two-way interaction of task transition and modality compatibility was significant, 
F(1, 46) = 13.73, p > .005, ηp² = .23, indicating larger PE switch costs in incompatible tasks 
(7.1%) than in compatible tasks (3.1%). Yet, neither the interaction of group and modality 
compatibility, F(1, 46) = 3.26, p = .066, ηp² = .066, nor the interaction of group and task 
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transition were significant, F(1, 46) = 2.98, p = .061, ηp² = .061. The three-way interaction was 
not significant either, F < 1. 
Supplemental analyses 
We compared whether performance in identical incompatible tasks differs depending on 
whether the other task used tactile or visual stimulation. If tactile stimulation increases between-
task crosstalk based on a stronger ideomotor link between tactile stimulation and manual 
responses compared to the link between visual stimulation and manual responses, then the 
performance in identical AM tasks should be worse in the tactile-auditory stimulus group 
compared to the visual-auditiory stimulus group. To examine this issue an additional ANOVA 
was conducted solely for AM tasks, including the independent between-subjects variable group 
and the within-subjects variable task transition using the uncollapsed (i.e., not averaged across 
both incompatible tasks) RT and PE data. 
For RT, the ANOVA revealed a significant between-subjects effect of group, F(1, 46) = 
24.18, p < .001, ηp² = .345, indicating overall slower RTs for AM tasks in the tactile-auditory 
stimulus group (i.e., when combined with TV tasks) (604 ms) than in the visual-auditory 
stimulus task (i.e., when combined with VV tasks) (480 ms). In addition, there was a main effect 
of task transition, F(1, 46) = 190.58, p < .001, ηp² = .806, indicating higher RT on switches (609 
ms) than on repetitions (475 ms). But importantly, the two-way interaction of group and task 
transition was significant,  F(1, 46) = 7.64, p < .01 , ηp² = .142, (see Figure 3), indicating larger 
switch costs for AM tasks in the tactile-auditory stimulus group (i.e., when combined with TV 
tasks, 161 ms) than in the visual-auditory stimulus group (i.e., when combined with VV tasks, 
107 ms). The ANOVA for PE showed the same main effects (for group, F(1, 46) = 15.862, p < 
.001, ηp² = .256; for task transition, F(1, 46) = 45.91, p < .001, ηp² = .500), but the interaction 
was non-significant, F(1, 46) = 1.643, p = .206, ηp² = .034. 
-- Table 2 -- 
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Taken together, these data confirm the overall finding of increased modality mapping 
effects on switch costs in the tactile-auditory stimulus group and show that cross-talk was 
specifically increased in identical tasks. 
Discussion 
In the present study we set out to further elucidate modality-specific influences in task 
switching based on cross-talk by studying tactile stimulation. Specifically, we employed the task 
switching procedure introduced by Stephan and Koch (2010), implemented tactile stimuli (in the 
tactile-auditory stimulus group) and compared the effect of modality compatibility in this tactile-
auditory stimulus group to that in a group with visual stimuli (visual-auditory stimulus group). 
Consistent with previous studies on modality compatibility, switch costs were increased 
in modality incompatible tasks compared to modality compatible tasks (Stephan & Koch, 2010, 
2011). The important novel aspect of the present study is, first, that the effect of modality 
compatibility extends to tasks with vibrotactile stimulation, and, second, that it is even more 
pronounced compared to the visual-auditory stimulus group. This finding is corroborated by the 
supplemental analyses, which show that performance in AM tasks is worse in the context of task 
combinations including tactile stimuli in contrast to visual stimuli. 
The theoretical motivation of the present study was to explore whether the previously 
found effect of modality compatibility is restricted to certain stimulus and response modalities 
(i.e., visual and auditory stimulation and manual and vocal responses). The observation of the 
modality compatibility effect in the tactile-auditory stimulus group nicely demonstrated that the 
notion of modality compatibility can be applied to other modalities, specifically tactile 
stimulation. We argued that the modality compatibility effect in task switching and dual tasks 
relies on modality specific processing pathways, in form of backward “ideomotor” links between 
the anticipated sensory effects produced by a response and the sensory effects evoked by the 
stimulus. These links might need to be overcome when switching between modality 
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incompatible tasks, causing between task cross-talk on the level of central processing codes 
(Stephan & Koch, 2010, 2011). 
However, it does not explain why the effect of modality compatibility was more 
pronounced in the tactile-auditory stimulus group. The fundamental difference between the 
visual-auditory stimulus group and the tactile-auditory stimulus group is that tactile stimuli were 
replaced by visual stimuli, which apparently influenced the specific modality relations between 
the stimulus (tactile or visual) and manual response. 
In the present design, the responses towards the visual stimuli involve a certain amount of 
mental transformation processes (e.g., mapping a diamond presented on the left side of the 
screen to a movement of the left index finger, or to saying the german words “links” (left)). In 
the tactile tasks, such mental transformation was only necessary when responding vocally but not 
(at least not to the same extent) when responding manually. Note though that the (overall) 
response times for tactile stimulation were nevertheless higher than for visual stimulation. This 
RT difference across task combinations may be due to differences in stimulus discriminability 
across modalities with respect to the stimuli used in the present study (i.e., harder for tactile 
stimuli than for visual stimuli). However, when we controlled for this influence by using 
proportional scores, the differential modality compatibility effect remained significant. 
A potential explanation for the increased effect of modality compatibility effect in the 
tactile-auditory stimulus group refers to the concept of ideomotor compatibility (see, e.g., 
Greenwald, 1972). It could be argued that, even though both the VM tasks and the TM tasks 
were modality compatible, the TM tasks used in the present study are more compatible with 
regard to ideomotor compatibility than the VM tasks. Note that, to create a strictly ideomotor 
compatible task involving tactile stimulation, the respective key would have to move rather than 
to vibrate (see, e.g., Brebner, 1977). Nevertheless, the anticipated sensory effect of the manual 
keypress response might be resembled by the vibration of this key (i.e., of the tactile stimulus) to 
a larger extent than it is resembled by the visually presented stimulus. This additional higher 
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degree of ideomotor compatibility might have led to a stronger ideomotor link between tactile 
stimulation and manual responses, thus resulting in an increased cross-talk in the incompatible 
tactile-vocal and auditory-manual tasks. 
Notably, the effect of modality compatibility is a phenomenon of compatibility across 
tasks rather than within tasks because the influence of modality compatibility is usually neither 
very consistent nor always significant in single-task conditions. In contrast, the modality 
compatibility effect in task switching is very robust (with the exception of oculomotor responses; 
see Stephan et al., 2013) and, as the present study shows, extends also to task combinations 
comprising tactile stimulation. 
In conclusion, the present study showed that the effect of modality compatibility can be 
generalized to tactile stimulation. Thus, our results extended findings using manual responses 
and therefore demonstrated that modality compatibility, as a general principle, affects switch 
costs in multitasking. Furthermore, the stronger compatibility effect with tactile compared to 
visual stimulation suggests that the degree of between-task crosstalk is determined by the 
strength of the ideomotor linkages. These results underline the importance of considering the 
influence of modality compatibility both in theoretical accounts of task switching and in applied 
multitasking settings. 
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Table 1 
Mean response times (RT in ms) and % error (PE) for the visual-auditory stimulus group and the 
tactile-auditory stimulus group as a function of modality compatibility and task transition (SD in 
parenthesis). 
 
   
Task transition     
                Single task   Repetition   Switch   Switch costs 
Visual-auditory stimulus group 
       
 
Incompatible 
       
  
RT 349 (46) 
 
450 (60) 
 
562 (88) 
 
112 
  
PE 2.9 (2.0) 
 
5.0 (3.5) 
 
11.2 (5.7) 
 
6.2 
          
 
Compatible 
       
  
RT 367 (57) 
 
431 (67) 
 
507 (67) 
 
76 
  
PE 3.9 (5.6) 
 
3.6 (2.8) 
 
5.7 (3.3) 
 
2.1 
          Tactile-auditory stimulus group 
       
 
Incompatible 
       
  
RT 434 (90) 
 
592 (100) 
 
767 (107) 
 
175 
  
PE 7.9 (7.0) 
 
8.8 (4.3) 
 
16.9 (9.4) 
 
8.1 
          
 
Compatible 
       
  
RT 425 (78) 
 
502 (83) 
 
569 (73) 
 
67 
  
PE 3.8 (3.6) 
 
5.0 (3.5) 
 
9.1 (5.2) 
 
4.1 
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Table 2 
Mean response times (RT) and % error (PE) for the visual-auditory stimulus group and the tactile-auditory stimulus group as a function of modality 
compatibility and task transition for the individual tasks (SD in parenthesis). 
 
                      
     
  
     
   
Visual-auditory stimulus group 
  
Tactile-auditory stimulus group 
     
  
     
   
Repetition 
 
Switch 
  
Repetition 
 
Switch 
  
  
M (SD) 
 
M (SD) 
 
  M (SD) 
 
M (SD) 
RT             
 
      
 
Incompatible 
     
Incompatible 
  
 
AM 
 
427 (66) 
 
534 (101) 
 
AM 524 (96) 
 
685 (107) 
 
VV 
 
474 (72) 
 
589 (88) 
 
TV 661 (124) 
 
850 (114) 
 
                    
 
Compatible 
   
  
 
Compatible 
   
 
AV 
 
522 (100) 
 
606 (101) 
 
AV 528 (104) 
 
629 (98) 
 
VM 
 
340 (47) 
 
408 (53) 
 
TM 476 (77) 
 
509 (66) 
                      
PE 
    
  
     
 
Incompatible 
     
Incompatible 
  
 
AM 
 
2.1 (3.0) 
 
6.8 (5.2) 
 
AM 7.1 (5.8) 
 
14.1 (8.9) 
 
VV 
 
7.9 (7.0) 
 
15.6 (8.5) 
 
TV 10.5 (5.8) 
 
19.7 (11.9) 
 
                    
 
Compatible 
   
  
 
Compatible 
   
 
AV 
 
6.1 (4.4) 
 
7.8 (5.9) 
 
AV 7.4 (6.7) 
 
14.2 (9.9) 
 
VM 
 
1.2 (2.2) 
 
3.6 (3.4) 
 
TM 2.6 (2.4) 
 
4.0 (4.0) 
                      
 
  
 -114- 
 
 
Figure 1. Mean RTs (in ms) as a function of modality compatibility, task transition, and group 
(visual-auditory stimulus group vs. tactile-auditory stimulus group). 
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Abstract 
The present study was aimed at examining modality-specific influences in task switching. To 
this end, participants switched either between modality compatible tasks (auditory-vocal and 
visual-manual) or incompatible tasks (auditory-manual and visual-vocal). In addition, auditory 
and visual stimuli were presented simultaneously in each trial, so that selective attention was 
required to process the task-relevant stimulus. The tasks followed a pre-instructed sequence of 
double alternations (AABB), so that no explicit task cues were required. The results show that 
switching between two modality incompatible tasks increases both switch costs and congruence 
effects compared to switching between two modality compatible tasks. We suggest an 
explanation in terms of ideomotor “backward” linkages between anticipated response effects and 
the stimuli that called for this response in the first place. According to this generalized ideomotor 
idea, the modality match between response effects and stimuli would prime selection of a 
response in the compatible modality. Therefore performance would be hindered when switching 
between modality incompatible tasks and facilitated when switching between modality 
compatible tasks.  
 
 
Keywords: task switching, cognitive control, modality influence, congruence effect, effect 
anticipation, compatibility, ideomotor theory 
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We are constantly exposed to a vast variety of sensory stimulation in different modalities 
(e.g., we hear, see, feel, etc.). There is also a vast variety of possible motor response options in 
different modalities (e.g., we speak, move our hands, feet, etc.). For example, imagine driving to 
work, you might be steering the car, watching the traffic, meanwhile you drink your morning 
coffee and talk to a passenger. This situation already involves visual, auditory, and even 
gustatory stimuli and requires vocal, manual, and pedal responses. Moreover, such situations 
require performing multiple tasks either simultaneously or in rapid alternation. Numerous studies 
have shown that human performance in such multitasking situations suffers from interference 
(see Pashler, 2000, for a review). 
In the last two decades, theoretical accounts of the cognitive mechanisms underlying this 
interference have been mainly focused on “central” processes that are considered to be not 
modality specific (i.e., amodal) and that “translate” perceptual input into motor output (response 
selection, see, e.g., Johnson & Proctor, 2004; Pashler, 1994, for reviews). An additional level of 
theorizing refers to processes that “configure” abstract “task sets”, which are thought to be 
responsible for the integration of abstract goals (intentions), stimuli, responses and their mapping 
(task-set reconfiguration; e.g., Monsell, 2003; Vandierendonck, Liefooghe & Verbruggen, 
2010). In comparison to this dominant focus on central processes, there has been little research 
on modality-specific influences on multitasking.  
Previous research on modality-specific influences has mainly used dual-task paradigms. 
For example, Greenwald (1972) introduced the idea of “ideomotor compatibility”, according to 
which a stimulus is most compatible to a response when it resembles the anticipated sensory 
response effects (e.g., saying “ONE” in response to hearing “one”). He reported that dual-task 
interference is reduced if the two tasks are ideomotor compatible, suggesting that ideomotor 
compatibility leads to reduced crosstalk at the level of response selection.  
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A more general idea has been proposed in the context of multiple resource accounts of 
dual-task performance, suggesting that interference occurs to the degree to which stimulus and 
response modalities overlap (i.e., resources need to be shared) across two tasks (e.g., Wickens, 
1984). This idea has more recently been re-examined by Hazeltine, Ruthruff, and Remington 
(2006), who found reduced dual-task interference when an auditory-vocal task was combined 
with a visual-manual task relative to the reverse combination of modalities (i.e., auditory-manual 
& visual-vocal). This finding is clear evidence for modality-specific influences on human 
multitasking, but explanations in terms of combinations of modality-specific processing 
resources have remained rather descriptive (see also Stelzel, Schumacher, Schubert & 
D’Esposito, 2006). The aim of the present study was to examine the role of modality-specific 
influences on human multitasking performance. Specifically, we used a task-switching procedure 
and investigated the influence of stimulus-response modality compatibility on crosstalk. 
In recent work, Stephan and Koch (2010, 2011) examined modality-specific influences in 
serial task switching. In task switching, performance is usually worse in a task switch relative to 
repetitions, resulting in “switch costs” (see, e.g., Kiesel, Steinhauser, Wendt, Falkenstein, Jost, & 
Koch, 2010, for a review). Stephan and Koch (2010) found reduced switch costs when 
participants switched between auditory-vocal and visual-manual tasks compared to switching 
between auditory-manual and visual-vocal tasks. Specifically, they used visual and auditory 
spatial stimuli that were presented one at a time (i.e., unimodally) and that required either a 
manual key press response (left vs. right) or a vocal response (saying “left” or “right”). The 
authors attributed the modality-specific effect on switch costs to modality compatibility, which 
they defined as the similarity of the stimulus modality (e.g., auditory) with the modality of the 
anticipated response effects (e.g., auditory if the response is vocal). 
Note that the notion of modality compatibility resembles the idea of ideomotor 
compatibility, but it is much broader and not restricted to a perfect match of stimulus and 
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response effect, relying only on a match in modality (e.g., saying “A” in response to hearing 
“one” would be modality compatible but not ideomotor compatible). Yet, the notion of modality 
compatibility shares with ideomotor compatibility the general idea of the ideomotor principle, 
which is that response selection is guided by anticipations of sensory response effects (e.g., 
James, 1890; Greenwald, 1970; Herwig & Waszak, 2009; Prinz, 1997; see also Shin, Proctor & 
Capaldi, 2010, for a review). Stephan and Koch (2011) suggested that these modality-specific 
ideomotor links derive from learning experience and refer to the modality of the most salient or 
intended response effects. Therefore, the anticipatory activation of effect representations and the 
stimulus-induced activation of the stimulus representation could prime each other on the 
modality level (e.g., auditory effects for speaking; visual effects for hand movements). In 
comparison, vocal responses may also lead to tactile effects in the laryngeal tract, but these are 
probably much less salient. Likewise, even though there are clearly situations that produce 
audible effects of manual responses (e.g., piano playing), these are probably less representative 
overall for manual response effects. Hence, in modality incompatible tasks, switching is 
associated with increased interference because the anticipated response effect, which precedes 
actual response execution, on a switch trial primes the competing task (or stimulus modality), 
thus causing potential task confusion and increased between-task crosstalk presumably during 
response selection. 
Attributing modality-specific effects on switch costs to modality compatibility refers to 
an account that is more mechanistic than simply referring to modality-specific “resources”, or 
“natural tendencies” (e.g., Hazeltine et al., 2006), but this account still requires further 
specification. The aim of this study was to substantiate this theoretical claim by examining 
whether modality incompatibility increases specific crosstalk, which we measure as congruence 
effect. 
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Previous studies on modality compatibility exclusively used unimodal stimuli, for which 
congruence is not defined. In contrast, the present study employed bimodal stimuli. Specifically, 
an auditory and a visual stimulus were presented simultaneously. The task was to indicate the 
location of the relevant (visual vs. auditory) stimulus (i.e., left vs. right) by responding with a left 
or right response (i.e., left vs. right key press or saying “left” vs. “right”). Importantly, the two 
stimuli could either be presented at the same relative location (i.e., both left) and thus be 
assigned to the same response (congruent), or they could be presented at different sides and thus 
require different responses (incongruent). Congruence effects have been shown to be a strong 
source of task interference in task switching (e.g., Meiran, 2005). 
Presenting bimodal stimuli required crossmodal selective attention because participants 
need to select a stimulus in one modality while ignoring the competing stimulus in the other 
modality, whereas previous studies employed univalent (i.e., unimodal) stimuli (Stephan & 
Koch, 2010, 2011). Participants were instructed prior to each block of trials about the relevant 
tasks, which are defined in terms of the modality combinations, so that the modality of the 
stimuli cued the modality of the required response. These univalent stimuli do not require 
selective attention because there was no competing, to-be-ignored stimulus. 
However, bimodal stimuli cannot serve as unambiguous task cue (i.e., instructing the 
required mapping of stimulus modality to response modality), which made it necessary to 
explicitly inform participants about the required tasks. To this end, we instructed participants to 
perform the two tasks in a fixed sequence (e.g., Rogers & Monsell, 1995; see also Monsell, 
2003). This was done to avoid presenting explicit task cues prior to stimulus onset, which has 
been shown to interact with the modality of the subsequent stimulus (Lukas, Philipp & Koch, 
2010). Using an instructed task sequence represents a second methodological difference to 
previous studies that used unimodal stimuli (Stephan & Koch, 2010, 2011). 
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In summary, we examined whether congruence effects when using bimodal stimuli would 
be increased in modality incompatible conditions relative to modality compatible conditions. 
Finding such increased congruency effects in modality incompatible conditions would further 
support the view that modality compatibility affects the degree of between task cross-talk in task 
switching. 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-two participants (18 women, mean age = 22.9 years) with normal or corrected-to-
normal vision gave their informed consent, participated, and received 8 € or partial course credit. 
Stimuli and Tasks 
Participants had to switch between two spatial discrimination tasks by responding either 
to the location of a visual or to the location of an auditory stimulus. Visual stimuli were white 
diamonds on a black background with a width and height of 1.5 cm, presented either 1.25 cm to 
the left or right of the center of a 15'' display (Sony, Multiscan 200/SX). Viewing distance 
amounted to 60 cm. Auditory stimuli were 400 Hz tones presented on the left or right ear via 
headphones (Speed Link, SL 8755, Weertzen, Germany). Manual responses were made on a 
QWERTZ keyboard by pressing the Ctrl or Alt key with the left or right index finger, 
respectively. Participants responded vocally by saying the words “links” (left) or “rechts” (right). 
The S-R mapping was always spatially compatible. 
Procedure 
Written instructions were presented on the screen before the experiment started, and the 
experimenter explained the tasks orally. Participants were requested to respond fast and 
accurately. 
Each participant took part in both the modality incompatible and compatible condition, 
with condition order counterbalanced across participants. At the beginning of each modality 
compatibility condition, two single-task blocks were presented (counterbalanced order), which 
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included eight practice trials and 56 experimental trials each. Single-task blocks were followed 
by 14 task-switching blocks of 16 trials each, containing both tasks in double alternating order 
(i.e., AABB). The first task-switching block was preceded by three blocks of 16 practice trials. 
The stimulus and response sequence was random with the constraint that each stimulus appeared 
equally frequently. After each block, mean RT in the preceding block was fed back to the 
participants. After a rest, participants initiated the next block by pressing the space key. 
Each trial started with the onset of the imperative stimulus, lasting until a response was 
made. The response-stimulus interval (RSI) was 600 ms, but if an error was made, the German 
word “Fehler” (error) was displayed for 500 ms (lengthening the RSI to 1100 ms). Overall, the 
experiment took 45 minutes. 
Design 
The independent within-subjects variables were modality compatibility (incompatible vs. 
compatible), congruence (incongruent vs. congruent), and task transition (switch vs. repetition). 
The dependent measures were RT and percentage error (PE). All significance tests were 
conducted with an alpha of 0.05. 
Results 
The first two trials of each block and trials with RT below 50 ms (which most likely 
represent voice-key artefacts, 0.2%) were discarded from analysis. For RT analysis, RTs were z-
transformed for each participant separately and then all values exceeding +/- 3 were discarded as 
outliers (1.7%). Also, error trials and immediately subsequent trials were excluded. Table 1 
shows the data as a function of stimulus modality (visual, auditory), response modality (vocal, 
manual), task transition (single, repetition vs. switch), and congruence (incongruent vs. 
congruent). For the following analyses, mean RTs and PEs were collapsed across the two 
modality compatible tasks and across the two modality incompatible tasks in order to equate all 
trivial differences pertaining to differences in stimulus modality and response modality per se 
(e.g., vocal responses are typically slower than manual responses), but our definition of modality 
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compatibility deconfounds these trivial modality-specific influences. Hence, our analysis yields 
comparable modality compatibility conditions, in which exactly the same stimuli and responses 
occurred in both conditions (see Stephan & Koch, 2010). 
Single-task performance 
We ran an analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the independent variables modality 
compatibility and congruence on RT and PE in single tasks (Table 1) to examine whether 
differences in task difficulty might explain effects of modality compatibility in task switching. 
The analyses revealed a significant effect of congruence for RT, F(1, 31) = 78.393, p < .001, ηp² 
= .717, and, PE, F(1, 31) = 44.065, p < .001, ηp² = .587, indicating higher RT and PE on 
incongruent trials (424 ms, 9.2%) than on congruent trials (387 ms, 4.0%). The effect of 
modality compatibility was not significant for RT and PE (Fs < 1). The interaction of modality 
compatibility and congruence was significant for PE, F(1, 31) = 5.436, p < .05, ηp² = .149, 
showing a larger congruence effect in modality incompatible than compatible tasks (6.7% vs. 
3.7%), but the same pattern of results (41 ms vs. 33 ms) was not significant for RT, F(1, 31) = 
1.933, p = .174, ηp² = .059. 
--Table 1-- 
Note that overall performance was similar across modality compatibility conditions. This 
implies that any advantage of modality compatibility in task switching cannot be due to apriori 
differences in task difficulty, as measured by performance level in single tasks. 
Task-switching performance 
To examine the influence of modality compatibility on the congruence effect in task 
switching, RT and PE were submitted to an ANOVA with modality compatibility, congruence, 
and task transition (Table 1 and Figure 1, left and middle panel). 
-- Figure 1 -- 
The ANOVA revealed an effect of task transition both for RT, F(1, 31) = 55.706, p < 
.001, ηp² = .642, and PE, F(1, 31) = 15.149, p < .001, ηp² = .328, indicating higher RT and PE on 
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switches than on repetitions (594 ms vs. 498 ms and 13.8% vs. 10.1%, respectively). The effect 
of modality compatibility was significant both for RT, F(1, 31) = 12.369, p < .005, ηp² = .285, 
and PE, F(1, 31) = 8.183, p < .01, ηp² = .209, indicating higher RTs and PE in incompatible tasks 
than in compatible tasks (574 ms vs. 518 ms and 13.4% vs. 10.5%, respectively). Importantly, 
also the interaction was significant both for RT, F(1, 31) = 12.994, p < .005, ηp² = .295, and PE, 
F(1, 31) = 6.935, p < .05, ηp² = .183, showing that switch costs were larger in incompatible tasks 
than in compatible tasks (115 ms vs. 78 ms and 4.8% vs. 2.6%, respectively). These results 
replicate previous findings (e.g., Stephan & Koch, 2011). 
There was a strong effect of congruence in both RT, F(1, 31) = 75.439, p < .001, ηp² = 
.709, and PE, F(1, 31) = 89.437, p < .001, ηp² = .743, indicating higher RTs and PE on 
incongruent trials than on congruent trials (569 ms vs. 523 ms and 16.6% vs. 7.2%, respectively). 
Importantly, this congruence effect was larger in modality incompatible tasks than in compatible 
tasks in both RT and PE (51 ms vs. 43 ms and 12.2% vs. 6.6%, respectively), but this interaction 
of modality compatibility and congruence was not significant in RT, F(1, 31) = 1.515, p = .228, 
ηp² = .047, but only in PE, F(1, 31) = 13.788, p < .005, ηp² = .308.
1
 
To corroborate this influence of modality compatibility on the congruence effect, we 
additionally calculated “inverse efficiency scores” (IES) by weighting RTs with the proportion 
of correct responses (i.e., RT/1-PE; see, e.g., Bruyer & Brysbaert, 2011; Hughes, Linck, Bowles, 
Koeth, & Bunting, 2013; Townsend & Ashby, 1983). Using IES, which is expressed in ms (see 
Figure 1, right panel), the interaction of modality compatibility and congruence remained clearly 
significant, F(1, 31) = 7.725, p < .01, ηp² = .199, indicating a larger congruence effect in 
modality incompatible tasks than in compatible tasks (197 ms vs. 125 ms). This finding confirms 
the influence of modality compatibility on the congruence effect. 
Additionally, in PE the interaction of task transition and congruence was significant, F(1, 
31) = 4.660, p < .05, ηp² = .131, indicating larger switch costs on incongruent trials than on 
congruent trials (5.1% vs. 2.3%), but this effect was not significant in RT. The three-way 
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interaction was not significant neither in RT nor in PE, F < 1. (This pattern did not change when 
using IES instead of RT and PE.) 
Discussion 
The present study aimed to examine modality-specific influences in task switching. To 
this end, we had participants switch either between modality compatible tasks (auditory-vocal 
and visual-manual) or incompatible tasks (auditory-manual and visual-vocal). In addition, we 
presented auditory and visual stimuli simultaneously in each trial, so that crossmodal selective 
attention was required to process the task-relevant stimulus. The tasks followed a pre-instructed 
sequence of double alternations (AABB), so that no explicit task cues were required. 
We found increased switch costs in modality incompatible tasks. This finding confirms 
previous results (Stephan & Koch, 2010) using task-switching and is consistent with analogous 
findings in dual-task studies (e.g., Hazeltine et al., 2006). However, an important novel aspect of 
the present finding is that these effects occur also with bimodal stimuli in instructed task 
sequences that require selective attention to the relevant stimulus modality, whereas previous 
studies used univalent (and thus unimodal) stimuli that cued task and response modality directly. 
Yet, the most important novel aspect of the present study is that the inclusion of bimodal 
stimuli enabled us to assess congruence effects as a converging measure of increased between-
task interference. We found that performance was much worse when the simultaneously 
presented auditory stimulus and the visual stimulus called for different responses (incongruent 
trial), but, importantly, this congruence effect was further increased in modality incompatible 
tasks. 
The finding of increased congruence effects in modality incompatible tasks supports the 
idea that the modality of the anticipated sensory effect of the required response actually primes 
processing of the competing stimulus. This priming should cause increased difficulties to ignore 
the competing stimulus and hence increases the congruence effect. Put differently, effect 
anticipation, which according to ideomotor theory is a necessary predecessor of response 
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selection (Shin et al., 2010), increases the crosstalk during the response process in incompatible 
tasks, whereas in compatible tasks this “late” response-based interference in task switching is 
much less pronounced. 
Note that current theories on the origin of switch costs do not provide an explanation for 
the influence of modality compatiblity. Most theoretical accounts either assume that switch costs 
are caused by the reconfiguration of abstract task sets (e.g., Monsell, 2003; Vandierendonck, 
Liefooghe & Verbruggen, 2010) and/or by proactive interference from the previously relevant 
task (e.g., Kiesel et al., 2010, Koch, Gade, Schuch, & Philipp, 2010, for reviews). The present 
data suggest that the modality-specific influences, which we assessed here as effects of modality 
compatibility, substantially contribute to proactive interference in task switching. 
When considering this clear modality-specific influence in task switching, it should be 
noted that the stimuli and responses in the modality compatible and the modality incompatible 
tasks were identical. Accordingly, the modality incompatible and compatible conditions should 
be equally affected by perceptual differences between auditory and visual stimuli as well as by 
differences in response execution of vocal and manual responses. 
Moreover, performance in single tasks did not differ across modality compatibility 
conditions, showing that modality incompatible tasks are not simply more difficult per se. 
Therefore, the data suggest that the influence of modality compatibility in task switching is an 
emergent phenomenon that is specifically due to the requirement to represent both response 
modalities concurrently in working memory. That is, modality compatibility represents 
compatibility across tasks rather than within tasks. This suggestion is further supported by data 
showing that modality compatibility does not have relevant effects in task switching if there is no 
requirement to represent two different response modalities concurrently in working memory (i.e., 
when response modality is constant in crossmodal selective attention situations; see Lukas et al., 
2010). 
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The present finding of increased congruence effects in modality incompatible tasks 
supports an account in terms of a generalized ideomotor priming mechanism on the level of 
modality selection. Importantly, this idea is more general than the original ideomotor account, 
which refers to the specific identity, not just the matching modality, of stimuli and anticipated 
response effects. 
One might argue though that the modality influence is only due to the fact that both the 
stimuli and the responses share a spatial dimension (i.e., left, right) and thus have dimensional 
overlap (DO) on the level of stimulus and response sets (Kornblum, Hasbroucq & Osman, 1990; 
see also Proctor & Vu, 2006). With DO, stimuli might activate spatially corresponding responses 
in the compatible modality more or less automatically, and modality compatibility effects might 
be restricted to conditions of automatic response activation. However, in a previous study we 
used stimulus and response sets that were non-overlapping both within and across tasks (i.e., 
without DO) and found that the influence of modality compatibility in task switching was at least 
as strong as with stimulus and response sets with DO (Stephan & Koch, 2011). However, in the 
present study, it was necessary to use tasks with DO because with non-overlapping sets, 
congruence relations are undefined. Hence, even though the present data provided evidence that 
modality compatibility increases the congruence effect, which presumably relates to interference 
both at the task and the response level (e.g., Kiesel et al., 2010), automatic response activation is 
by no means a prerequisite to finding modality compatibility effects in task switching, as shown 
by Stephan and Koch (2011). 
It could be argued that modality compatibility could be considered a specific type of set 
level compatibility (e.g., Proctor & Wang, 1997). Indeed, some studies on set-level compatibility 
included modality variations and found that stimuli physically located on the left and right are 
more compatible to left and right sided keypresses than to the vocal response “left” and “right”, 
whereas the location words left and right are more compatible to the vocal (“left” and ”right”) 
response than to a left or right sided keypress (e.g., Proctor & Wang, 1997; Wang & Proctor, 
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1996, see also Virzi & Egeth, 1985). Other models that consider the influence of modalities, such 
as multiple resources acounts (e.g., Wickens, 1984) or translational models (e.g., Virzi & Egeth, 
1985), share the idea of parallel spatial and verbal systems or codes. According to resource 
models, parallel processing of two tasks is possible if stimulus modalities, central codes, and 
response modalities do not overlap across tasks (see, e.g., Wickens, 1984). Likewise, 
translational models (e.g., Virzi & Egeth, 1985) propose that as long as only one processing 
system (verbal or spatial) is involved, no translation into another processing system is necessary 
(e.g., if the word LEFT is presented on the left side of a screen and a participant has to respond 
to the location by pressing a left key, only the spatial system is involved), but translation is 
necessary when the relevant stimulus information and the relevant response modality differ (e.g., 
if the word LEFT is presented on the left side of a screen and a participant has to name the 
position by saying “left”). However, these studies used mostly visual stimuli and systematically 
manipulated the mapping between central codes (verbal vs. spatial) and response modality (e.g., 
Wickens, 1984), but the mapping between stimulus and response modalities, which defines 
modality compatibility, was not manipulated systematically. In addition, effects of set-level 
compatibility (and DO) typically affect performance in single tasks, whereas modality 
compatibility did not affect single-task performance. Therefore, we believe that it is important to 
distinguish between set-level compatibility and modality compatibility, which is specifically 
related to compatibility across tasks. 
Taken together, the present findings demonstrate modality-specific influences in task 
switching and show that switching between two modality incompatible tasks increases both 
switch costs and congruence effects compared to switching between two modality compatible 
tasks. These findings call for more attention to modality-specific processes in models of task 
switching. Specifically, compared to more traditional accounts in terms of “processing 
resources” based on modality combinations (e.g., Wickens, 1984), the present account offers a 
more mechanistic explanation in terms of ideomotor “backward” linkages between anticipated 
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response effects and the stimuli that called for this response in the first place. According to the 
present generalized ideomotor idea, the modality match between response effects and stimuli 
would prime selection of a response in the compatible modality. Therefore, performance would 
be hindered when switching between modality incompatible tasks and facilitated when switching 
between modality compatible tasks. 
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Footnote 
1
The overall error rates of three participants exceeded 20% (20.9%; 21.9%; 25.3%). Importantly, 
if these three participants were excluded, the two-way interaction between congruence and 
modality compatibility was still clearly significant, F(1, 28) = 9.398, p < .01, ηp² = .251, 
indicating a larger congruence effect in incompatible tasks than in compatible tasks (10.4% vs. 
6.3%). 
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Table 1. 
Mean response times (RT) and percent error (PE) as a function of modality compatibility [depicted as the interaction effect of stimulus modality 
(visual vs. auditory) and response modality (vocal vs. manual); shaded areas depict the modality compatible conditions], task transition (single, 
repetition vs. switch), and congruence (incongruent vs. congruent) (SD in parenthesis). 
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Figure 1. Switch costs and congruence effects for reaction time (RT; left panel), percent error (PE; middle panel), and inverse efficiency scores 
(IES; right panel) as a function of modality compatibility. 
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Abstract 
Previous research suggested that specific pairings of stimulus and response modalities (visual-
manual and auditory-vocal tasks) lead to better dual-task performance than other pairings 
(visual-vocal and auditory-manual tasks). In the present task-switching study, we further 
examined this modality compatibility effect and investigated the role of response modality by 
additionally studying oculomotor responses as an alternative to manual responses. Interestingly, 
the switch cost pattern revealed a much stronger modality compatibility effect for groups in 
which vocal and manual responses were combined as compared to a group involving vocal and 
oculomotor responses, where the modality compatibility effect was largely abolished. We 
suggest that in the vocal-manual response groups the modality compatibility effect is based on 
cross-talk of central processing codes due to preferred stimulus-response modality processing 
pathways, whereas the oculomotor response modality may be shielded against cross-talk due to 
the supra-modal functional importance of visual orientation. (144 words) 
 
Keywords: cognitive control, task switching, modality compatibility, oculomotor response, 
cross-talk, saccades  
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Being simultaneously engaged in two or more tasks results in performance costs (Pashler, 
1998). The size of such costs has been shown to be determined by several factors, including 
temporal task structure (e.g., Meyer & Kieras, 1997a, b; Pashler, 1994), processing content (e.g., 
Navon & Miller, 1987), and training (e.g., Schumacher et al., 2001). Recently, several studies 
examined stimulus and response modalities and their interrelation in both tasks. 
Stimulus and response modalities in dual-tasking were already a prominent research topic 
in the 1970s and 1980s. Typically, studies utilized two complex continuous tasks (e.g., reading, 
writing, driving, etc.) which involved same versus different modalities. Whenever two tasks 
involved the same stimulus or response modality, dual-task costs (regarding response times 
and/or errors) were greater (e.g., Hirst, Neisser, & Spelke, 1978; Spelke, Hirst, & Neisser, 1976). 
These results led to multiple resource accounts of multitasking. For example, Wickens (1984, 
2008) proposed that dual-task costs are determined by the extent to which time-shared tasks use 
the same processing structures, which are ordered along three dimensions: stage (e.g., perceptual, 
central, execution-related), codes (e.g., verbal, spatial), and modalities (e.g., visual, auditory). To 
the extent that two tasks draw on the same resources along each of these dimensions, 
performance is predicted to be worse. Note though that many of these studies involved fairly 
complex continuous tasks, which made it difficult to achieve full experimental control over the 
timing of cognitive processes (Pashler, 1994). 
More recent evidence suggested that not only shared modalities between tasks are 
important, but also combinations of modalities within each task. For example, Hazeltine, 
Ruthruff, and Remington (2006) utilized a dual-task paradigm with simultaneous stimulus onset 
for both tasks. They compared performance in a condition including auditory-vocal (AV) tasks 
and visual-manual (VM) tasks to that in a condition including visual-vocal (VV) and auditory-
manual (AM) tasks. In AV tasks, participants responded to three different tones by saying “one”, 
“two”, or “three”, and in the VM task they responded to visually presented words from the 
categories bug/food/tree by pressing one of three buttons. In the AM task, participants responded 
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to the tones by pressing the buttons, and in the VV task they responded to the words by saying 
“bug”/“food”/“tree”. The major finding was that combining VM and AV tasks led to smaller 
dual-task costs compared to combining a VV and AM tasks, even though single-task 
performance was comparable across conditions. Hazeltine et al. (2006) and Ruthruff, Hazeltine, 
and Remington (2006) attributed this effect of modality compatibility to “natural tendencies” to 
bind certain stimulus modalities to certain response modalities (preferred modality-specific S-R 
processing pathways). These preferences may be based on over-learned and/or 
neurophysiologically hard-wired modality associations (e.g., Hazeltine et al., 2006; Stephan & 
Koch, 2010). For example, we usually use visual information to guide manual movements and 
respond vocally to questions in oral communication. Furthermore, neurophysiological evidence 
suggested privileged brain pathways between specific sensory and (pre-)motor regions. 
Specifically, visual stimulation induces activity of the superior ventrolateral premotor cortex 
(VLP), which is a part of the premotor cortex necessary for prehension. When stimulated 
auditorily, the activity in the VLP was located more inferiorly, in an area crucial for vocalization 
(Schubotz, 2007; Schubotz, von Cramon, & Lohmann, 2003). These results indicate that areas 
responsible for a certain response modality are directly activated by stimulation of the 
compatible stimulus modality, whereas no such association was found for incompatible modality 
mappings. 
A more specific theoretical framework for explaining the modality compatibility effect 
refers to the notion of ideomotor compatibility (Greenwald, 1972). Greenwald proposed that 
actions are coded in terms of the anticipated mental image of the sensory feedback they produce, 
suggesting that the extent to which a stimulus resembles normally occurring sensory feedback of 
the response (e.g., saying a word in response to hearing it) affects dual-task costs. 
In previous studies (Stephan & Koch, 2010), we extended this quite specific concept of 
ideomotor compatibility by generally suggesting that the identity of the stimulus modality and 
the modality of the usually occurring sensory consequences of the response may determine the 
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modality compatibility effect (response-effect modality compatibility). For example, we typically 
experience changes in the visual scene as a result from moving our hands, which may result in an 
advantage for VM (vs. AM) tasks. The advantage for AV (vs. VV) tasks may stem from our 
experience that speaking typically creates audible effects. On the other hand, manual behavior 
only occasionally creates audible effects (e.g., while playing an instrument), and speaking 
seldom immediately results in visible effects. In this sense, action-effect modality congruency 
might be an underlying principle that accounts for modality compatibility effects, because 
preferred modality-specific processing pathways may emerge as a consequence of the functional 
match between specific sensory and motor systems. 
Stephan and Koch (2010) further examined the modality compatibility effect in a task-
switching paradigm, in which two or more tasks are presented sequentially and performance is 
compared between task repetitions and task switches. Typically, performance in switch trials is 
worse than in repetition trials (“switch costs”; see, e.g. Rogers & Monsell, 1995; for reviews see 
also Kiesel et al., 2010; Vandierendonck, Liefooghe, & Verbruggen, 2010). Specifically, in a 
modality compatible condition, Stephan and Koch (2010, 2011) had participants respond to 
visually presented diamonds on the left or right side of the screen by pressing a left or right key 
on a keyboard, and to tones presented on the left or right side by saying “links” [left] or “rechts” 
[right]. In an incompatible condition, participants responded vocally to the diamonds by saying 
“links”/“rechts”, and manually to the tones by pressing the left/right key. Stimuli were presented 
individually (i.e., visual or auditory) and the stimulus-response mapping was fixed within 
blocks, so that no additional task cues were necessary. Also note that in each modality 
compatibility condition, exactly the same visual and auditory stimuli were given, followed by the 
exact same responses. Therefore, it was possible to collapse the data across the two compatible 
tasks and across the two incompatible tasks in each condition to control for potential differences 
due to the specific modalities used in the individual task combinations. Thus, any specific 
performance costs associated either with switching the stimulus modality (Lukas, Philipp, & 
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Koch, 2010) or with switching the response modality (Philipp & Koch, 2005, 2010) should affect 
both modality compatibility conditions equally. As a result, the authors found higher switch costs 
when participants switched between modality incompatible tasks compared to switching between 
modality compatible tasks, even though single-task performance was comparable across 
modality compatibility conditions. These results suggest that whenever two tasks involve 
modality incompatible mappings, the preferred pattern of modality mappings has to be overcome 
as a whole. This conflict between mapping patterns should lead to cross-talk, eventually resulting 
in costs. 
However, as of now empirical data and theory with respect to the modality compatibility 
effect were restricted to only two stimulus- and response modalities, namely visual and auditory 
stimuli and manual and vocal responses (see also Huestegge & Hazeltine, 2011). In the present 
study, we aimed at further examining the notion of modality compatibility by additionally 
studying oculomotor responses as an alternative to manual responses. Recent research 
established that oculomotor responses can be considered as a response modality in the sense that 
they produce (and are subject to) interference in the context of other response demands 
(Huestegge, 2011; Huestegge & Adam, 2011; Huestegge & Koch, 2009, 2010a). 
In the present study, we maintained the tasks used by Stephan and Koch (2010) for one 
group of participants (vocal-manual response group) to establish a solid modality compatibility 
baseline effect. Critically, we also implemented a vocal-oculomotor response group, for which 
manual responses are replaced by oculomotor responses, resulting in a condition including an 
AV task combined with a visual-oculomotor (VO) task and a condition with a VV task combined 
with an auditory-oculomotor (AO) task.
 
Note that, for the sake of readability, we refer to VO 
tasks as “modality compatible” and to the AO tasks as “modality incompatible”, even though the 
truth of this assumption is essentially at stake in the present study. 
On the one hand, some characteristics of the visual system appear to suggest a 
comparable or even greater modality compatibility effect in the vocal-oculomotor response 
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group compared to the vocal-manual response group. First, each saccade inevitably results in a 
substantial change of the visual stimulus at the current fixation location, while this is not always 
the case for manual behavior (e.g., we can move our hands under a table or behind our back). 
Second, the neurophysiological association between visual stimulus and oculomotor response 
should be quite strong, because visuo-motor processing is known to be controlled by a tightly 
knit network (e.g., Hutton, 2008; Munoz, Armstrong, & Coe, 2007; Sweeney, Luna, Keedy, 
McDowell, & Clementz, 2007), and even early visual processing areas (e.g., V1) directly project 
towards oculomotor control areas (e.g., Isa & Yoshida, 2009). Third, for the combination of 
visual stimulus and oculomotor response the same sensorimotor system (i.e., the eye) is 
involved. 
On the other hand, it is also possible that the modality compatibility effect is weaker (or 
even absent) in the vocal-oculomotor response group. For example, it appears equally important 
to localize both visual and auditory cues for potential threats as fast as possible (in terms of a 
visual orientation response), so that both VO and AO tasks could be modality compatible. 
Furthermore, the visual system typically produces stability of a visual scene across multiple 
saccades (e.g., Bridgeman, Van der Heijden, & Velichkovsky, 1994), so that the overall percept 
of a visual scene does not change as a result of saccade execution in the same way as the visual 
scene may change when we move our hands within our field of view. Additionally, we may have 
learned that our eye movements often have less actual impact on our environment than manual 
action. Due to these factors, the oculomotor response modality may be shielded against cross-
talk in dual-task or task switching situations, so that the modality compatibility effect may not 
(or to a lesser degree) occur for the vocal-oculomotor response group. The aim of the present 
study was to explore the status of oculomotor responses for modality compatibility in task 
switching. 
Experiment 1a 
Method 
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 Participants. Thirty-two native German speakers with normal hearing and normal (or 
corrected to normal) vision (22 female and 10 male, mean age = 23.6 years) were tested. They 
received course credit or payment, and gave their informed consent. Participants were randomly 
divided into two groups of 16 participants (vocal-manual response group vs. vocal-oculomotor 
response group). 
 Stimuli and Apparatus. In the vocal-manual response group, we used a setup as in a 
previous study (Stephan & Koch, 2010). Visual stimuli were white diamonds (width and height 
of 1.5 cm), presented against a black background either 1.25 cm left or right to the center of a 
15'' display. Viewing distance amounted to 60 cm. As auditory stimuli we used 400 Hz tones 
presented via headphones either on the left or right ear. Vocal responses were made by saying 
the words “links” (left) or “rechts” (right). Accuracy was coded online by the experimenter, and 
a voice key was used to measure vocal RTs. Manual responses were registered by pressing a left 
(Ctrl) or right (Alt) key on a QWERTZ keyboard with the left vs. right index fingers. Responses 
were always spatially compatible to the stimuli. 
 In the vocal-oculomotor response group, auditory stimuli and vocal responses were as in 
the vocal-manual response group. As visual stimuli, we presented a green fixation cross (width 
and height of 0.4 cm) on black background at the center of a 21” display. Additionally, two 
green squares (width and height of 0.4 cm) were displayed to the left and right of the fixation 
cross, which were present throughout the experiment and served as targets for the oculomotor 
responses. In each trial, the central fixation cross was replaced by a white arrow (width of 1.6 cm 
and height of 0.9 cm) pointing to the left or right, which served as the imperative stimulus. 
Viewing distance amounted to 67 cm. Oculomotor responses were made by executing a saccade 
to the left or right target (green square) as indicated by arrow direction. 
Saccade onset (of the right eye) was registered by using a head-mounted Eyelink II 
infrared reflection system (SR Research, Canada) with a temporal resolution of 500 Hz. 
Saccades were coded as correct if they reached the area of 1.5° surrounding the correct target 
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(green square). A horizontal three-point calibration occurred at the beginning of each 
experimental block. A chin rest served to control viewing distance and minimized head 
movements. Whenever no oculomotor response was required, participants were instructed to 
remain fixated on the central fixation cross. Saccades (as well as manual responses) towards the 
incorrect direction and responses given in the incorrect modality were coded as errors. 
 Procedure. The experiment was run in a single session of about 45 minutes. At the 
beginning of the experiment, instructions were presented visually on the screen and orally by the 
experimenter. Participants were requested to respond accurately and fast. 
Each participant took part in the modality compatible condition (i.e., VM and AV tasks 
for the vocal-manual response group and VO and AV tasks for the vocal-oculomotor response 
group) and in the incompatible condition (i.e., VV and AM tasks for the vocal-manual response 
group and VV and AO for the vocal-oculomotor response group), with condition order 
counterbalanced across participants. In each modality compatibility condition, two single-task 
blocks (counterbalanced order) were followed by two task-switching blocks. In the single-task 
blocks, only one task was presented for eight practice trials and 40 experimental trials. The 
modality mapping was fixed within blocks. The two task-switching blocks contained both tasks 
(both either modality compatible or modality incompatible) in random order. In each condition, 
the first task-switching block was preceded by 16 practice trials. Both task-switching blocks 
consisted of 80 trials each. 
In all blocks, the stimulus and response sequence was random, with the constraint that 
each stimulus appeared equally often. Each trial started with the onset of the imperative stimulus 
and lasted until a response was made or until 1500 ms had elapsed. The response-stimulus 
interval (RSI) amounted to 600 ms. 
 Design. Group served as an independent between-subjects variable (vocal-manual 
response group vs. vocal-oculomotor response group). The independent within-subjects variables 
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were modality compatibility (incompatible vs. compatible) and task transition (switch vs. 
repetition). RT and percentage of errors (PE) were measured as dependent variables. 
Results and Discussion 
Practice trials as well as the first two experimental trials in each block were excluded. 
Responses given within the first 50 ms after stimulus onset were discarded (1% in the vocal-
manual response group; 3.1% in the vocal-oculomotor response group). Additionally, all trials in 
which no response was detected were excluded (5.5% in the vocal-manual response group; 2% in 
the vocal-oculomotor response group). RTs exceeding +/- 3 SD (intraindividually) from the 
mean were discarded as outliers (1.4% for the vocal-manual response group; 1.3% for the vocal-
oculomotor response group). Also, error trials and immediately subsequent trials were excluded 
from the RT analysis. For each group, mean RTs and PEs were then collapsed across the two 
modality compatible tasks and across the two modality incompatible tasks to control for specific 
effects of the individual stimulus or response modalities (see Stephan & Koch, 2010). Statistical 
tests utilized an alpha level of 5%. 
--Table 1-- 
Single-task performance. To examine whether single-task performance differs between 
modality compatibility conditions and groups, a mixed ANOVA with group (manual vs. 
oculomotor) and the independent within-subject variable modality compatibility (compatible vs. 
incompatible)  was run. For RT, it revealed a significant effect of modality compatibility, F(1, 
30) = 6.12, p < .05, ηp² = .169, indicating faster RTs in incompatible tasks (321 ms) than in 
compatible tasks (337 ms). There was no significant main effect of group, F(1, 30) = 1.78, p = 
.193, ηp² = .056, and no significant interaction, F < 1. 
For PE, the effect of modality compatibility was significant, too, F(1, 30) = 13.22, p < 
.005, ηp² = .306, indicating higher PE in incompatible tasks (5.1%) than in compatible tasks 
(2.6%). Note that this main effect of modality compatibility was reversed in the RT data, 
suggesting a speed-accuracy tradeoff. There was also a main effect of group, F(1, 30) = 47.49, p 
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< .001, ηp² = .613, indicating smaller PE in the vocal-manual response group (1.8%) than in the 
vocal-oculomotor response group (5.9%). The interaction was significant, too, F(1, 30) = 6.60, p 
< .05, ηp² = .180, showing that the effect of modality compatibility was smaller in the vocal-
manual response group (0.7%) than in the vocal-oculomotor response group (4.2%). 
Taken together, the single-task data show that performance in the vocal-oculomotor 
group was generally somewhat more error prone, but there was no clear performance difference 
for modality compatible and incompatible tasks, suggesting that overall task difficulty is not a 
relevant factor for any influence of modality compatibility in task switching. 
Task switching performance. RT in task-switching blocks were submitted to a mixed 
ANOVA with the independent variables modality compatibility, task transition, and group 
(manual vs. oculomotor). The effect of task transition was significant, F(1, 30) = 196.01, p < 
.001, ηp² = .867, indicating higher RTs on switches (497 ms) than on repetitions (421 ms). There 
was also a main effect of group, F(1, 30) = 13.64, p < .005, ηp² = .312, indicating longer RTs in 
the vocal-manual response group than in the vocal-oculomotor response group (494 ms vs. 424 
ms) due to the overall short latencies of saccades (see below). Crucially, the three-way 
interaction between group, modality compatibility and task transition was significant, too, F(1, 
30) = 8.16, p < .01, ηp² = .214. No other effect or interaction was significant (main effect of 
modality compatibility: F(1, 30) = 2.35, p = .136; ηp² = .073; interaction between modality 
compatibility and group: F(1, 30) = 3.33, p = .078, ηp² = .100; interaction between task transition 
and modality compatibility: F(1, 30) = 2.21, p = .147, ηp² = .069; interaction between task 
transition and group: F < 1; see Table 1; see Figure 1). 
To further qualify the three-way interaction, we conducted separate two-way ANOVAs 
for each group. The ANOVA for the vocal-manual response group revealed a significant effect 
of task transition, F(1, 15) = 73.82, p < .001, ηp² = .831, indicating longer RTs on switches (532 
ms) than on repetitions (456 ms). The effect of modality compatibility was significant, too, F(1, 
15) = 6.15, p < .05, ηp² = .291, indicating shorter RT in compatible tasks than in incompatible 
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tasks (481 ms vs. 507 ms). Importantly, the two-way interaction between task transition and 
modality compatibility was significant, F(1, 15) = 13.04, p < .005, ηp² = .465, indicating larger 
RT switch costs in incompatible tasks (94 ms) than in compatible tasks (58 ms), nicely 
confirming the data of Stephan and Koch (2010; 2011). 
The same ANOVA for the vocal-oculomotor response group also revealed a significant 
effect of task transition, F(1, 15) = 141.58, p < .001, ηp² = .904, indicating higher RT on switches 
(463 ms) than on repetitions (385 ms). Most importantly, however, neither the main effect of 
modality compatibility nor the interaction was significant, Fs < 1, indicating that in the vocal-
oculomotor response group switch costs were not significantly affected by modality 
compatibility. Note that the non-significance of the main effect of modality compatibility and the 
interaction between modality compatibility and task transition cannot be due to a floor effect, 
since RTs in single tasks were even much lower (320 ms) than in any of the task switching 
conditions (see Figure 1). 
--Figure 1-- 
The same three-way ANOVA on PE revealed a significant effect of task transition, F(1, 
30) = 71.65, p < .001, ηp² = .705, indicating that mean PE was greater on switches (9.6%) than 
on repetitions (4.4%). There was also a main between-subject effect of group, F(1, 30) = 47.25, p 
< .001, ηp² = .612, indicating larger PE in the vocal-oculomotor response group than in the vocal-
manual response group (11.1% vs. 2.9%). 
While neither the main effect of modality compatibility nor its interactions were 
significant, Fs < 1, there was a significant two-way interaction between task transition and 
group, F(1, 30) = 29.81, p > .001, ηp² = .498, indicating larger PE switch costs in the vocal-
oculomotor response group (8.6%) than in the vocal-manual response group (1.9%). Importantly, 
however, this interaction does not affect the interpretation of the crucial three-way interaction in 
the RT data because it could not account for the substantial difference regarding the modality 
compatibility effect between groups. 
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Further analyses. To further investigate the difference in the modality compatibility 
effect between the two groups we analysed potential differences in the specific compatibility 
relations between the auditory vs. visual stimulus and the manual vs. oculomotor response. To 
this end, we conducted an additional ANOVA with the independent variable stimulus modality 
(auditory vs. visual) and the independent between-subjects variable response modality (manual 
vs. oculomotor) using the uncollapsed RT and PE data. 
For RTs, the ANOVA revealed no significant main effect of stimulus modality, F(1, 30) 
= 3.52, p = .07, ηp² = .105, but a significant main effect of response modality, F(1, 30) = 31.83, p 
< .001, ηp² = .515, indicating overall faster RTs for oculomotor responses (333 ms) than for 
manual responses (428 ms). Interestingly, the two-way interaction between stimulus and 
response modality was significant, too, F(1, 30) = 13.24, p < .005, ηp² = .306 (see Figure 2), 
indicating a stronger influence of the stimulus modality on manual responses (difference 
between auditory and visual stimulus: 48 ms) than for oculomotor responses (-16 ms, 
respectively; see Table 2). 
-- Table 2 -- 
-- Figure 2 -- 
For PE, the same two-way ANOVA yielded a significant effect of stimulus modality, 
F(1, 30) = 8.36, p < .01, ηp² = .218, indicating smaller PE in tasks with visual stimuli (2.8%) than 
in tasks with auditory stimuli (4.6%). There was also a significant effect of response modality, 
F(1, 30) = 6.93, p < .05, ηp² = .188, indicating smaller PE on oculomotor responses (2.4%) than 
on manual responses (5.1%). The interaction was not significant, F < 1. 
Taken together, the data show that the influence of modality compatibility in task 
switching is robust when using manual responses (replicating earlier findings; Stephan & Koch, 
2010, 2011). However, this influence seems to dispappear with oculomotor responses. 
Note though that the different types of visual stimuli between groups may potentially 
compromise our group comparison. Specifically, we designed the oculomotor task in a way to 
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make it more comparable to the processing demands of the manual task from Stephan and Koch 
(2010), but this included using a symbolic visual stimulus (i.e., a centrally presented left vs. right 
pointing arrow) instead of visually defined by physical spatial location. Therefore, it cannot be 
ruled out that differences in the visual stimuli might have any influence on the pattern of results. 
We conducted Experiment 1b to rule out such influences by using symbolic visual stimuli 
(instead of spatially defined visual stimuli) in a symbolic vocal-manual response group. 
Experiment 1b was aimed to replicate the modality compatibility effect in task switching with 
symbolic visual stimuli, and any difference of these data to that of the vocal-oculomotor 
response group in Experiment 1a cannot be due to stimulus differences between groups. 
Experiment 1b 
Method 
Participants. Sixteen new native German speakers with normal hearing and normal (or 
corrected to normal) vision (14 female and 2 male, mean age = 22.1 years) were tested. They 
received course credit or payment, and gave their informed consent.  
 Stimuli, Apparatus, Procedure, and Design. Auditory stimuli and vocal and manual 
responses were the same as in both response groups in Experiment 1a. In the symbolic vocal-
manual response group, we used a maximally similar stimulus setup as in the vocal-oculomotor 
response group in Experiment 1a; for the analyses, we also included the data of that group for a 
direct comparison. Specifically, in each trial the central fixation cross was replaced by a white 
arrow (width of 1.6 cm and height of .09 cm) pointing to the left or right, which was the 
imperative stimulus.  
Results and Discussion 
Data analyses proceeded as in Experiment 1a. We excluded practice trials, the first two 
experimental trials in each block and responses given within the first 50 ms after stimulus onset 
(RT < 50 ms; 1.5%). Additionally, all trials in which no response was detected were excluded 
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(5.4%). For RT analyses, outliers (1.4%) as well as error trials and immediately subsequent trials 
were excluded. 
Single-task performance. We performed a mixed ANOVA with the independent within-
subject variable modality compatibility (compatible vs. incompatible) and group (manual vs. 
oculomotor). For RT, this ANOVA revealed a significant effect of group, F(1, 30) = 24.43, p < 
.001, ηp² = .449, indicating faster RTs in in the vocal-oculomotor group (320ms) than in the 
symbolic vocal-manual group (390 ms). There was no significant main effect of modality 
compatibility, F(1, 30) = 3.02, p = .092, ηp² = .092, and no significant interaction between 
modality compatibility and group, F < 1. 
For PE, the same ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of group, F(1, 30) = 31.57, 
p < .001, ηp² = .513, indicating smaller PE in the vocal-manual group (2.2%) than in the vocal-
oculomotor group (5.9%). The effect of modality compatibility was not significant, F(1, 30) = 
3.93, p = .057, ηp² = .116, but the interaction was significant, F(1, 30) = 18.41, p < .001, ηp² = 
.380, showing that the effect of modality compatibility was even smaller in the symbolic vocal-
manual response group (-1.6%) compared to the vocal-oculomotor response group (4.2%). Thus, 
the effects of modality compatibility in single tasks cannot explain the effects in task switching. 
Task-switching performance. The same three-way ANOVA as in Experiment 1a was 
conducted to compare performance betweeen the vocal-oculomotor group (from Experiment 1a) 
and the symbolic vocal-manual group. The overall pattern of results was identical to that in 
Experiment 1a. Specifically, the effect of task transition on RTs was significant, F(1, 30) = 
203.35, p < .001, ηp² = .871, indicating higher RT on switches (504 ms) than on repetitions (432 
ms). There was also an effect of group, F(1, 30) = 23.99, p < .001, ηp² = .444, indicating longer 
RTs in the vocal-manual group than in the vocal-oculomotor group (512 ms vs. 424 ms). 
Crucially, the three-way interaction was significant, too, F(1, 30) = 5.71, p < .05, ηp² = .160. No 
other effect or interaction was significant (modality compatibility: F(1, 30) = 2.08, p = .16, ηp² = 
.065; interaction between modality compatibility and group: F(1, 30) = 3.15, p = .086, ηp² = 
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.095; interaction between task transition and modality compatibility: F(1, 30) = 1.65, p = .208, 
ηp² = .052; interaction between task transition and group: F(1, 30) = 1.2, p = .282, ηp² = .038; see 
Figure 1). 
A separate two-way ANOVA for the symbolic vocal-manual group revealed a significant 
effect of task transition, F(1, 15) = 74.23, p < .001, ηp² = .823, indicating higher RTs on switches 
(546 ms) than on repetitions (479 ms). The effect of modality compatibility was significant, too, 
F(1, 15) = 8.60, p < .05, ηp² = .363, indicating shorter RTs in compatible tasks than in 
incompatible tasks (501 ms vs. 523 ms). Importantly, the two-way interaction between task 
transition and modality compatibility was significant, F(1, 15) = 5.78, p < .05, ηp² = .278, 
indicating larger switch costs in incompatible tasks (86 ms) than in compatible tasks (48 ms), 
nicely confirming the modality compatibility effect in Experiment 1a (see Table 1). 
For PE, the three-way ANOVA revealed a significant effect of task transition, F(1, 30) = 
61.01, p < .001, ηp² = .670, indicating that mean PE was greater on switches (9.2%) than on 
repetitions (4.3%). There was also a main effect of group, F(1, 30) = 55.70, p < .001, ηp² = .650, 
indicating larger PE in the vocal-oculomotor response group than in the vocal-manual response 
group (11.1% vs. 2.4%). The two-way interaction between task transition and group was 
significant, too, F(1, 30) = 33.96, p > .001, ηp² = .531, indicating larger PE switch costs in the 
vocal-oculomotor group (8.6%) than in the symbolic vocal-manual group (1.2%). But neither the 
main effect of modality compatibility nor its interactions were significant [interaction of task 
transition and modality compatibility: F(1, 30) = 1.61, p = .215, ηp² = .051; all other Fs < 1]. As 
in Experiment 1a, there was a speed-accuracy trade-off concerning the main effect of group 
when comparing the vocal-oculomotor response group and the symbolic vocal-manual response 
group. However, note that this trade-off does not affect the interpretation of the theoretically 
significant three-way interaction indicating the substantial group difference regarding the 
modality compatibility effect. 
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A separate two-way ANOVA only for the symbolic vocal-manual group revealed a 
significant effect of task transition, F(1, 15) = 6.93, p < .05, ηp² = .316, indicating that mean PE 
was greater on switches (3.0%) than on repetitions (1.8%). Neither the main effect of modality 
compatibility, F(1, 15) = 1.314, p = .27, ηp² = .081, nor the interaction, F(1, 15) = 1.434, p = .25, 
ηp² = .087, was significant. 
We additionally conducted an analysis including both vocal-manual groups across 
experiments. Here we focus on effects of group. For RT in single-task blocks, the ANOVA 
revealed an effect of group, F(1, 30) = 13.50, p < .005, ηp² = .310, indicating faster RTs in the 
vocal-manual group (339 ms) than in the symbolic vocal-manual group (390 ms). The interaction 
of modality compatibility and group was not significant, F < 1. The same analysis for PE 
revealed no significant main effects [group: F < 1; modality compatibility: F(1, 30) = 1.03, p = 
.32, ηp² = .033], but the interaction was significant, F(1, 30) = 7.82, p < .01, ηp² = .207, showing 
that the effect of modality compatibility was slightly larger in the vocal-manual group (0.7%) 
than in the symbolic vocal-manual group (-1.6%). For RTs in the task-switching blocks, the 
critical interaction of task transition and modality compatibility was significant, F(1, 30) = 15.71, 
p < .001, ηp² = .344, indicating larger RT switch costs in incompatible tasks (90 ms) than in 
compatible tasks (53 ms), but this effect was not modulated by group, Fs< 1, and there were not 
other significant effects of group, Fs< 1. The same analysis for PE revealed, like for RT, no 
significant effect of the group variable, Fs < 1. Taken together, these results show that the 
change in imperative stimuli across experiment had no sizable effect on task-switching 
performance.  
Taken together, this additional analysis replicates the pattern of results found in 
Experiment 1a very well, including the critical three-way interaction. This strongly supports the 
conclusion that the absence of a modality compatibility effect on switch costs in the vocal-
oculomotor group was not due to differences in the type of visual stimuli.  
General Discussion 
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The present study was aimed at further examining the mechanisms behind the previously 
observed modality compatibility effects on switch costs in task switching by looking at the role 
of specific response modalities involved. To this end, we modified the task switching procedure 
from Stephan and Koch (2010) by additionally examining modality compatibility with 
oculomotor responses (in a vocal-oculomotor response group) as an alternative to the previously 
studied manual responses (in two variants of a vocal-manual response group). In Experiment 1a, 
the procedure in the vocal-manual group was identical to that in Stephan and Koch (2010). In 
Experiment 1b, the stimulus conditions in the vocal-manual group were made more comparable 
to those in the vocal-oculomotor group. 
While substantial switch costs were observed for all groups, the modality compatibility 
effect on switch costs was substantially greater in the vocal-manual response groups than in the 
vocal-oculomotor response group. Performance differences in single-task conditions cannot 
explain this differential pattern of results in task switching conditions. 
The substantial modality compatibility effect in the vocal-manual response groups 
replicates previous results (Stephan & Koch, 2010, 2011). To explain why specific modality 
bindings are compatible (e.g., VM and AV tasks) whereas others are not (e.g., VV and AM 
tasks), we reason that this may be due to usually experienced co-occurrences between modalities 
of responses and their typical sensory consequences (response-effect modality compatibility, see 
Stephan & Koch, 2010). Specifically, we argue that the prevalent tendency to bind stimuli in a 
certain stimulus modality to responses in the compatible response modality may need to be 
overcome when two incompatible tasks are combined. Thus, the conflict between preferred vs. 
required binding patterns may result in cross-talk on the level of central processing codes 
whenever two modality incompatible tasks are combined (Stephan & Koch, 2010, 2011). In 
single-task situations, however, the absence of ambiguity for the individual modality bindings 
may explain why no beneficial modality compatibility effects are observed in single tasks. 
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However, VO tasks did not elicit a modality compatibility effect despite the fact that 
oculomotor responses are always followed by visual changes at fixation location (e.g., Huestegge 
& Koch, 2010b) and despite the neurophysiologically tightly knit network of visuo-motor 
processing (e.g., Hutton, 2008; Isa & Yoshida, 2009; Munoz et al., 2007; Sweeney et al., 2007). 
Thus, in the vocal-oculomotor group the cross-talk mechanism referred to above does not seem 
to affect performance. A potential explanation for this finding may be derived from the 
comparison between performance in the tasks with manual and oculomotor response. In the 
condition with manual responses, there was a stronger performance advantage if stimuli were 
presented visually than when they were presented auditorily. In contrast, oculomotor 
performance was equally effective for both visual and auditory stimuli. Probably, the oculomotor 
system is unique in that it responds equally well to auditory and visual stimulation under certain 
conditions (e.g., Zambarbieri, 2002), so that in fact both VO and AO tasks could be considered 
modality compatible. This may be due to the importance to locate both visual and auditory cues 
for potential threats as fast as possible (in terms of a visual orientation response). In this way, 
both stimulus modalities were strongly bound to the oculomotor response modality. The 
exceptional strength of these bindings may have led to a relative shielding of the oculomotor 
response system from cross-talk in task switching settings. Specifically, since the modality 
compatibility effect only occurs when two modality incompatible tasks are combined (and not in 
single-task conditions), one would not expect a strong modality compatibility effect if only one 
of the two tasks involves a non-preferred modality pairing. 
Another potential explanation for the absence of the modality compatibility effect in the 
vocal-oculomotor group refers to the concept of response-effect modality compatibility (see 
above). Although saccades do result in the acquisition of new visual information at the fovea, the 
visual system is known to maintain perceptual stability over time, and thus the percept is 
integrated over multiple saccades (e.g., Bridgeman, Van der Hejiden, & Velichkovsky, 1994; 
Melcher & Colby, 2008). Therefore, it could be argued that individual saccades typically do not 
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result in a substantial change in the percept of a scene in general, even though new fixations may 
be targeted at different objects in a given scene. Thus, the cognitive system may have learned 
that oculomotor behaviour does not impact on the real world in the same way as manual 
responses, which can substantially influence the visual scene. These factors may additionally 
have contributed to the lack of a privileged route between visual stimulus and oculomotor 
response. 
Based on the results from Experiment 1a alone, one could have argued that the different 
types of visual stimuli between groups may potentially compromise the interpretation of group 
differences. In Experiment 1a, we designed the tasks in the vocal-manual response group in a 
way to ensure that we observe the same robust modality compatibility effect as found in previous 
studies (e.g., Stephan & Koch, 2010), which is an important precondition for a conclusive 
comparison with the new data from the vocal-oculomotor response group. Therefore, we decided 
against using the same visual stimuli in the vocal-oculomotor response group as in the vocal-
manual response group to make task requirements for manual and oculomotor tasks more 
comparable in terms of the mental processes involved: The onset of peripheral visual stimuli in 
the vocal-oculomotor response group would have resulted in quasi-automatic attention shifts, 
whereas the visual stimuli in the vocal-manual response group do not automatically trigger 
manual responses. In the present design, both manual and oculomotor responses involve a 
similar amount of mental transformation processes (e.g., mapping a tone on the left ear to a 
movement of the left index finger, and mapping the direction of an arrow to the direction of a 
saccade). However, Experiment 1b clearly showed that the same results emerged when stimuli 
were comparable across groups. The central arrows used for the vocal-manual group in 
Experiment 1b slowed down single-task RTs compared with the peripheral stimuli from 
Experiment 1a, an effect similar to that known from literature on central (or endogeneous) vs. 
peripheral (or exogeneous) cueing (e.g., Müller & Rabbitt, 1989; Posner, Snyder, & Davidson, 
1980). Importantly, however, the comparison across experiments demonstrated that this stimulus 
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change did not alter the result pattern in task switching conditions, while the change of response 
modalities (manual vs. oculomotor) yielded quite substantial effects. This finding further 
highlights the overall importance of modality pairings (compared with factors like stimulus type) 
for cognitive mechanisms during multitasking. 
In conclusion, preferred processing pathways (based on response-effect modality 
compatibility) may generally represent a basis for cross-talk effects whenever two modality 
incompatible tasks are combined. However, oculomotor responses appear to be shielded from 
this particular type of cross-talk. Accordingly, the modality compatibility effect appears to be 
strongly determined by the specific stimulus and response modalities and their characteristics, a 
finding that further supports the idea of modality-specific mechanisms in dual-task control. 
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Table 1 
Mean response times (RT) and % error (PE) for all response groups in Experiment 1a and 1b as a function of modality compatibility and task 
transiton. 
      Task transition     
          
      Single task   Repetition   Switch   Switch costs 
          
Experiment 1a 
     Vocal-oculomotor response group 
       
 
Incompatible 
       
  
RT 310 (46) 
 
387 (61) 
 
459 (55) 
 
72 
  
PE 8.1 (3.9) 
 
7.0 (7.3) 
 
16.6 (8.8) 
 
9.6 
          
 
Compatible 
       
  
RT 330 (46) 
 
383 (51) 
 
467 (59) 
 
84 
  
PE 3.8 (2.2) 
 
6.6 (3.9) 
 
14.1 (8.3) 
 
7.5 
                    
     Vocal-manual response group 
       
 
Incompatible 
       
  
RT 332 (36) 
 
460 (55) 
 
554 (72) 
 
94 
  
PE 2.1 (1.8) 
 
2.5 (2.7) 
 
4.4 (2.5) 
 
1.9 
          
 
Compatible 
       
  
RT 345 (45) 
 
452 (62) 
 
510 (71) 
 
58 
  
PE 1.4 (1.7) 
 
1.5 (1.8) 
 
3.3 (2.9) 
 
1.8 
                    
Experiment 1b  
     Vocal-manual response group  
       
 
Incompatible 
       
  
RT 386 (41) 
 
480 (56) 
 
566 (52) 
 
86 
  
PE 1.5 (1.4) 
 
1.8 (1.8) 
 
3.6 (3.4) 
 
1.8 
          
 
Compatible 
       
  
RT 393 (49) 
 
477 (55) 
 
525 (73) 
 
48 
  
PE 3.0 (2.5) 
 
1.8 (1.6) 
 
2.5 (1.9) 
 
0.7 
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Table 2 
Mean response times (RT) and % error (PE) for all response groups in Experiment 1a and 1b as a function of task transiton and modality 
compatibility for the individual tasks (SD in parenthesis). 
                              
 
      
  
         
                
   
Experiment 1a 
 
Experiment 1b 
      
  
          
   
Vocal-Oculomotor Response Group 
  
Vocal-Manual Response Group 
 
Vocal-Manual Response Group 
      
  
          
   
Repetition 
 
Switch 
  
Repetition 
 
Switch 
 
Repetition 
 
Switch 
   
  
M (SD) 
 
M (SD) 
 
  M (SD) 
 
M (SD) 
 
M (SD) 
 
M (SD) 
 RT             
 
              
 
 
Incompatible 
     
Incompatible 
       
 
VV 
 
482 (71) 
 
559 (70) 
 
VV 521 (76) 
 
602 (91) 
 
558 (70) 
 
624 (70) 
 
 
AO 
 
291 (62) 
 
359 (59) 
 
AM 399 (61) 
 
506 (64) 
 
403 (60) 
 
508 (59) 
  
                            
 
 
Compatible 
   
  
 
Compatible 
        
 
AV 
 
462 (80) 
 
557 (89) 
 
AV 538 (74) 
 
578 (83) 
 
560 (64) 
 
603 (88) 
 
 
VO 
 
305 (40) 
 
377 (57) 
 
VM 366 (62) 
 
442 (70) 
 
394 (61) 
 
447 (69) 
 
                              
 
PE 
    
  
          
 
Incompatible 
     
Incompatible 
       
 
VV 
 
11.7 (13.2) 
 
29.4 (18.2) 
 
VV .2 (.8) 
 
1.1 (1.5) 
 
.5 (1.5) 
 
2.5 (2.6) 
 
 
AO 
 
2.2 (3.1) 
 
3.8 (2.3) 
 
AM 4.8 (5.3) 
 
7.7 (4.7) 
 
3.0 (3.1) 
 
4.6 (5.6) 
  
                            
 
 
Compatible 
   
  
 
Compatible 
        
 
AV 
 
12.0 (7.6) 
 
25.9 (16.7) 
 
AV 1.2 (2.2) 
 
.9 (1.6) 
 
1.5 (1.9) 
 
1.4 (1.8) 
 
 
VO 
 
1.3 (2.9) 
 
2.4 (3.3) 
 
VM 1.9 (3.1) 
 
5.8 (5.4) 
 
2.2 (1.8) 
 
3.7 (3.2) 
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Figure 1. Mean response times (RT) for all response groups as a function of modality compatibility and task transition. 
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Figure 2. Mean response times (RT) in Experiment 1a for the visual-manual task, the auditory-manual task, the visual-oculomotor task and the 
auditory-oculomotor task as a function of stimulus modality and response modality. 
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